人性论：英汉对照典藏版

英休谟

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　　人性论：英汉对照典藏版/英休谟著.北京：北京中文在线数字出版股份有限公司，2009.10

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　　人性论：英汉对照典藏版

　　英 休谟　著

　　出 品 人：童之磊

　　责任编辑：朱厚权

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　　首次发布：2009.10.26

　　更新时间：2014.9.25

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　　出 版 社：陕西人民出版社

　　ISBN：978-7-224-08016-2

　　出版时间：2007.05.01

编者的话

在帝国主义国家以坚船利炮轰开中国大门之前，我们几乎还不知道有这样一种与我们迥异的人存在。他们与我们外貌不同，这让我们产生了种种仇恨的联想。我们视其为妖魔，用故老相传抵御妖魔的手段与之对抗。今日，我们难免会想，在当日的侵略者眼中，我们所采用的是否是一种巫术？以巫术对抗现代文明，难怪我们会一败涂地，只是当年，有多少志士空耗了血泪？

痛定思痛，有识之士开始思考，使东西方的发展差距如此之大，其根本原因何在？答案就是理性精神。

西方的理性精神源自古希腊，古希腊哲学中所谓的“爱智慧”，即体现了对理性的推崇。理性精神在西方持续发展，虽有中世纪的低迷，但在文艺复兴和启蒙时代后冲破了种种精神钳制，使西方爆发了真正意义上的思想革命。自此，人类对自身的理性产生了极大的信赖，人类理性代替上帝的意志成为“万物的尺度”。理性意识的高涨使人们重视现世人生价值，造就了自由进行创造的进取精神，使得西方无论在理论还是在实践上，都踏上了健康蓬勃的发展道路。

与西方重视个人价值与实践的理性精神相比，中国的传统思想太过于“内求于心”。我们所强调的个人体验与涵养缺乏思辨、超越、分析、实证，除了提升个人修养，为社会定制道德规范外，对社会实践并不具有指导意义。

这种东方式的精神，使得17、18世纪，当西方世界在理性精神指导下蒸蒸日上时，中国却陷入了柏杨先生所谓的“文化酱缸”之中，思想界是“一塌糊涂的污泥”，看不到些微的光芒。而相应的，科学与文化也只有承袭，难得创新。毋庸讳言，若无外力介入，强迫国人“睁眼看世界”，或许今日的中国，仍然以为自己处于不与外界通人烟的“桃花源”中呢！

回顾来路，感喟再三。为此，在《文思博要》首批十种获得良好的反响之后，我们又择取十种图书：《理想国》《乌托邦》《人性论》《权利意志》《菊花与刀》《人口原理》《艺术哲学》《宽容》《人类理解论》《伦理学》，汇为《文思博要》第二批，以馈读者。这十种图书为不同时代、不同文化领域的杰作，但都闪耀着西方理性精神的光芒。相信阅读之后，读者非但能在语言学习上更进一步，其思维的宽度与广度也将会得到极大的拓展。

大卫·休谟（David Hume，1711—1776），出生在苏格兰爱丁堡一个没落贵族家庭。这家人喜欢自称是古老的霍谟（Home）家庭的后裔。青少年时代，休谟聪敏有才，好读书（尤嗜维吉尔与西塞罗），很早就有志于思想与哲学。12岁进入爱丁堡大学学习法律，由于家庭原因而中途辍学，以后在家中自学，对哲学产生了强烈兴趣。1732年休谟刚满21岁就开始撰写他的代表作《人性论》。1734年，他东渡法国，继续进行哲学研究和著述。在法国期间，休谟完成了《人性论》，于1739年至1740年在英国分卷出版，但是无人问津，他曾经沮丧地说：“它从机器中一生出来就死了。”究其原因，在于一方面此时的休谟不过是一个无名之辈，另一方面他在书中所提出的一些问题是当时英国思想界还没有意识到的问题，当然还有宗教方面的原因。好在休谟天性豁达，很快便恢复了自信，他经过反省后认为《人性论》失败的主要原因是叙述不当，于是他将《人性论》第一卷“论人性”和第三卷“论道德”改写成《人类理解研究》和《道德原则研究》，分别于1748年和1751年出版，获得了广泛的影响。

休谟哲学所面临的问题与洛克甚至与笛卡尔也是一致的，那就是在知识真假难辨的情况下如何为之确定可靠的基础。他继承了洛克的思路，并且比洛克更加深入，主张解决问题的关键在于对“人性”的研究。在休谟看来，哲学就是研究人性的科学，因为人性乃是一切科学的“首都或心脏”，所有的科学都或直接或间接地与人性有关，在不同程度上依赖于人，因而“在我们没有熟悉这门科学之前，任何问题都不能得到确实的解决。”至于如何来研究人性，休谟明确指出：“关于人的科学是其他科学的唯一牢固的基础，而我们对这个科学本身所能给予的唯一牢固的基础又必须建立在经验和观察之上。”《人性论》有一个副标题“在精神科学中采用实验推理方法的一个尝试”，这表明休谟贯彻的是经验主义的方法和原则。我们从下面几个方面阐释一下休谟《人性论》一书的主要观点：

一、经验论的基本原则休谟认为知觉是知识的基本要素，包括感觉、情感、情绪、思维等所有的意识活动。知觉分为两类，一类是“印象”（impressions），一类是“观念”（ideas）。

按照休谟的观点，除了印象和观念之外，我们的知觉（不论印象或是观念）还有另一种区别，这就是简单与复合之间的区别。简单观念直接摹写简单印象，复合观念或是来自对复合印象的摹写，或是来自对简单观念的排列和组合。总而言之，一切观念或思想最终来源于印象即感觉经验。于是，休谟提出了“人性科学”的两条基本原则。

二、因果观

在17、18世纪哲学和科学之中，因果关系通常被看作是自然界中最普遍的客观规律，甚至被视为社会和人性的必然法则。休谟对此表示存疑：既然我们的知识实际上被局限在感觉经验之内，那么我们有什么根据将因果关系推溯到感觉之外去呢？它能否为我们的知识提供客观性和必然性的基础？于是，他深入研究了因果观念。

休谟认为人类理智的对象可以自然地分为两种，这就是“观念的关系”和“实际的事情”。与此相应，知识也分类两大类：一类是关于观念的知识，一类是关于事实的知识。

三、宗教怀疑论

从休谟第一部著作《人性论》到他的最后一部著作《自然对话录》，宗教问题始终是休谟思考的主要问题之一，而且他对宗教持怀疑论的态度。当然，休谟不是无神论者，他甚至认为无神论实际上是不可能的。这就是说，上帝的存在既不可能被证实，也不可能被否定。从这种怀疑论的立场出发，休谟批判了关于上帝存在的各种证明。

休谟的哲学在近代哲学史上第一个不可知论的西方哲学发展中起了很重要的作用，是19世纪在英国和其他西方国家广泛传播的实证主义思潮的直接先驱，也是现代逻辑经验主义、实用主义、分析哲学等许多流派的重要思想来源。

四、道德观

休谟的体系是先研究人性、研究心理，然后再讨论道德问题，是为了“避免前人的脆弱之处”，立足于“坚实性”基础上。一切科学都不同程度地关系到民生，并回到人性，都是人的科学。

休谟认为道德不是来源于理性，而是来自情感、道德感。道德的本质不在理性，而在感性。休谟还论述到道德价值的问题。他认为，道德区别所以有善恶关系，必然在于内心活动和外在对象之间的，道德判断不是来自事实本身，而是来自人的内心好恶。道德判断不是“是什么”，而是“应当怎样”，应该根据人的内心，而不是外

由于休谟在哲学史中有过这样长久而巨大的影响，所以他的主要著作《人性论》对于研究哲学的人以及一般要求稍稍了解他的观点的人来说，都有阅读的必要。

部世界。

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BOOK 1　Of the Understanding

PART 1　Of Ideas,Their Origin,Composition,Connexion,Abstraction,etc

SECT.1　Of the Origin of Our Ideas

All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds,which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS.The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness,with which they strike upon the mind,and make their way into our thought or consciousness.Those perceptions,which enter with most force and violence,we may name impressions：and under this name I comprehend all our sensations,passions and emotions,as they make their first appearance in the soul.By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning；such as,for in-stance,are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse,excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch,and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasi-ness it may occasion.I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in ex-plaining this distinction.Every one of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking.The common degrees of these are easily distinguished；though it is not impossible but in particular instances they may very nearly approach to each other.Thus in sleep,in a fever,in madness,or in any very violent emotions of soul,our ideas may approach to our impressions,As on the other hand it sometimes happens,that our impressions are so faint and low,that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas.But notwithstanding this near resemblance in a few instances,they are in general so very dif-ferent,that no-one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads,and assign to each a peculiar name to mark the difference.[1]

There is another division of our perceptions,which it will be convenient to observe,and which extends itself both to our impressions and ideas.This division is into SIMPLE and COMPLEX.Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation.The complex are the contrary to these,and may be distin-guished into parts.Though a particular colour,taste,and smell,are qualities all united together in this apple,it is easy to perceive they are not the same,but are at least dis-tinguishable from each other.

Having by these divisions given an order and arrangement to our objects,we may now apply ourselves to consider with the more accuracy their qualities and relations.The first circumstance,that strikes my eye,is the great resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every other particular,except their degree of force and vivacity.The one seem to be in a manner the reflexion of the other；so that all the perceptions of the mind are double,and appear both as impressions and ideas.When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber,the ideas I form are exact representations of the impressions I felt；nor is there any circumstance of the one,which is not to be found in the other.In running over my other perceptions,I find still the same resemblance and representation.Ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other.This circumstance seems to me remarkable,and engages my attention for a moment.

Upon a more accurate survey I find I have been carried away too far by the first ap-pearance,and that I must make use of the distinction of perceptions into simple and complex,to limit this general decision,that all our ideas and impressions are resemb-ling.I observe,that many of our complex ideas never had impressions,that correspon-ded to them,and that many of our complex impressions never are exactly copied in ide-as.I can imagine to myself such a city as the New Jerusalem,whose pavement is gold and walls are rubies,though I never saw any such.I have seen Paris；but shall I affirm I can form such an idea of that city,as will perfectly represent all its streets and houses in their real and just proportions？

I perceive,therefore,that though there is in general a great,resemblance betwixt our complex impressions and ideas,yet the rule is not universally true,that they are ex-act copies of each other.We may next consider how the case stands with our simple,perceptions.After the most accurate examination,of which I am capable,I venture to affirm,that the rule here holds without any exception,and that every simple idea has a simple impression,which resembles it,and every simple impression a correspondent i-dea.That idea of red,which we form in the dark,and that impression which strikes our eyes in sun-shine,differ only in degree,not in nature.That the case is the same with all our simple impressions and ideas,it is impossible to prove by a particular enumera-tion of them.

Thus we find,that all simple ideas and impressions resemble each other；and as the complex are formed from them,we may affirm in general,that these two species of perception are exactly correspondent.Having discovered this relation,which requires no farther examination,I am curious to find some other of their qualities.Let us consider how.they stand with regard to their existence,and which of the impressions and ideas are causes,and which effects.

The full examination of this question is the subject of the present treatise；and therefore we shall here content ourselves with establishing one general proposition,That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv d from simple impressions,which are correspondent to them,and which they exactly represent……

From this constant conjunction of resembling perceptions I immediately conclude,that there is a great connexion betwixt our correspondent impressions and ideas,and that the existence of the one has a considerable influence upon that of the other.Such a con-stant conjunction,in such an infinite number of instances,can never arise from chance；but clearly proves a dependence of the impressions on the ideas,or of the ideas on the impressions.That I may know on which side this dependence lies,I consider the order of their first appearance；and find by constant experience,that the simple impressions always take the precedence of their correspondent ideas,but never appear in the contra-ry order.The constant conjunction of our resembling perceptions,is a convincing proof,that the one are the causes of the other；and this priority of the impressions is an equal proof,that our impressions are the causes of our ideas,not our ideas of our,impres-sions.

To confirm this I consider another plain and convincing phenomenon；which is,that,where-ever by any accident the faculties,which give rise to any impressions,are obstructed in their operations,as when one is born blind or deaf；not only the impres-sions are lost,but also their correspondent ideas；so that there never appear in the mind the least traces of either of them.Nor is this only true,where the organs of sensation are entirely destroyed,but likewise where they have never been put in action to produce a particular impression.We cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine ap-ple,without having actually tasted it.

There is however one contradictory phenomenon,which may prove,that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent impressions.I believe it will readily be allowed that the several distinct ideas of colours,which enter by the eyes,or those of sounds,which are conveyed by the hearing,are really different from each other,though at the same time resembling.Now if this be true of different colours,it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour,that each of them pro-duces a distinct idea,independent

Suppose therefore a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years,and to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds,excepting one particular shade of blue,for instance,which it never has been his fortune to meet with.Let all the different shades of that colour,except that single one,be placed before him,descend-ing gradually from the deepest to the lightest；it is plain,that he will perceive a blank,where that shade is wanting,said will be sensible,that there is a greater distance in that place betwixt the contiguous colours,than in any other.Now I ask,whether it is possi-ble for him,from his own imagination,to supply this deficiency,and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade,though it had never been conveyed to him by his sen-ses？I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can；and this may serve as a proof,that the simple ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions；though the instance is so particular and singular,that it is scarce worth our observing,and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim.

But besides this exception,it may not be amiss to remark on this head,that the principle of the priority of impressions to ideas must be understood with another limita-tion,viz.，that as our ideas are images of our impressions,so we can form secondary i-deas,which are images of the primary；as appears from this very reasoning concerning them.This is not,properly speaking,an exception to the rule so much as an explan-ation of it.Ideas produce the images of themselves in new ideas；but as the first ideas are supposed to be derived from impressions,it still remains true,that all our simple i-deas proceed either mediately or immediately,from their correspondent impressions.

This then is the first principle I establish in the science of human nature；nor ought we to despise it because of the simplicity of its appearance.For it is remarkable,that the present question concerning the precedency of our impressions or ideas,is the same with what has made so much noise in other terms,when it has been disputed whether there be any innate ideas,or whether all ideas be derived from sensation and reflexion.

[1]I here make use of these terms,impression and idea,in a sense different from what is usual,and I hope this liberty will be allowed me.Perhaps I rather restore the word,idea,to its original sense,from which Mr.LOCKE had perverted it,in making it stand for all our perceptions.By the terms of impression I would not be understood to express the manner,in which our lively perceptions are produced in the soul,but merely the perceptions themselves；for which there is no particular name either in the English or any other language,that I know of.

of the rest.

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SECT.2　Division of the Subject

Since it appears,that our simple impressions are prior to their correspondent ideas,and that the exceptions are very rare,method seems to require we should examine our impressions,before we consider our ideas.Impressions way be divided into two kinds,those of SENSATION and those of REFLEXION.The first kind arises in the soul origi-nally,from unknown causes.The second is derived in a great measure from our ideas,and that in the following order.An impression first strikes upon the senses,and makes us perceive heat or cold,thirst or hunger,pleasure or pain of some kind or other.Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind,which remains after the impression ceases；and this we call an idea.This idea of pleasure or pain,when it returns upon the soul,produces the new impressions of desire and aversion,hope and fear,which may properly be called impressions of reflexion,because derived from it.These again are copied by the memory and imagination,and become ideas；which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas.So that the impressions of reflexion are only an-tecedent to their correspondent ideas；but posterior to those of sensation,and derived from them.The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral；and therefore shall not at present be entered upon.And as the impressions of reflexion,viz.passions,desires,and emotions,which principally deserve our attention,arise mostly from ideas,it will be necessary to reverse that meth-od,which at first sight seems most natural；and in order to explain the nature and prin-ciples of the human mind,give a particular account of ideas,before we proceed to im-pressions.For this reason I have here chosen to begin with ideas.

SECT.3　Of the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination

We find by experience,that when any impression has been present with the mind,it again makes its appearance there as an idea；and this it may do after two different ways：either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vi-vacity,and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea：or when it en-tirely loses that vivacity,and is a perfect idea.The faculty,by which we repeat our im-pressions in the first manner,is called the MEMORY,and the other the IMAGINA-TION.tis evident at first sight,that the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination,and that the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours,than any which are employed by the latter.When we remember any past event,the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner；whereas in the imagination the perception is faint and languid,and cannot without difficulty be pre-served by the mind steddy and uniform for any considerable time.Here then is a sensi-ble difference betwixt one species of ideas and another.But of this more fully hereaf-ter.[1]

There is another difference betwixt these two kinds of ideas,which is no less evi-dent,namely that though neither the ideas,of the memory nor imagination,neither the lively nor faint ideas can make their appearance in the mind,unless their correspondent impressions have gone before to prepare the way for them,yet the imagination is not re-strained to the same order and form with the original impressions；while the memory is in a manner tied down in that respect,without any power of variation.

An historian may,perhaps,for the more convenient Carrying on of his narration,relate an event before another,to which it was in fact posterior；but then he takes notice of this disorder,if he be exact；and by that means replaces the idea in its due position.The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas,but their order and position.

The same evidence follows us in our second principle,of the liberty of the imagina-tion to transpose and changes its ideas.The fables we meet with in poems and romances put this entirely out of the question.Nature there is totally confounded,and nothing mentioned but winged horses,fiery dragons,and monstrous giants.Nor will this liberty of the fancy appear strange,when we consider,that all our ideas are copy d from our impressions,and that there are not any two impressions which are perfectly inseparable.Not to mention,that this is an evident consequence of the division of ideas into simple and complex.Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas,it can easily produce a separation.

[1]Part II,Sect.5.

SECT.4　Of the Connexion or Association of Ideas

Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected,chance alone would join them；and it is impossible the same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones（as they Commonly do）without some bond of union among them,some associating quality,by which one idea naturally introduces another.This uniting principle among ideas is not to be considered as an inseparable connexion；for that has been already excluded from the imagination：Nor yet are we to conclude,that without it the mind cannot join two ideas；for nothing is more free than that faculty：but we are only to regard it as a gentle force,which commonly prevails,and is the cause why,among other things,languages so near-ly correspond to each other；nature in a manner pointing out to every one those simple i-deas,which are most proper to be united in a complex one.The qualities,from which this association arises,and by which the mind is after this manner convey d from one i-dea to another,are three,viz.RESEMBLANCE,CONTIGUITY in time or place,and CAUSE and EFFECT.

I believe it will not be very necessary to prove,that these qualities produce an as-sociation among ideas,and upon the appearance of one idea naturally introduce another.It is plain,that in the course of our thinking,and in the constant revolution of our ide-as,our imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that resembles it,and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and association.It is likewise evident that as the senses,in changing their objects,are necessitated to change them regularly,and take them as they lie CONTIGUOUS to each other,the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking,and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects.As to the connexion,that is made by the relation of cause and effect,we shall have occasion afterwards to examine it to the bottom,and therefore shall not at present insist upon it.It is sufficient to observe,that there is no relation,which produces a stronger connexion in the fancy,and makes one idea more readily recall an-other,than the relation of cause and effect betwixt their objects.

Of the three relations above-mention d this of causation is the most extensive.Two objects may be considered as placed in this relation,as well when one is the cause of any of the actions or motions of the other,as when the former is the cause of the exist-ence of the latter.For as that action or motion is nothing but the object itself,consid-ered in a certain light,and as the object continues the same in all its different situa-tions,it is easy to imagine how such an influence of objects upon one another may con-nect them in the imagination.

We may carry this farther,and remark,not only that two objects are connected by the relation of cause and effect,when the one produces a motion or any action in the other,but also when it has a power of producing it.And this we may observe to be the source of all the relation,of interest and duty,by which men influence each other in so-ciety,and are placed in the ties of government and subordination.A master is such-a-one as by his situation,arising either from force or agreement,has a power of direc-ting in certain particulars the actions of another,whom we call servant.When a person is possessed of any power,there is no more required to convert it into action,but the exertion of the will；and that in every case is considered as possible,and in many as probable；especially in the case of authority,where the obedience of the subject is a pleasure and advantage to the superior.

These are therefore the principles of union or cohesion among our simple ideas,and in the imagination supply the place of that inseparable connexion,by which they are u-nited in our memory.Here is a kind of ATTRACTION,which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural,and to shew itself in as many and as various forms.Its effects are every where conspicuous；but as to its causes,they are mostly unknown,and must be resolved into original qualities of human nature,which I pretend not to explain.

Amongst the effects of this union or association of ideas,there are none more re-markable,than those complex ideas,which are the common subjects of our thoughts and reasoning,and generally arise from some principle of union among our simple ideas.These complex ideas may be divided into Relations,Modes,and Substances.We shall briefly examine each of these in order,and shall subjoin some considerations concerning our general and particular ideas,before we leave the present subject,which may be considered as the elements of this philosophy.

SECT.5　Of relations

The word RELATION is commonly used in two senses considerably different fromeach other.Either for that quality,by which two ideas are connected together in the i-magination,and the one naturally introduces the other,after the manner above-ex-plained：or for that particular circumstance,in which,even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy,we may think proper to compare them.In common language the former is always the sense,in which we use the word,relation；and it is only in philoso-phy,that we extend it to mean any particular subject of comparison,without a connect-ing principle.Thus distance will be allowed by philosophers to be a true relation,be-cause we acquire an idea of it by the comparing of objects：But in a common way we say,that nothing can be more distant than such or such things from each other,nothing can have less relation；as if distance and relation were incompatible.

It may perhaps be esteemed an endless task to enumerate all those qualities,which make objects admit of comparison,and by which the ideas of philosophical relation are produced.But if we diligently consider them,we shall find that without difficulty they may be comprised under seven general heads,which may be considered as the sources of all philosophical relation.

1.The first is resemblance：And this is a relation,without which no philosophical relation can exist；since no objects will admit of comparison,but what have some degree of resemblance.But though resemblance be necessary to all philosophical relation,it does not follow,that it always produces a connexion or association of ideas.When a quality becomes very general,and is common to a great many individuals,it leads not the mind directly to any one of them；but by presenting at once too great a choice,does thereby prevent the imagination from fixing on any single object.

2.Identity may be esteem d a second species of relation.This relation I here con-sider as apply d in its strictest sense to constant and unchangeable objects；without ex-amining the nature and foundation of personal identity,which shall find its place after-wards.Of all relations the most universal is that of identity,being common to every be-ing whose existence has any duration.

3.After identity the most universal and comprehensive relations are those of Space and Time,which are the sources of an infinite number of comparisons,such as distant,contiguous,above,below,before,after,etc.

4.All those objects,which admit of quantity,or number,may be compared in that particular；which is another very fertile source of relation.

5.When any two objects possess the same quality in common,the degrees,in which they possess it,form a fifth species of relation……

6.The relation of contrariety may at first sight be regarded as an exception to the rule,that no relation of any kind can subsist without some degree of resemblance.But let us consider,that no two ideas are in themselves contrary,except those of existence and non-existence,which are plainly resembling,as implying both of them an idea of the object；though the latter excludes the object from all times and places,in which it is supposed not to exist.

7.All other objects,such as fire and water,heat and cold,are only found to be contrary from experience,and from the contrariety of their causes or effects；which rela-tion of cause and effect is a seventh philosophical relation,as well as a natural one.The resemblance implied in this relation,shall be explained afterwards.

It might naturally be expected,that I should join difference to the other relations.But that I consider rather as a negation of relation,than as anything real or positive.Difference is of two kinds as oppos d either to identity or resemblance.The first is called a difference of number；the other of kind.

SECT.6　Of Modes and Substances

The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode,is nothing but a collection of Simple ideas,that are united by the imagination,and have a particular name assigned them,by which we are able to recall,either to ourselves or others,that collection.But the difference betwixt these ideas consists in this,that the particular qualities,which form a substance,are commonly refer d to an unknown something,in which they are supposed to inhere；or granting this fiction should not take place,are at least supposed to be closely and inseparably connected by the relations of contiguity and causation.The effect of this is,that whatever new simple quality we discover to have the same connex-ion with the rest,we immediately comprehend it among them,even though it did not en-ter into the first conception of the substance.Thus our idea of gold may at first be a yellow colour,weight,malleableness,fusibility；but upon the discovery of its dissolu-bility in aqua regia,we join that to the other qualities,and suppose it to belong to the substance as much as if its idea had from the beginning made a part of the compound one.The principle of union being regarded as the chief part of the complex idea,gives entrance to whatever quality afterwards occurs,and is equally comprehended by it,as are the others,which first presented themselves.

That this cannot take place in modes,is evident from considering their nature.The simple ideas of which modes are formed,either represent qualities,which are not united by contiguity and causation,but are dispersed in different subjects；or if they be all u-nited together,the uniting principle is not regarded as the foundation of the complex ide-a.The idea of a dance is an instance of the first kind of modes；that of beauty of the second.The reason is obvious,why such complex ideas cannot receive any new idea,without changing the name,which distinguishes the mode.

SECT.7　Of Abstract Ideas

A very material question has been started concerning abstract or general ideas,whether they be general or particular in the mind s conception of them.A great philoso-pher（Dr.Berkeley）has disputed the received opinion in this particular,and has asser-ted,that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones,annexed to a certain term,which gives them a more extensive signification,and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals,which are similar to them.As I look upon this to be one of the grea-test and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of let-ters,I shall here endeavour to confirm it by some arguments,which I hope will put it beyond all doubt and controversy.

It is evident,that in forming most of our general ideas,if not all of them,we ab-stract from every particular degree of quantity and quality,and that an object ceases not to be of any particular species on account of every small alteration in its extension,dura-tion and other properties.It may therefore be thought,that here is a plain dilemma,that decides concerning the nature of those abstract ideas,which have afforded so much speculation to philosophers.The abstract idea of a man represents men of all sizes and all qualities；which it is concluded it cannot do,but either by representing at once all possible sizes and all possible qualities,or by,representing no particular one at all.Now it having been esteemed absurd to defend the former proposition,as implying an in-finite capacity in the mind,it has been commonly inferred in favour of the latter：and our abstract ideas have been supposed to represent no particular degree either of quantity or quality.But that this inference is erroneous,I shall endeavour to make appear,first,by proving,that it is utterly impossible to conceive any quantity or quality,without forming a precise notion of its degrees：And secondly by showing,that though the ca-pacity of the mind be not infinite,yet we can at once form a notion of all possible de-grees of quantity and quality,in such a manner at least,as,however imperfect,may serve all the purposes of reflection and conversation.

To begin with the first proposition,that the mind cannot form any notion of quantity without forming a precise notion of degrees of each；we may prove this by the three fol-lowing arguments.First,We have observed,that whatever objects are different are dis-tinguishable,and that whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination.And we may here add,that these propositions are equally true in the inverse,and that whatever objects are separable are also distinguishable,and that what-ever objects are distinguishable,are also different.In order therefore to know,whether abstraction implies a separation,we need only consider it in this view,and examine,whether all the circumstances,which we abstract from in our general ideas,be such as are distinguishable and different from those,which we retain as essential parts of them.They are consequently conjoined with each other in the conception；and the general idea of a.line,notwithstanding all our abstractions and refinements,has in its appearance in the mind a precise degree of quantity and quality；however it may be made to represent others,which have different degrees of both.

Secondly,Itisconfest,that no object can appear to the senses；or in other words,that no impression can become present to the mind,without being determined in its de-grees both of quantity and quality……

Thirdly,it is a principle generally received in philosophy that everything in nature is individual,and that it is utterly absurd to suppose a triangle really existent,which has no precise proportion of sides and angles.The image in the mind is only that of a particular object,though the application of it in our reasoning be the same,as if it were universal……

This application of ideas beyond their nature proceeds from our collecting all their possible degrees of quantity and quality in such an imperfect manner as may serve the purposes of life,which is the second proposition I proposed to explain.When we have found a resemblance among several objects,that often occur to us,we apply the same name to all of them,whatever differences we may observe in the degrees of their quantity and quality,and whatever other differences may appear among them.The word raises up an individual idea,along with a certain custom；and that custom produces any other individual one,for which we may have occasion.But as the production of all the ideas,to which the name may be applied,is in most cases impossible,we abridge that work bya more partial consideration,and find but few inconveniences to arise in our reasoning from that abridgment.

For this is one of the most extraordinary circumstances in the present affair,that af-ter the mind has produced an individual idea,upon which we reason,the attendant cus-tom,revived by the general or abstract term,readily suggests any other individual,if by chance we form any reasoning,that agrees not with it……

Nay so entire is the custom,that the very same idea may be annex to several differ-ent words,and may be employed in different reasonings,without any danger of mistake.Thus the idea of an equilateral triangle of an inch perpendicular may serve us in talking of a figure,of a rectilinear figure,of a regular figure,of a triangle,and of an equilater-al triangle……

That we may fix the meaning of the word,figure,we may revolve in our mind the i-deas of circles,squares,parallelograms,triangles of different sizes and proportions,and may not rest on one image or idea.However this may be,it is certain that we form the idea of individuals,whenever we use any general term；that we seldom or never can ex-haust these individuals；and that those,which remain,are only represented by means of that habit,by which we recall them,whenever any present occasion requires it.This then is the nature of our abstract ideas and general terms；and it is after this manner we account for the foregoing paradox,that some ideas are particular in their nature,but general in their representation.A particular idea becomes general by being annexed to a general term；that is,to a term,which from a customary conjunction has a relation to many other particular ideas,and readily recalls them in the imagination.

First then I observe,that when we mention any great number,such as a thousand,the mind has generally no adequate idea of it,but only a power of producing such an i-dea,by its adequate idea of the decimals,under which the number is comprehended.This imperfection,however,in our ideas,is never felt in our reasonings；which seems to be an instance parallel to the present one of universal ideas.

Secondly,we have several instances of habits,which may be revived by one single word；as when a person,who has by rote any periods of a discourse,or any number of verses,will be put in remembrance of the whole,which he is at a loss to recollect,by that single word or expression,with which they begin.

Thirdly,I believe every one,who examines the situation of his mind in reasoning will agree with me,that we do not annex distinct and complete ideas to every term wemake use of,and that in talking of government,church,negotiation,conquest,we sel-dom spread out in our minds all the simple ideas,of which these complex ones are com-posed.It is however observable,that notwithstanding this imperfection we may avoid talking nonsense on these subjects,and may perceive any repugnance among the ideas,as well as if we had a full comprehension of them.Thus if instead of saying,that in war the weaker have always recourse to negotiation,we should say,that they have always re-course to conquest,the custom,which we have acquired of attributing certain relations to ideas,still follows the words,and makes us immediately perceive the absurdity of that

Fourthly，……Nothing is more admirable,than the readiness,with which the imagi-nation suggests its ideas,and presents them at the very instant,in which they become necessary or useful.The fancy runs from one end of the universe to the other in collec-ting those ideas,which belong to any subject.One would think the whole intellectual world of ideas was at once subjected to our view,and that we did nothing but pick out such as were most proper for our purpose……

Before I leave this subject I shall employ the same principles to explain that distinc-tion of reason,which is so much talked of,and is so little understood,in the schools.Of this kind is the distinction betwixt figure and the body figured；motion and the body moved.The difficulty of explaining this distinction arises from the principle above ex-plained,that all ideas,which are different,are separable.For it follows from thence,that if the figure be different from the body,their ideas must be separable as well as dis-tinguishable：if they be not different,their ideas can neither be separable nor distin-guishable.What then is meant by a distinction of reason,since it implies neither a difference nor separation？

To remove this difficulty we must have recourse to the foregoing explication of ab-stract ideas.It is certain that the mind would never have dreamed of distinguishing a fig-ure from the body figured,as being in reality neither distinguishable,nor different,nor separable.Thus when a globe of white marble is presented,we receive only the impres-sion of a white colour disposed in a certain form,nor are we able to separate and distin-guish the colour from the form.But observing afterwards a globe of black marble and a cube of white,and comparing them with our former object,we find two separate resem-blances,in what formerly seemed,and really is,perfectly inseparable.After a little more practice of this kind,we begin to distinguish the figure from the colour by a dis-tinction of reason.When we would consider only the figure of the globe of white marble,we form in reality an idea both of the figure and colour,but tacitly carry our eye to its resemblance with the globe of black marble：And in the same manner,when we would consider its colour only,we turn our view to its resemblance with the cube of white mar-ble.By this means we accompany our ideas with a kind of reflection,of which custom renders us,in a great measure,insensible.A person,who desires us to consider the figure of a globe of white marble without thinking on its colour,desires an impossibility but his meaning is,that we should consider the figure and colour together,but still keep in our eye the resemblance to the globe of black marble,or that to any other globe of whatever colour or substance.

propos ition.

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PART 2　Of the Ideas of Space and Time

SECT.1　Of the Infinite Divisibility of Our Ideas of Space and Time

Whatever has the air of a paradox,and is contrary to the first and most unpreju-diced notions of mankind,is often greedily embraced by philosophers,as shewing the superiority of their science,which cou d discover opinions so remote from vulgar concep-tion.On the other hand,anything proposed to us,which causes surprize and admira-tion,gives such a satisfaction to the mind,that it indulges itself in those agreeable emo-tions,and will never be persuaded that its pleasure is entirely without foundation.From these dispositions in philosophers and their disciples arises that mutual complaisance be-twixt them；while the former furnish such plenty of strange and unaccountable opinions,and the latter so readily believe them.Of this mutual complaisance I cannot give a more evident instance than in the doctrine of infinite divisibility,with the examination of which I shall begin this subject of the ideas of space and time.

It is universally allowed,that the capacity of the mind is limited,and can never at-tain a full and adequate conception of infinity.In rejecting the infinite capacity of the mind,we suppose it may arrive at an end in the division of its ideas；nor are there any possible means of evading the evidence of this conclusion.

It is therefore certain,that the imagination reaches a minimum,and may raise up to itself an idea,of which it cannot conceive any sub-division,and which cannot be diminished without a total annihilation.

It is the same case with the impressions of the senses as with the ideas of the imagi-nation.Put a spot of ink upon paper,fix your eye upon that spot,and retire to such a distance,that,at last you lose sight of it；it is plain,that the moment before it vanished the image or impression was perfectly indivisible.

We may hence discover the error of the common opinion,that the capacity of the mind is limited on both sides,and that it is impossible for the imagination to form an ad-equate idea,of what goes beyond a certain degree of minuteness as well as of greatness.Nothing can be more minute,than some ideas,which we form in the fancy；and ima-ges,which appear to the senses；since there are ideas and images perfectly simple and indivisible.The only defect of our senses is,that they give us disproportioned images of things,and represent as minute and uncompounded what is really great and composed of a vast number of parts.

SECT.2　Of the Infinite Divisibility of Space and Time

Every thing capable of being infinitely divided contains an infinite number of parts；otherwise the division would be stopt short by the indivisible parts,which we should im-mediately arrive at.If therefore any finite extension be infinitely divisible,it can be no contradiction to suppose,that a finite extension contains an infinite number of parts：And vice versa,if it be a contradiction to suppose,that a finite extension contains an in-finite number of parts,no finite extension can be infinitely divisible.But that this latter supposition is absurd,I easily convince myself by the consideration of my clear ideas.Upon the whole,I conclude,that the idea of all infinite number of parts is individually the same idea with that of an infinite extension；that no finite extension is capable of containing an infinite number of parts；and consequently that no finite extension is infi-nitely divisible.

I may subjoin another argument proposed by a noted author[1]，which seems to me very strong and beautiful.It is evident,that existence in itself belongs only to unity,and is never applicable to number,but on account of the unites,of which the number is composed.Twenty men may be said to exist；but it is only because one,two,three,four，＆c.are existent,and if you deny the existence of the latter,that of the former falls of course.It is therefore utterly absurd to suppose any number to exist,and yet de-ny the existence of unites.That term of unity is merely a fictitious denomination,which the mind may apply to any quantity of objects it collects together；nor can such an unity any more exist alone than number can,as being in reality a true number.

All this reasoning takes place with regard to time.It is a property inseparable from time,and which in a manner constitutes its essence,that each of its parts succeeds an-other,and that none of them,however contiguous,can ever be co-existent.For the same reason,that the year 1737 cannot concur with the present year 1738，every mo-ment must be distinct from,and posterior or antecedent to another.

The infinite divisibility of space implies that of time,as is evident from the nature of motion.If the latter,therefore,be impossible,the former must be equally so.

Here we may observe,that nothing can be more absurd,than this custom of calling a difficulty what pretends to be a demonstration,and endeavouring by that means to e-lude its force and evidence.It is not in demonstrations as in probabilities,that difficul-ties can take place,and one argument counter-ballance another,and diminish its au-thority.A demonstration,if just,admits of no opposite difficulty；and if not just,it is a mere sophism,and consequently can never be a difficulty.

It is an established maxim in metaphysics,That whatever the mind clearly con-ceives,includes the idea of possible existence,or in other words,that nothing we imag-ine is absolutely impossible.We can form the idea of a golden mountain,and from thence conclude that such a mountain may actually exist.We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley,and therefore regard it as impossible.

Now it is certain we have an idea of extension；for otherwise why do we talk and reason concerning it？It is likewise certain that this idea,as conceived by the imagina-tion,though divisible into parts or inferior ideas,is not infinitely divisible,nor consists of an infinite number of parts：for that exceeds the comprehension of our limited capaci-ties.

[1]Mons.Malezieu.

SECT.3　Of the Other Qualities of Our Idea of Space and Time

Upon opening my eyes,and turning them to the surrounding objects,I perceive many visible bodies；and upon shutting them again,and considering the distance be-twixt these bodies,I acquire the idea of extension.As every idea is derived from some impression,which is exactly similar to it,the impressions similar to this idea of exten-sion,must either be some sensations derived from the sight,or some internal impres-sions arising from these sensations.

The table before me is alone sufficient by its view to give me the idea of extension.Suppose that in the extended object,or composition of coloured points,from which we first received the idea of extension,the points were of a purple colour；it follows,that in every repetition of that idea we would not only place the points in the same order with re-spect to each other,but also bestow on them that precise colour,with which alone we are acquainted.But afterwards having experience of the other colours of violet,green,red,white,black,and of all the different compositions of these,and finding a resem-blance in the disposition of coloured points,of which they are composed,we omit the peculiarities of colour,as far as possible,and found an abstract idea merely on that dis-position of points,or manner of appearance.

As it is from the disposition of visible and tangible objects we receive the idea of space,so from the succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea of time,nor is it possible for time alone ever to make its appearance,or be taken notice of by the mind.A man in a sound sleep,or strongly occupy d with one thought,is insensible of time；and according as his perceptions succeed each other with greater or less rapidity,the same duration appears longer or shorter to his imagination……Wherever we have no successive perceptions,we have no notion of time,From these phenomena,as well as from many others,we may conclude,that time cannot make its appearance to the mind,either alone,or attended with a steady unchangeable object,but is always dis-covered some PERCEIVABLE succession of changeable objects.

Having therefore found,that time in its first appearance to the mind is always con-joined with a succession of changeable objects,and that otherwise it can never fall under our notice,we must now examine whether it can be conceived without our conceiving any succession of objects,and whether it can alone form a distinct idea in the imagina-tion.

The idea of time is not derived from a particular impression mixed up with others,and plainly distinguishable from them；but arises altogether from the manner,in which impressions appear to the mind,without making one of the number.The ideas of some objects it certainly must have,nor is it possible for it without these ideas ever to arrive at any conception of time；which since it,appears not as any primary distinct impression,can plainly be nothing but different ideas,or impressions,or objects disposed in a cer-tain manner,that is,succeeding each other.

There is another very decisive argument,which establishes the present doctrineconcerning our ideas of space and time,and is founded only on that simple principle,that our ideas of them are compounded of parts,which are indivisible.This argument may be worth the examining.

The idea of space is conveyed to the mind by two senses,the sight and touch；nor does anything ever appear extended,that is not either visible or tangible.That com-pound impression,which represents extension,consists of several lesser impressions,that are indivisible to the eye or feeling,and may be called impressions of atoms or cor-puscles endowed with colour and solidity.But this is not all.It is not only requisite,that these atoms should be coloured or tangible,in order to discover themselves to our senses；it is also necessary we should preserve the idea of their colour or tangibility in order to comprehend them by our imagination.There is nothing but the idea of their col-our or tangibility,which can render them conceivable by the mind.Upon the removal of the ideas of these sensible qualities,they are utterly annihilated to the thought or imagi-nation.

Now such as the parts are,such is the whole.If a point be not considered as col-oured or tangible,it can convey to us no idea；and consequently the idea of extension,which is composed of the ideas of these points,can never possibly exist.But if the idea of extension really can exist,as we are conscious it does,its parts must also exist；and in order to that,must be considered as coloured or tangible.We have therefore no idea of space or extension,but when we regard it as an object either of our sight or feeling.

The same reasoning will prove,that the indivisible moments of time must be filled with some real object or existence,whose succession forms the duration,and makes it be conceivable by the mind.

SECT.4　Of the Idea of Existence,and of External Existence

It may not be amiss,before we leave this subject,to explain the ideas of existence and of external existence；which have their difficulties,as well as the ideas of space and time.By this means we shall be the better prepared for the examination of knowledge and probability,when we understand perfectly all those particular ideas,which may en-ter into our reasoning.

There is no impression nor idea of any kind,of which we have any consciousness or memory,that is not conceived as existent；and it is evident,that from this conscious-ness the most perfect idea and assurance of being is derived.From hence we may form adilemma,the most clear and conclusive that can be imagined,viz.that since we never remember any idea or impression without attributing existence to it,the idea of existence must either be derived from a distinct impression,conjoined with every perception or ob-ject of our thought,or must be the very same with the idea of the perception or object.

As this dilemma is an evident consequence of the principle,that every idea arises from a similar impression,so our decision betwixt the propositions of the dilemma is no more doubtful.so far from there being any distinct impression,attending every impres-sion and every idea,that I do not think there are any two distinct impressions,which are inseparably conjoined.Though certain sensations may at one time be united,we quickly find they admit of a separation,and may be presented apart.And thus,though every impression and idea we remember be considered as existent,the idea of existence is not derived from any particular impression.

The idea of existence,then,is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent.To reflect on any thing simply,and to reflect on it as existent,are nothing different from each other.That idea,when conjoined with the idea of any object,makes no addition to it.Whatever we conceive,we conceive to be existent.Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being；and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form.

Our foregoing reasoning[1]concerning the distinction of ideas without any real differ-ence will not here serve us in any stead.That kind of distinction is founded on the dif-ferent resemblances,which the same simple idea may have to several different ideas.But no object can be presented resembling some object with respect to its existence,and different from others in the same particular；since every object,that is presented,must necessarily be existent.

A like reasoning will account for the idea of external existence.We may observe,that it is universally allowed by philosophers,and is besides pretty obvious of itself,that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas,and that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion.To hate,to love,to think,to feel,to see；all this is nothing but to perceive.

Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions,and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind；it follows,that it is imp-ossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions.Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possi-ble：Let us chase our imagination to the heavens,or to the utmost limits of the universe；we never really advance a step beyond ourselves,nor can conceive any kind of exist-ence,but those perceptions,which have appeared in that narrow compass.This is the universe of the imagination,nor have we any idea but what is there produced.

The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects,when supposed specifically different from our perceptions,is to form a relative idea of them,without pretending to comprehend the related objects.Generally speaking we do not suppose them specifically different；but only attribute to them different relations,connections and durations.But of this more fully hereafter.[2]

[1]Part I.Sect.7.

[2]Part IV,Sect.2.

PART 3　Of Knowledge and Probability

SECT.1　Of Knowledge

There are seven[1]different kinds of philosophical relation,viz.resemblance,iden-tity,relations of time and place,proportion in quantity or number,degrees in any quali-ty,contrariety,and causation.These relations may be divided into two classes；into such as depend entirely on the ideas,which we compare together,and such as may be changed without any change in the ideas.It is from the idea of a triangle,that we dis-cover the relation of equality,which its three angles bear to two right ones；and this re-lation is invariable,as long as our idea remains the same.On the contrary,the relations of contiguity and distance betwixt two objects may be changed merely by an alteration of their place,without any change on the objects themselves or on their ideas；and the place depends on a hundred different accidents,which cannot be foreseen by the mind.It is the same case with identity and causation.Two objects,though perfectly resembling each other,and even appearing in the same place at different times,may be numerically different：And as the power,by which one object produces another,is never discover-able merely from their idea,it is evident cause and effect are relations,of which we re-ceive information from experience,and not from any abstract reasoning or reflection.There is no single phenomenon,even the most simple,which can be accounted for from the qualities of the objects,as they appear to us；or which we could foresee without the help of our memory and experience.

It appears,therefore,that of these seven philosophical relations,there remain only four,which depending solely upon ideas,can be the objects of knowledge said certain-ty.These four are resemblance,contrariety,degrees in quality,and proportions in quantity or number.Three of these relations are discoverable at first sight,and fall more properly under the province of intuition than demonstration.When any objects resemble each other,the resemblance will at first strike the eye,or rather the mind；and seldom requires a second examination.The case is the same with contrariety,and with the de-grees of any quality.We might proceed,after the same manner,in fixing the propor-tions of quantity or number,and might at one view observe a superiority or inferiority betwixt any numbers,or figures；especially where the difference is very great and re-markable.

There,remain,therefore,algebra and arithmetic as the only sciences,in which we can carry on a chain of reasoning to any degree of intricacy,and yet preserve a perfect exactness and certainty.When two numbers are so combined,as that the one has always an unite answering to every unite of the other,we pronounce them equal；and it is for want of such a standard of equality in extension,that geometry can scarce be esteemed a perfect and infallible science.

[1]Part I.Sect.5.

SECT.2　Of Probability,and of the Idea of Cause and Effect

This is all I think necessary to observe concerning those four relations,which are the foundation of science；but as to the other three,which depend not upon the idea,and may be absent or present even while that remains the same,it will be proper to ex-plain them more particularly.These three relations are identity,the situations in time and place,and causation.

All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a comparison,and a discovery of those relations,either constant or inconstant,which two or more objects bear to each other.When both the objects are present to the senses along with the relation,we call this per-ception rather than reasoning；nor is there in this case any exercise of the thought,or any action,properly speaking,but a mere passive admission of the impressions through the organs of sensation.According to this way of thinking,we ought not to receive as reasoning any of the observations we may make concerning identity,and the relations of time and place；since in none of them the mind can go beyond what is immediately pres-ent to the senses,either to discover the real existence or the relations of objects.It is only causation,which produces such a connexion,as to give us assurance from the ex-istence or action of one object,that it was followed or preceded by any other existence or action；nor can the other two relations be ever made use of in reasoning,except so far as they either affect or are affected by it.The same reasoning extends to identity.But this conclusion beyond the impressions of our senses can be founded only on the connexion of cause and effect；nor can we otherwise have any security,that the object is not changed upon us,however much the new object may resemble that which was formerly present to the senses.

Here then it appears,that of those three relations,which depend not upon the mere ideas,the only one,that can be traced beyond our senses and informs us of existences and objects,which we do not see or feel,is causation.

The idea of causation must be derived from some relation among objects；and that relation we must now endeavour to discover.I find in the first place,that whatever ob-jects are considered as causes or effects,are contiguous；and that nothing can operate in a time or place,which is ever so little removed from those of its existence.We may therefore consider the relation of CONTIGUITY as essential to that of causation；at least may suppose it such,according to the general opinion,till we can find a more[1]proper occasion to clear up this matter,by examining what objects are or are not susceptible of juxtaposition and conjunction.

The second relation I shall observe as essential to causes and effects,is not so uni-versally acknowledged,but is liable to some controversy.It is that of PRIORITY of time in the cause before the effect.Some pretend that it is not absolutely necessary a cause should precede its effect.Now if any cause may be perfectly co-temporary with its effect,it is certain,according to this maxim,that they must all of them be so；since any one of them,which retards its operation for a single moment,exerts not itself at that ver-y individual time,in which it might have operated；and therefore is no proper cause.The consequence of this would be no less than the destruction of that succession of cau-ses,which we observe in the world；and indeed,the utter annihilation of time.For if one cause were co-temporary with its effect,and this effect with its effect,and so on,it is plain there would be no such thing as succession,and all objects must be co-exist-ent.

Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession,as affording a complete idea of causation？By no means.An object may be contiguous and prior to another,without being considered as its cause.There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into consideration；and that relation is of much greater impor-tance,than any of the other two above-mentioned.

It is necessary for us to leave the direct survey of this question concerning the na-ture of that necessary connexion,which enters into our idea of cause and effect；and en-deavour to find some other questions,the examination of which will perhaps afford a hint,that may serve to clear up the present difficulty.Of these questions there occur two,which I shall proceed to examine,viz.

First,For what reason we pronounce it necessary,that every thing whose existence has a beginning,should also have a cause？

Secondly,Why we conclude,that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects；and what is the nature of that inference we draw from the one to the other,and of the belief we repose in it？

I shall only observe before I proceed any farther,that though the ideas of cause and effect be derived from the impressions of reflection as well as from those of sensation,yet for brevity s sake,I commonly mention only the latter as the origin of these ideas；though I desire that whatever I say of them may also extend to the former.Passions are connected with their objects and with one another；no less than external bodies are con-nected together.The same relation,then,of cause and effect,which belongs to one,must be common to all of them.

[1]Part IV.Sect.5.

SECT.3　Why a Cause is Always Necessary

To begin with the first question concerning the necessity of a cause：It is a general maxim in philosophy,that whatever begins to exist,must have a cause of existence.This is commonly taken for granted in all reasonings,without any proof given or deman-ded.

All certainty arises from the comparison of ideas,and from the discovery of such re-lations as are unalterable,so long as the ideas continue the same.These relations are resemblance,proportions in quantity and number,degrees of any quality,and contrarie-ty；none of which are imply d in this proposition,Whatever has a beginning has also a cause of existence.That proposition therefore is not intuitively certain.

It is sufficient only to observe,that when we exclude all causes we really do ex-clude them,and neither suppose nothing nor the object itself to be the causes of the ex-istence；and consequently can draw no argument from the absurdity of these suppositions to prove the absurdity of that exclusion.If every thing must have a cause,it follows,that upon the exclusion of other causes we must accept of the object itself or of nothing as causes.But it is the very point in question,whether every thing must have a cause or not；and therefore,according to all just reasoning,it ought never to be taken for gran-ted.

They are still more frivolous,who say,that every effect must have a,cause,be-cause it is imply d in the very idea of effect.Every effect necessarily pre-supposes a cause；effect being a relative term,of which cause is the correlative.But this does not prove,that every being must be preceded by a cause；no more than it follows,because every husband must have a wife,that therefore every man must be marry d.The true state of the question is,whether every object,which begins to exist,must owe its exist-ence to a cause：and this I assert neither to be intuitively nor demonstratively certain,and hope to have proved it sufficiently by the foregoing arguments.

Since it is not from knowledge or any scientific reasoning,that we derive the opin-ion of the necessity of a cause to every new production,that opinion must necessarily a-rise from observation and experience.The next question,then,should naturally be,how experience gives rise to such a principle？But as I find it will be more convenient to sink this question in the following,Why we conclude,that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects,and why we form an inference from one to an-other？we shall make that the subject of our future enquiry.It will,perhaps,be found in the end,that the same answer will serve for both questions.

SECT.4　Of the Component Parts of Our Reasonings Concerning Cause and Effect

Though the mind in its reasonings from causes or effects carries its view beyond those objects,which it sees or remembers,it must never lose sight of them entirely,norreason merely upon its own ideas,without some mixture of impressions,or at least of i-deas of the memory,which are equivalent to impressions.When we infer effects from causes,we must establish the existence of these causes；which we have only two ways of doing,either by an immediate perception of our memory or senses,or by an inference from other causes；which causes again we must ascertain in the same manner,either by a present impression,or by an inference from their causes,and so on,till we arrive at some object,which we see or remember.It is impossible for us to carry on our infer-ences in infinitum；and the only thing,that can stop them,is an impression of the mem-ory or senses,beyond which there is no room for doubt or enquiry.

To give an instance of this,we may choose any point of history,and consider for what reason we either believe or reject it.Thus we believe that Caesar was killed in the senate-house on the ides of March；and that because this fact is established on the unan-imous testimony of historians,who agree to assign this precise time and place to that e-vent.Here are certain characters and letters present either to our memory or senses；which characters we likewise remember to have been used as the signs of certain ideas；and these ideas were either in the minds of such as were immediately present at that ac-tion,and received the ideas directly from its existence；or they were derived from the testimony of others,and that again from another testimony,by a visible gradation,it will arrive at those who were eyewitnesses and spectators of the event.It is obvious all this chain of argument or connexion of causes and effects,is at first founded on those characters or letters,which are seen or remembered,and that without the authority ei-ther of the memory or senses our whole reasoning would be chimerical and without foun-dation.Every link of the chain would in that case hang upon another；but there would not be any thing fixed to one end of it,capable of sustaining the whole；and consequent-ly there would be no belief nor evidence.And this actually is the case with all hypothet-ical arguments,or reasonings upon a supposition；there being in them,neither any present impression,nor belief of a real existence.

SECT.5　Of the Impressions of the Senses and Memory

All our arguments concerning causes and effects consist both of an impression of the memory or,senses,and of the idea of that existence,which produces the object of the impression,or is produced by it.Here therefore we have three things to explain,viz.First,The original impression.Secondly,The transition to the idea of the connected cause or effect.Thirdly,The nature and qualities of that idea.

As to those impressions,which arise from the senses,their ultimate cause is,in my opinion,perfectly inexplicable by human reason,and it will always be impossible to decide with certainty,whether they arise immediately from the object,or are produced by the creative power of the mind,or are derived from the author of our being.Nor is such a question any way material to our present purpose.We may draw inferences from the coherence of our perceptions,whether they be true or false；whether they represent nature justly,or be mere illusions of the senses.

When we search for the characteristic,which distinguishes the memory from the i-magination,we must immediately perceive,that it cannot lie in the simple ideas it pres-ents to us；since both these faculties borrow their simple ideas from the impressions,and can never go beyond these original perceptions.These faculties are as little distinguished from each other by the arrangement of their complex ideas.For though it be a peculiar property of the memory to preserve the original order and position of its ideas,while the imagination transposes and changes them,as it pleases；yet this difference is not suffi-cient to distinguish them in their operation,or make us know the one from the other；it being impossible to recall the past impressions,in order to compare them with our pres-ent ideas,and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar.Since therefore the memory,is known,neither by the order of its complex ideas,nor the nature of its sim-ple ones；it follows,that the difference betwixt it and the imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity.A man may indulge his fancy in feigning any past scene of adven-tures；nor would there be any possibility of distinguishing this from a remembrance of a like kind,were not the ideas of the imagination fainter and more obscure.

And as an idea of the memory,by losing its force and vivacity,may degenerate to such a degree,as to be taken for an idea of the imagination；so on the other hand an i-dea of the imagination may acquire such a force and vivacity,as to pass for an idea of the memory,and counterfeit its effects on the belief and judgment.This is noted in the case of liars；who by the frequent repetition of their lies,come at last to believe and re-member them,as realities；custom and habit having in this case,as in many others,the same influence on the mind as nature,and infixing the idea with equal force and vigour.

It is merely the force and liveliness of the perception,which constitutes the first act of the judgment,and lays the foundation of that reasoning,which we build upon it,when we trace the relation of cause and effect.

SECT.6　Of the Inference from the Impression to the Idea

It is therefore by EXPERIENCE only,that we can infer the existence of one object from that of another.The nature of experience is this.Thus in advancing we have insen-sibly discovered a new relation betwixt cause and effect,when we least expected it,and were entirely employed upon another subject.This relation is their CONSTANT CON-JUNCTION……we shall continue the thread of our discourse；and having found,that after the discovery of the constant conjunction of any objects,we always draw an infer-ence from one object to another,we shall now examine the nature of that inference,and of the transition from the impression to the idea.Perhaps it will appear in the end,that the necessary connexion depends on the inference,instead of the inference s depending on the necessary connexion.

Since it appears,that the transition from an impression present to the memory or senses to the idea of an object,which we call cause or effect,is founded on past experi-ence,and on our remembrance of their constant conjunction,the next question is,Whether experience produces the idea by means of the understanding or imagination；whether we are determined by reason to make the transition,or by a certain association and relation of perceptions.If reason determined us,it would proceed upon that princi-ple,that instances,of which we have had no experience,must resemble those,of which we have had experience,and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same.In order therefore to clear up this matter,let us consider all the arguments,upon which such a proposition may be supposed to be founded；and as these must be derived either from knowledge or probability,let us cast our eye on each of these degrees of evi-dence,and see whether they afford any just conclusion of this nature.

It is necessary that in all probable reasonings there be something present to the mind,either seen or remembered；and that from this we infer something connected with it,which is not seen nor remembered.

The only connexion or relation of objects,which can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses,is that of cause and effect；and that because it is the only one,on which we can found a just inference from one object to another.The i-dea of cause and effect is derived from experience,which informs us,that such particu-lar objects,in all past instances,have been constantly conjoined with each other：And as an object similar to one of these is supposed to be immediately present in its impres-sion,we thence presume on the existence of one similar to its usual attendant.Accord-ing to this account of things,which is,I think,in every point unquestionable,probabil-ity is founded on the presumption of a resemblance betwixt those objects,of which we have had experience,and those,of which we have had none；and therefore it is impos-sible this presumption can arise from probability.The same principle cannot be both the,cause and effect of another；and this is,perhaps,the only proposition concerning that relation,which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.

Thus not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate connexion of cau-ses and effects,but even after experience has informed us of their constant conjunction,it is impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason,why we should extend that ex-perience beyond those particular instances,which have fallen under our observation.We suppose,but are never able to prove,that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects,of which we have had experience,and those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery.

Though causation be a philosophical relation,as implying contiguity,succession,and constant conjunction,yet it is only so far as it is a natural relation,and produces an union among our ideas,that we are able to reason upon it,or draw any inference from it.

SECT.7　Of the Nature of the Idea or Belief

All the perceptions of the mind are of two kinds,viz.impressions and ideas,which differ from each other only in their different degrees of force and vivacity.Our ideas are copy d from our impressions,and represent them in all their parts.When you would any way vary the idea of a particular object,you can only increase or diminish its force and vivacity.If you make any other change on it,it represents a different object or impres-sion.So that as belief does nothing but vary the manner,in which we conceive any ob-ject,it can only bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity.An opinion,therefore,or belief may be most accurately defined,a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression.

This definition will also be found to be entirely conformable to every one s feeling and experience.Nothing is more evident,than that those ideas,to which we assent,are more strong,firm and vivid,than the loose reveries of a castle-builder.If one person sits down to read a book as a romance,and another as a true history,they plainly receive the same ideas,and in the same order；nor does the incredulity of the one,and the belief of the other hinder them from putting the very same sense upon their author.His words produce the same ideas in both；though his testimony has not the same influ-ence on them.The latter has a more lively conception of all the incidents.He enters deeper into the concerns of the persons：represents to himself their actions,and charac-ters,and friendships,and enmities：He even goes so far as to form a notion of their fea-tures,and air,and person.While the former,who gives no credit to the testimony of the author,has a more faint and languid conception of all these particulars；and except on account of the style and ingenuity of the composition,can receive little entertainment from it.

I would willingly establish it as a general maxim in the science of human nature,that when any impression becomes present to us,it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it,but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vi-vacity.（from SECT.VIII.）

It would perhaps be more convenient,in order at once to preserve the common sig-nification of words,and mark the several degrees of evidence,to distinguish human rea-son into three kinds,viz.THAT FROM KNOWLEDGE,FROM PROOFS,AND FROM PROBABILITIES.By knowledge,I mean the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas.By proofs,those arguments,which are derived from the relation of cause and effect,and which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty.By probability,that evi-dence,which is still attended with uncertainty.

Probability or reasoning from conjecture may be divided into two kinds,viz.that which is founded on chance,and that which arises from causes.

Chance is merely the negation of a cause,and produces a total indifference in the mind；that one negation of a cause and one total indifference can never be superior or inferior to another；and that there must always be a mixture of causes among the chances,in order to be the foundation of any reasoning.（from Sect.XI.）

SECT.8　Of the Probability of Causes

The probabilities of causes are of several kinds；but are all derived from the same origin,viz.THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS TO A PRESENT IMPRESSION.As the habit,which produces the association,arises from the frequent conjunction of objects,it must arrive at its perfection by degrees,and must acquire new force from each instancethat falls under our observation.

First,We may observe,that there is no probability so great as not to allow of a contrary possibility；because otherwise it would cease to be a probability,and would be-come a certainty.

Secondly,The component parts of this possibility and probability are of the same nature,and differ in number only,but not in kind.

Thirdly,We may establish it as a certain maxim,that in all moral as well as natu-ral phenomena,wherever any cause consists of a number of parts,and the effect increa-ses or diminishes,according to the variation of that number,the effects properly speak-ing,is a compounded one,and arises from the union of the several effects,that proceed from each part of the cause.

The component parts of the probability and possibility,being alike in their nature,must produce like effects；and the likeness of their effects consists in this,that each of them presents a view of a particular object.But though these parts be alike in their na-ture,they are very different in their quantity and number；and this difference must ap-pear in the effect as well as the similarity.Now as the view they present is in both cases full and entire,and comprehends the object in all its parts,it is impossible that in this particular there can be any difference；nor is there any thing but a superior vivacity in the probability,arising from the concurrence of a superior number of views,which can distinguish these effects.

SECT.9　Of Unphilosophical Probability

A fourth unphilosophical species of probability is that derived from general rules,which we rashly form to ourselves,and which are the source of what we properly call PREJUDICE.An IRISHMAN cannot have wit,and a Frenchman cannot have solidity；for which reason,though the conversation of the former in any instance be visibly very a-greeable,and of the latter very judicious,we have entertained such a prejudice against them,that they must be dunces or fops in spite of sense and reason.Human nature is very subject to errors of this kind；and perhaps this nation as much as any other.

Should it be demanded why men form general rules,and allow them to influence their judgment,even contrary to present observation and experience,I should reply,that in my opinion it proceeds from those very principles,on which all judgments con-cerning causes and effects depend.

When an object appears,that resembles any cause in very considerable circum-stances,the imagination naturally carries us to a lively conception of the usual effect,Though the object be different in the most material and most efficacious circumstances from that cause.Here is the first influence of general rules.But when we take a review of this act of the mind,and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding,we find it to be of an irregular nature,and destructive of all the most established principles of reasonings；which is the cause of our rejecting it.This is a sec-ond influence of general rules,and implies the condemnation of the former.Sometimes the one,sometimes the other prevails,according to the disposition and character of the person.The vulgar are commonly guided by the first,and wise men by the second.Mean while the sceptics may here have the pleasure of observing a new and signal con-tradiction in our reason,and of seeing all philosophy ready to be subverted by a princi-ple of human nature,and again saved by a new direction of the very same principle.The following of general rules is a very unphilosophical species of probability；and yet it is only by following them that we can correct this,and all other unphilosophical proba-bilities.

SECT.10　Rules by Which to Judge of Causes and Effects

According to the precedent doctrine,there are no objects which by the mere sur-vey,without consulting experience,we can determine to be the causes of any other；and no objects,which we can certainly determine in the same manner not to be the causes.Any thing may produce any thing.Creation,annihilation,motion,reason,volition；all these may arise from one another,or from any other object we can imagine.Nor will this appear strange,if we compare two principles explained above,that the constant con-junction of objects determines their causation,and[1]that properly speaking,no objects are contrary to each other,but existence and nonexistence.

Since therefore it is possible for all objects to become causes or effects to each oth-er,it may be proper to fix some general rules,by which we may know when they really are so.

（1）The cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time.

（2）The cause must be prior to the effect.

（3）There must be a constant union betwixt the cause and effect.It is chiefly this quality,that constitutes the relation.

（4）The same cause always produces the same effect,and the same effect never a-rises but from the same cause.This principle we derive from experience,and is the source of most of our philosophical reasonings.For when by any clear experiment we have discovered the causes or effects of any phenomenon,we immediately extend our observation to every phenomenon of the same kind,without waiting for that constant rep-etition,from which the first idea of this relation is derived.

（5）There is another principle,which hangs upon this,viz.that where several dif-ferent objects produce the same effect,it must be by means of some quality,which we discover to be common amongst them.For as like effects imply like causes,we must al-ways ascribe the causation to the circumstance,wherein we discover the resemblance.

（6）The following principle is founded on the same reason.The difference in the effects of two resembling objects must proceed from that particular,in which they differ.For as like causes always produce like effects,when in any instance we find our expec-tation to be disappointed,we must conclude that this irregularity proceeds from some difference in the causes.

（7）When any object increases or diminishes with the increase or diminution of its cause,it is to be regarded as a compounded effect,derived from the union of the several different effects,which arise from the several different parts of the cause.The absence or presence of one part of the cause is here supposed to be always attended with the ab-sence or presence of a proportionable part of the effect.This constant conjunction suffi-ciently proves,that the one part is the cause of the other.We must,however,beware not to draw such a conclusion from a few experiments.A certain degree of heat gives pleasure；if you diminish that heat,the pleasure diminishes；but it does not follow,that if you augment it beyond a certain degree,the pleasure will likewise augment；for we find that it degenerates into pain.

（8）The eighth and last rule I shall take notice of is,that an object,which exists for any time in its full perfection without any effect,is not the sole cause of that effect,but requires to be assisted by some other principle,which may forward its influence and operation.For as like effects necessarily follow from like causes,and in a contiguous time and place,their separation for a moment shews,that these causes are not compleat ones.

Here is all the LOGIC I think proper to employ in my reasoning；and perhaps even this was not very necessary,but might have been supply d by the natural principles of our understanding.All the rules of this nature are very easy in their invention,but ex-tremely difficult in their application；and even experimental philosophy,which seems the most natural and simple of any,requires the utmost stretch of human judgment.

[1]Part I.Sect.5.

PART 4　Of the Sceptical and Other systems of Philosophy

SECT.1　Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason

In all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible；but when we apply them,our fallible and uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them,and fall into error.We must,therefore,in every reasoning form a new judgment,as a check or con-troul on our first judgment or belief；and must enlarge our view to comprehend a kind of history of all the instances,wherein our understanding has deceiv d us,compar d with those,wherein its testimony was just and true.Our reason must be considered as a kind of cause,of which truth is the natural effect；but such-a-one as by the irruption of other causes,and by the inconstancy of our mental powers,may frequently be prevented.By this means all knowledge degenerates into probability；and this probability is greater or less,according to our experience of the veracity or deceitfulness of our understanding,and according to the simplicity or intricacy of the question.

There is no Algebraist nor Mathematician so expert in his science,as to place en-tire confidence in any truth immediately upon his discovery of it,or regard it as any thing,but a mere probability.Every time he runs over his proofs,his confidence en-creases；but still more by the approbation of his friends；and is rais d to its utmost per-fection by the universal assent and applauses of the,learned world.Now tis evident,that this gradual encrease of assurance is nothing but the addition of new probabilities,and is deriv d from the constant union of causes and effects,according to past experience and observation.

In accompts of any length or importance,Merchants seldom trust to the,infallible certainty of numbers for their security；but by the artificial structure of the accompts,produce a probability beyond what is deriv d from the skill and experience of the ac-comptant.For that is plainly of itself some degree of probability；tho uncertain and vari-able,according to the degrees of his experience and length of the accompt.Now as nonewill maintain,that our assurance in a long numeration exceeds probability,I may safely affirm,that there scarce is any proposition concerning numbers,of which we can have a fuller security.For tis easily possible,by gradually diminishing the numbers,to reduce the longest series of addition to the most simple question,which can be form d,to an addition of two single numbers；and upon this supposition we shall find it impracticable to shew the precise limits of knowledge and of probability,or discover that particular number,at which the one ends and the other begins.But knowledge and probability are of such contrary and disagreeing natures,that they cannot well run insensibly into each other,and that because they will not divide,but must be either entirely present,or en-tirely absent.Besides,if any single addition were certain,every one woued be so,and consequently the whole or total sum；unless the whole can be different from all its parts.I had almost said,that this was certain；but I reflect that it must reduce itself,as well as every other reasoning,and from knowledge degenerate into probability.

Since therefore all knowledge resolves itself into probability,and becomes at last of the same nature with that evidence,which we employ in common life,we must now ex-amine this latter species of reasoning,and see on what foundation it stands.

In every judgment,which we can form concerning probability,as well as concern-ing knowledge,we ought always to correct the first judgment,deriv d from the nature of the object,by another judgment,deriv d from the nature of the understanding.Tis cer-tain a man of solid sense and long experience ought to have,and usually has,a greater assurance in his opinions,than one that is foolish and ignorant,and that our sentiments have different degrees of authority,even with ourselves,in proportion to the degrees of our reason and experience.In the man of the best sense and longest experience,this au-thority is never entire；since even such-a-one must be conscious of many errors in the past,and must still dread the like for the future.Here then arises a new species of probability to correct and regulate the first,and fix its just standard and proportion.As demonstration is subject to the controul of probability,so is probability liable to a new correction by a reflex act of the mind,wherein the nature of our understanding,and our reasoning from the first probability become our objects.

Having thus found in every probability,beside the original uncertainty inherent in the subject,a new uncertainty deriv d from the weakness of that faculty,which judges,and having adjusted these two together,we are obliged by our reason to add a new doubt deriv d from the possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truth and fidelity ofour faculties.

This is a doubt,which immediately occurs to us,and of which,if we woued close-ly pursue our reason,we cannot avoid giving a decision.But this decision,tho it shoued be favourable to our preceding judgment,being founded only on probability,must weaken still further our first evidence,and must itself be weaken d by a fourth doubt of the same kind,and so on in infinitum：till at last there remain nothing of the o-riginal probability,however great we may suppose it to have been,and however small the diminution by every new uncertainty.No finite object can subsist under a decrease repeated in infinitum；and even the vastest quantity,which can enter into human imagi-nation,must in this manner be reduc d to nothing.Let our first belief be never so strong,it must infallibly perish by passing thro so many new examinations,of which each diminishes somewhat of its force and vigour.When I reflect on the natural fallibili-ty of my judgment,I have less confidence in my opinions,than when I only consider the objects concerning which I reason；and when I proceed still farther,to turn the scrutiny against every successive estimation I make of my faculties,all the rules of logic require a continual diminution,and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.

Shou d it here be ask d me,whether I sincerely assent to this argument,which I seem to take such pains to inculcate,and whether I be really one of those sceptics,who hold that all is uncertain,and that our judgment is not in any thing possest of any meas-ures of truth and falshood；I shou d reply,that this question is entirely superfluous,and that neither I,nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion.Nature,by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel；nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light,upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression,than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long,as we are awake,or seeing the sur-rounding bodies,when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine.Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total scepticism,has really disputed without an antagonist,and endeavour d by arguments to establish a faculty,which nature has ante-cedently implanted in the mind,and render d unavoidable.

My intention then in displaying so carefully the arguments of that fantastic sect,is only to make the reader sensible of the truth of my hypothesis,that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv d from nothing but custom；and that belief is more properly an act of the,sensitive,than of the cogitative part of our natures.I havehere prov d,that the very same principles,which make us form a decision upon any subject,and correct that decision by the consideration of our genius and capacity,and of the situation of our mind,when we examin d that subject；I say,I have prov d,that these same principles,when carry d farther,and apply d to every new reflex judgment,must,by continually diminishing the original evidence,at last reduce it to nothing,and utterly subvert all belief and opinion.If belief,therefore,were a simple act of the thought,without any peculiar manner of conception,or the addition of a force and vi-vacity,it must infallibly destroy itself,and in every case terminate in a total suspense of judgment.But as experience will sufficiently convince any one,who thinks it worth while to try,that tho he can find no error in the foregoing arguments,yet he still contin-ues to believe,and think,and reason as usual,he may safely conclude,that his rea-soning and belief is some sensation or peculiar manner of conception,which tis impossi-ble for mere ideas and reflections to destroy.

SECT.2　Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses

Thus the sceptic still continues to reason and believe,even tho he asserts,that he cannot defend his reason by reason；and by the same rule he must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body,tho he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity.Nature has not left this to his choice,and has doubtless,esteem d it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations.We may well ask,What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body？but tis in vain to ask,Whether there be body or not？That is a point,which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.

The subject,then,of our present enquiry is concerning the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of body：And my reasonings on this head I shall begin with a distinction,which at first sight may seem superfluous,but which will contribute very much to the perfect understanding of what follows.We ought to examine apart those two questions,which are commonly confounded together,viz.Why we attribute a continu d existence to objects,even when they are not present to the senses；and why we suppose them to have an existence DISTINCT from the mind and perception.Under this last head I comprehend their situation as well as relations,their external position as well as the independence of their existence and operation.These two questions concerning the continu d and distinct existence of body are intimately connected together.For if the objects of our senses continue to exist,even when they are not perceiv d,their existence is of course independent of and distinct from the perception：and vice versa,if their ex-istence be independent of the perception and distinct from it,they must continue to ex-ist,even tho they be not perceiv d.But tho the decision of the one question decides the other；yet that we may the more easily discover the principles of human nature,from whence the decision arises,we shall carry along with us this distinction,and shall con-sider,whether it be the senses,reason,or the imagination,that produces the opinion of a continu d or of a distinct existence.These are the only questions,that are intelligible on the present subject.For as to the notion of external existence,when taken for some-thing specially different from our perceptions,we have already shewn its absurdity.

To begin with the SENSES,tis evident these faculties are incapable of giving rise to the notion of the continu d existence of their objects,after they no longer appear to the senses.For that is a contradiction in terms,and suppose that the senses continue to op-erate,even after they have ceas d all manner of operation.These faculties,therefore,if they have any influence in the present case,must produce the opinion of a distinct,not of a continu d existence；and in order to that,must present their impressions either as images and representations,or as these very distinct and external existences.

That our senses offer not their impressions as the images of something distinct,or independent,and external,is evident；because they convey to us nothing but a single perception,and never give us the least intimation of any thing beyond.A single percep-tion can never produce the idea of a double existence,but by some inference either of the reason or imagination.When the mind looks farther than what immediately appears to it,its conclusions can never be put to the account of the senses；and it certainly looks farther,when from a single perception it infers a double existence,and supposes the re-lations of resemblance and causation betwixt them.

If our senses,therefore,suggest any idea of distinct existences,they must convey the impressions as those very existences,by a kind of fallacy and illusion.Upon this bead we may observe,that all sensations are felt by the mind,such as they really are,and that when we doubt,whether they present themselves as distinct objects,or as mere impressions,the difficulty is not concerning their nature,but concerning their relations and situation.Now if the senses presented our impressions as external to,and independ-ent of ourselves,both the objects and ourselves must be obvious to our senses,otherwise they cou d not be compar d by these faculties.The difficulty,then,is how fax we are ourselves the objects of our senses.

Thus to resume what I have said concerning the senses；they give us no notion of continu d existence,because they cannot operate beyond the extent,in which they really operate.They as little produce the opinion of a distinct existence,because they neither can offer it to the mind as represented,nor as original.To offer it as represented,they must present both an object and an image.To make it appear as original,they must convey a falshood；and this falshood must lie in the relations and situation：In order to which they must be able to compare the object with ourselves；and even in that case they do not,nor is it possible they shou d,deceive us.We may,therefore,conclude with certainty,that the opinion of a continu d and of a distinct existence never arises from the sense.

To confirm this we may observe,that there are three different kinds of impressions convey d by the senses.The first are those of the figure,bulk,motion and solidity of bodies.The second those of colours,tastes,smells,sounds,heat and cold.The third are the pains and pleasures,that arise from the application of objects to our bodies,as by the cutting of our flesh with steel,and such like.Both philosophers and the vulgar suppose the first of these to have a distinct continu d existence.The vulgar only regard the second as on the same footing.Both philosophers and the vulgar,again,esteem the third to be merely perceptions and consequently interrupted and dependent beingsses.

These vulgar opinions,then,being rejected,we must search for some other hy-pothesis,by which we may discover those peculiar qualities in our impressions,which makes us attribute to them a distinct and continu d existence.

After a little examination,we shall find,that all those objects,to which we attrib-ute a continu d existence,have a peculiar constancy,which distinguishes them from the impressions,whose existence depends upon our perception.Those mountains,and hou-ses,and trees,which lie at present under my eye,have always appear d to me in the same order；and when I lose sight of them by shutting my eyes or turning my head,I soon after find them return upon me without the least alteration.My bed and table,my books and papers,present themselves in the same uniform manner,and change not up-on account of any interruption in my seeing or perceiving them.This is the case with all the impressions,whose objects are suppos d to have an external existence；and is the case with no other impressions,whether gentle or violent,voluntary or involuntary.

But whatever force we may ascribe to this principle,I am afraid tis too weak tosupport alone so vast an edifice,as is that of the continu d existence of all external bodies；and that we must join the constancy of their appearance to the coherence,in or-der to give a satisfactory account of that opinion.As the explication of this will lead me into a considerable compass of very profound reasoning；I think it proper,in order to a-void confusion,to give a short sketch or abridgment of my system,and afterwards draw out all its parts in their full compass.This inference from the constancy of our percep-tions,like the precedent from their coherence,gives rise to the opinion of the continu d existence of body,which is prior to that of its distinct existence,and produces that latter principle.

In order to justify this system,there are four things requisite.First,To explain the principium individuationis,or principle of identity.Secondly,Give a reason,why the resemblance of our broken and interrupted perceptions induces us to attribute an identity to them.Thirdly,Account for that propensity,which this illusion gives,to unite these broken appearances by a continued existence.Fourthly and lastly,Explain that force and vivacity of conception,which arises from the

I believe an intelligent reader will find less difficulty to assent to this system,than to comprehend it fully and distinctly,and will allow,after a little reflection,that every part carries its own proof along with it.Tis indeed evident,that as the vulgar suppose their perceptions to be their only objects,and at the same time believe the continu d ex-istence of matter,we must account for the origin of the belief upon that supposition.Now upon that supposition,tis a false opinion that any of our objects,or perceptions,are identically the same after an interruption；and consequently the opinion of their i-dentity can never arise from reason,but must arise from the imagination.The imagina-tion is seduc d into such an opinion only by means of the resemblance of certain percep-tions；since we find they are only our resembling perceptions,which we have a propen-sion to suppose the same.This propension to bestow an identity on our resembling per-ceptions,produces the fiction of a continu d existence；since that fiction,as well as the identity,is really false,as is acknowledged by all philosophers,and has no other effect than to remedy the interruption of our perceptions,which is the only circumstance that is contrary to their identity.In the last place this propension causes belief by means of the present impressions of the memory；since without the remembrance of former sensations,tis plain we never shou d have any belief of the continu d existence of body.Thus in ex-amining all these parts,we find that each of them is supported by the strongest proofs：and that all of them together form a consistent system,which is perfectly convincing.A strong propensity or inclination alone,without any present impression,will sometimes cause a belief or opinion.How much more when aided by that circumstance？

Having thus given an account of all the systems both popular and philosophical,with regard to external existences,I cannot forbear giving vent to a certain sentiment,which arises upon reviewing those systems.I begun this subject with premising,that we ought to have an implicit faith in our senses,and that this wou d be the conclusion,I shou d draw from the whole of my reasoning.But to be ingenuous,I feel myself at pres-ent of a quite contrary sentiment,and am more inclin d to repose no faith at all in my senses,or rather imagination,than to place in it such an implicit confidence.I cannot conceive bow such trivial qualities of the fancy,conducted by such false suppositions,can ever lead to any solid and rational system.They are the coherence and constancy of our perceptions,which produce the opinion of their continu d existence；tho these qual-ities of perceptions have no perceivable connexion with such an existence.The constan-cy of our perceptions has the most considerable effect,and yet is attended with the grea-test difficulties.Tis a gross illusion to suppose,that our resembling perceptions are nu-merically the same；and tis this illusion,which leads us into the opinion,that these perceptions are uninterrupted,and are still existent,even when they are not present to the senses.This is the case with our popular system.And as to our philosophical one,tis liable to the same difficulties；and is over-and-above loaded with this absurdity,that it at once denies and establishes the vulgar supposition.Philosophers deny our resemb-ling perceptions to be identically the same,and uninterrupted；and yet have so great a propensity to believe them such,that they arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions,to which they attribute these qualities.I say,a new set of perceptions：For we may well suppose in general,but tis impossible for us distinctly to conceive,objects to be in their nature any thing but exactly the same with perceptions.What then can we look for from this confusion of groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and falshood？And how can we justify to ourselves any belief we repose in them？

This sceptical doubt,both with respect to reason and the senses,is a malady,which can never be radically cur d,but must return upon us every moment,however we may chace it away,and sometimes may seem entirely free from it.Tis impossible upon any system to defend either our understanding or senses；and we but expose them farther when we endeavour to justify them in that manner.As the sceptical doubt arises natur-ally from a profound and intense reflection on those subjects,it always encreases,the farther we carry our reflections,whether in opposition or conformity to it.Carelessness and in-attention alone can afford us any remedy.For this reason I rely entirely upon them；and take it for granted,whatever may be the reader s opinion at this present mo-ment,that an hour hence he will be persuaded there is both an external and internal world；and going upon that supposition,I intend to examine some general systems both ancient and modern,which have been propos d of both,before I proceed to a more par-ticular enquiry concerning our impressions.This will not,perhaps,in the end be found foreign to our present purpose.

prope nsity.

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SECT.3　Of the ancient Philosophy

Several moralists have recommended it as an excellent method of becoming ac-quainted with our own hearts,and knowing our progress in virtue,to recollect our dreams in a morning,and examine them with the same rigour,that we wou d our most serious and most deliberate actions.Our character is the same throughout,say they,and appears best where artifice,fear,and policy have no place,and men can neither be hypocrites with themselves nor others.The generosity,or baseness of our temper,our meekness or cruelty,our courage or pusilanimity,influence the fictions of the imagina-tion with the most unbounded liberty,and discover themselves in the most glaring col-ours.In like manner,I am persuaded,there might be several useful discoveries made from a criticism of the fictions of the antient philosophy,concerning substances,and substantial form,and accidents,and occult qualities；which,however unreasonable and capricious,have a very intimate connexion with the principles of human nature.

Tis confest by the most judicious philosophers,that our ideas of bodies are nothing but collections form d by the mind of the ideas of the several distinct sensible qualities,of which objects are compos d,and which we find to have a constant union with each other.

The peripatetic philosophy asserts the original matter to be perfectly homogeneous in all bodies,and considers fire,water,earth,and air,as of the very same substance；on account of their gradual revolutions and changes into each other.At the same time it assigns to each of these species of objects a distinct substantial form,which it supposes to be the source of all those different qualities they possess,and to be a new foundation of simplicity and identity to each particular species.All depends on our manner of vi-ewing the objects.When we look along the insensible changes of bodies,we suppose all of them to be of the same substance or essence.When we consider their sensible differ-ences,we attribute to each of them a substantial and essential difference.And in order to indulge ourselves in both these ways of considering our objects,we suppose all bodies to have at once a substance and a substantial form.

SECT.4　Of the Modern Philosophy

The opinions of the antient philosophers,their fictions of substance and accident,and their reasonings concerning substantial forms and occult qualities,are like the spec-tres in the dark,and are derivid from principles,which,however common,are neither universal nor unavoidable in human nature.The modern philosophy pretends to be en-tirely free from this defect,and to arise only from the solid,permanent,and consistent principles of the imagination.Upon what grounds this pretension is founded must now be the subject of our enquiry.

Thus there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses；or more properly speaking,betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect,and those that persuade us of the continu d and independent existence of body.When we reason from cause and effect,we conclude,that neither colour,sound,taste,nor smell have a continu d and independent existence.When we exclude these sensible qualities there remains nothing in the universe,which has such an existence.

SECT.5　Of the Immateriality of the Soul

Thus neither by considering the first origin of ideas,nor by means of a definition are we able to arrive at any satisfactory notion of substance；which seems to me a suffi-cient reason for abandoning utterly that dispute concerning the materiality and immateri-ality of the soul,and makes me absolutely condemn even the question itself.We have no perfect idea of any thing but of a perception.A substance is entirely different from a perception.We have,therefore,no idea of a substance.Inhesion in something is suppos d to be requisite to support the existence of our perceptions.Nothing appears requisite to support the existence of a perception.We have,therefore,no idea of inhe-sion.What possibility then of answering that question,Whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance,when we do not so much as understand the meaning of the question？

There is one argument commonly employ d for the immateriality of the soul,which seems to me remarkable.Whatever is extended consists of parts；and whatever consists of parts is divisible,if not in reality,at least in the imagination.

I assert,that the doctrine of the immateriality,simplicity,and indivisibility of a thinking substance is a true atheism,and will serve to justify all those sentiments,for which Spinoza is so universally infamous.

The fundamental principle of the atheism of Spinoza is the doctrine of the simplicity of the universe,and the unity of that substance,in which he supposes both thought and matter to inhere.There is only one substance,says he,in the world；and that substance is perfectly simple and indivisible,and exists every where,without any local presence.

To pronounce,then,the final decision upon the whole；the question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely unintelligible：All our perceptions are not suscep-tible of a local union,either with what is extended or unextended：there being some of them of the one kind,and some of the other：And as the constant conjunction of objects constitutes the very essence of cause and effect,matter and motion may often be regar-ded as the causes of thought,as far as we have any notion of that relation.

SECT.6　Of Personal Identity

There are some philosophers.who imagine we are every moment intimately con-scious of what we call our SELF；that we feel its existence and its continuance in exist-ence；and are certain,beyond the evidence of a demonstration,both of its perfect iden-tity and simplicity.The strongest sensation,the most violent passion,say they,instead of distracting us from this view,only fix it the more intensely,and make us consider their influence on self either by their pain or pleasure.To attempt a farther proof of this were to weaken its evidence；since no proof can be deriv d from any fact,of which we are so intimately conscious；nor is there any thing,of which we can be certain,if we doubt of this.

We now proceed to explain the nature of personal identity,which has become so great a question in philosophy,especially of late years in England,where all the abstru-ser sciences are study d with a peculiar ardour and application.And here tis evident,the same method of reasoning must be continu d which has so successfully explain d the identity of plants,and animals,and ships,and houses,and of all the compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature.The identity,which we ascribe to the-mind of man,is only a fictitious one,and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies.It cannot,therefore,have a different origin,but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects.

The only question,therefore,which remains,is,by what relations this uninter-rupted progress of our thought is produc d,when we consider the successive existence of a mind or thinking person.And here tis evident we must confine ourselves to resem-blance and causation,and must drop contiguity,which has little or no influence in the present case.

The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion,which is of great importance in the present affair,viz.that all the nice and subtile questions concerning personal identi-ty can never possibly be decided,and are to be regarded rather as gramatical than as philosophical difficulties.Identity depends on the relations of ideas；and these relations produce identity,by means of that easy transition they occasion.But as the relations,and the easiness of the transition may diminish by insensible degrees,we have no just standard,by.which we can decide any dispute concerning the time,when they acquire or lose a title to the name of identity.All the disputes concerning the identity of con-nected objects are merely verbal,except so fax as the relation of parts-gives rise to some fiction or imaginary principle of union,as we have already observed.

Thus we have finish d our examination of the several systems of philosophy,both of the intellectual and natural world；and in our miscellaneous way of reasoning have been led into several topics；which will either illustrate and confirm some preceding part of this discourse,or prepare the way for our following opinions.Tis now time to return to a more close examination of our subject,and to proceed in the accurate anatomy of human nature,having fully explain d the nature of our judgment and understandings.

SECT.7　Conclusion of This Book

But before I launch out into those immense depths of philosophy,which lie before me,I find myself inclin d to stop a moment in my present station,and to ponder that voyage,which I have undertaken,and which undoubtedly requires the utmost art and industry to be brought to a happy conclusion.Methinks I am like a man,who having struck on many shoals,and having narrowly escap d shipwreck in passing a small frith,has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel,and e-ven carries his ambition so far as to think of compassing the globe under these disadv-antageous circumstances.My memory of past errors and perplexities,makes me diffident for the future.The wretched condition,weakness,and disorder of the faculties,I must employ in my enquiries,encrease my apprehensions.And the impossibility of amending or correcting these faculties,reduces me almost to despair,and makes me resolve to perish on the barren rock,on which I am at present,rather than venture myself upon that boundless ocean,which runs out into immensity.This sudden view of my danger strikes me with melancholy；and as tis usual for that passion,above all others,to in-dulge itself；I cannot forbear feeding my despair,with all those desponding reflections,which the present subject furnishes me with in such abundance.

Most fortunately it happens,that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds,nature herself suffices to that purpose,and cures me of this philosophical mel-ancholy and delirium,either by relaxing this bent of mind,or by some avocation,and lively impression of my senses,which obliterate all these chimeras.I dine,I play a game of backgammon,I converse,and am merry with my friends；and when after three or four hours amusement,I wou d return to these speculations,they appear so cold,and strain d,and ridiculous,that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any far-ther.

These are the sentiments of my spleen and indolence,and indeed I must confess,that philosophy has nothing to oppose to them,and expects a victory more from the re-turns of a serious good-humour d disposition,than from the force of reason and convic-tion.In all the incidents of life we ought still to preserve our scepticism.If we believe,that fire warms,or water refreshes,tis only because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise.Nay if we are philosophers,it ought only to be upon sceptical principles,and from an inclination,which we feel to the employing ourselves after that manner.Where reason is lively,and mixes itself with some propensity,it ought to be assented to.Where it does not,it never can have any title to operate upon us.

Nor is it only proper we shou d in general indulge our inclination in the most elabo-rate philosophical researches,notwithstanding our sceptical principles,but also that we shou d yield to that propensity,which inclines us to be positive and certain in particular points,according to the light,in which we survey them in any particular instant.Tis easier to forbear all examination and enquiry,than to check ourselves in so natural a propensity,and guard against that assurance,which always arises from an exact and full survey of an object.On such an occasion we are apt not only to forget our scepticism,but even our modesty too；and make use of such terms as these,tis evident,tis cer-tain,tis undeniable；which a due deference to the public ought,perhaps,to prevent.I may have fallen into this fault after the example of others；but I here enter a caveat a-gainst any Objections,which may be offer d on that head；and declare that such expres-sions were extorted from me by the present view of the object,and imply no dogmatical spirit,nor conceited idea of my own judgment,which are sentiments that I am sensible can become no body,and a sceptic still less than any other.

第一卷　论知性

第一章　论观念，它们的起源、组成、联系、抽象等等

第一节　论观念的起源

所有人类心灵的知觉最后都转变成两个不同的种类，我将之称作印象和观念。二者之间的差异在于，当它们刺激心灵的时候，当它们进入我们的思想和意识的时候，二者的强烈程度和生动程度是不同的。刺激心灵最强烈最粗暴的那些知觉，我们叫作印象：在这个名词之下，我包括了所有第一次出现在灵魂中的感觉。感情和激情。而观念，我用来指那些在思考和推理中出现的微弱意象；当前讨论激起的所有那些知觉就是例证，但要除去那些由视觉和触觉引起的感觉，和那些由这些讨论所可能引起的愉快或者不快。我相信无须多言就能够说明上述这种差异。每个人自己就能够很快地察觉感觉和思维的不同。两者之间的普遍差异程度是容易区分的，虽然在特殊的例子中两者可能十分接近。例如在睡眠、发烧、疯狂或灵魂陷入狂暴的激情之中时，我们的观念与我们的印象接近，另一方面，有时发生这种情况，我们的印象是如此的微弱和低沉，以至于我们无法区别印象和观念。尽管二者在极少数的例子中非常近似，但是，在大多数情况下还是差异很大，所以没人会犹豫着不把它们归到不同的标题之下，并分配给它们各自一个特殊的名称，以标志这种差异。[1]

我们的知觉还有另外一个区分，它为我们的观察提供了便利，并且它既适用于印象也适用于观念。这个区分就是简单知觉和复合知觉。简单知觉或感觉和观念，不允许再作区分。而复合知觉则与此不同，它可以区分为不同的部分。尽管某种特殊的颜色、味道和气味是某个苹果兼具的特性，但我们很容易就能分辨出它们各自的不同，至少可以区分它们。

通过这些区分，我们可以将我们的研究对象按某种顺序加以排列，现在我们可以要求自己更精确地去考虑它们的特性和关系。首先引起我注意的第一种情况是，我们的印象和观念之间除了各自的强烈程度和活泼程度不同外，它们在其他的方面是极其类似的。一个似乎是另一个的反射；所以所有的心灵的知觉都是双重的，并且同时作为印象和观念出现。当我闭眼想起我的房间，我形成的观念是我曾感觉到的印象的精确再现。其中的细节，无一不可以在另外一个中找到。在我回想我的其他知觉时，我仍然发现这种相似的再现关系。这种情况在我看来是非常突出的，立即引起了我的注意。

通过更为精确的观察后，我发现我被初次的现象弄得过于迷惑了。我必须利用简单知觉和复合知觉这个区分，来限制“我们的所有观念和印象都是类似的”这个概括判断。我观察到，我们的许多复合观念从来不曾有与它们相应的印象，并且，许多复合印象也从未精确地在观念中复现过。我能够想象自己在类似新耶路撒冷这样的一座城市里，看到黄金铺地，红宝石饰墙，虽然我从来不曾见过这样一座城市。我曾见过巴黎，但是我能够断言我形成的关于这个城市的观念，是完全地按照它真实和适当的比例再现了它的街道和房屋吗？

因此，我意识到，虽然大体来说，复合印象和观念有很多的类似，但那个规律，即它们彼此互为对方精确的复本，却并不是普遍正确的。接着，我们可以考虑我们的简单知觉是什么情形。在进行了我能够作出的最为精确的考察之后，我敢断言，上面所说的规律在这里可以毫无例外地适用，每个简单观念都有一个与之类似的简单印象，而每个简单印象都有一个与之对应的观念。我们在黑暗中形成的关于红色的观念，和我们在阳光下眼睛受到刺激形成的印象，只有程度上的不同，没有本质上的差别。我们所有的简单印象和简单观念都是如此，虽然不可能通过一一列举来证明。

这样，我们就可以发现，所有的简单观念和简单印象是彼此类似的，而又因为复合印象和复合观念是由简单印象和简单观念组成的，我们就可以概括地断言，这样两种知觉是完全对应的。发现了这样一种无须进一步检验的关系之后，我开始对发现它们的其他一些性质产生好奇。让我们来研究，它们和它们的存在之间是什么关系，而哪些印象和观念是原因，哪些又是结果。

充分考察这个问题，是这本专著的主题；因此我们在这里只需建立一个概括的命题就可以了，即我们的全部简单观念在初次出现的时候都来自于简单印象，而这种简单印象和简单观念相对应，并为简单观念所精确地复现。

根据类似的知觉之间的恒常的结合，我立刻可以断定，在我们的互相对应的印象和观念之间有着某种强大的联系。而且一者的存在对另一者有着相当大的影响。这样一种出现在无数例子中的恒常的联系，决不会是出于偶然；而且，它清楚地证明了不是印象依赖于观念，就是观念依赖于印象。为了知道哪一方依赖于哪一方，我得考虑两者初次出现的次序；通过恒常的经验我发现，简单印象总是先于它所对应的观念而出现，而绝不会以相反的顺序出现。这种我们类似知觉的恒常联系，是一个令人信服的证据，证明一者是另一者的原因；而这种印象的优先性也是一个同样的证据，证明了印象是观念的原因，而不是观念是印象的原因。

为了证明这一点，我又思考了另一种明显而令人信服的现象，如果那些能够产生印象的官能受到意外事故的损害而不能发挥作用，例如一个生来就是聋子的人，他不但没了印象，而且也失去了相应的观念，因而在心灵中两者都没有留下痕迹。不但在这种感觉器官完全被毁坏时是这种情况，而且如果从未参加过产生某个特殊印象的活动时，也是如此。我们如果不曾亲自品尝过菠萝，便不能形成关于菠萝味道的恰当观念。

但是，有一个完全相反的现象，可以证明观念出现在与之相应的印象之前的情况并不是绝对不可能的。我相信人们会很乐意承认，各种通过眼睛进入心灵的关于颜色的观念，与通过听觉进入心灵的声音的观念，确实是不同的，尽管同时它们是相似的。如果不同的颜色是这种情况，那么同一种颜色的各种深浅程度情况必然也是如此，也就是说，各个色调都产生与其他色调不同的一个观念。

假设一个人三十年来视觉正常，并且完全熟悉各种颜色，只除了一种特别的蓝色调，是他从未见过的。那么把这个颜色的所有色调，除了特别的那种之外，放在他的面前，从最深的逐渐降到最浅的；显然，他会在没有那个色调的地方，察觉到比起其他相连的两个色调之间的距离，这个地方的距离更为大些。那么现在我要问，这个人是否能够通过他的想象去填补空白，并产生关于这种特殊色调的观念，虽然那种色调从未通过感觉传递到他的心中呢？我相信很少有人会认为他不能；因此这个就可以作为证据，证明简单观念并非总是从相应的印象中得来的；尽管这种例子极为特殊，独一无二，几乎不值得我们去注意它，并且也不值得只是为了它而改变我们的普

但是除了这个例外，在这个标题下是可以这样讨论的，那就是先前说到的印象和观念的原则，必须加上另一个限定，即我们观念是我们印象的意象，因此我们可以形成第二种观念，它是前一种观念的意象；这在我们现下关于它们的推理中可以看到。但恰当地说，这与其说是那个规则的一个例外，不如说是它的一个说明。观念可以在新观念中产生它们自身的意象；但是下列说法仍然是真的，即我们所有的简单观念直接或间接地来自于与之相应的印象。

这就是我在人性科学里建立的第一条原则；我们不应该因为它看起来简单而轻视它。因为人们可以注意到，现在这个关于印象和观念之先后的问题，和别人用其他术语争论的问题，比如是否有先天理念的问题，或者我们所有的观念是否都来自于感觉和反省，是一样的。

[1]我在此用这两个术语：印象和观念，与通常意义不同，我希望能有这种使用词语的自由。与“观念”这个词在洛克先生那里被滥用来代表一切知觉不同，我宁愿恢复这个词的原初含义。我使用印象这个词，不是指我们生动的感觉在灵魂中产生的方式，而仅仅是指这些知觉本身。据我所知，在英语或任何其他语言中知觉没有特殊的名词来表示。

遍原理。

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第二节　题目的划分

既然我们的简单印象先于与之相应的观念，并且很少发生例外的情况，所以科学的方法就要求我们首先考察我们的印象，接着再考察我们的观念。印象可以被分成两种：感觉印象和反省印象。第一种是由于不知名的原因最初产生于我们的心灵。第二种大部分是来自于我们的观念，它们的顺序如下。一个印象首先刺激感官，使我们知觉种种热、冷、渴、饥、苦、乐。有一个被心灵留下的印象的复本，在印象停止之后仍然存在着；我们把这个复本称作观念。这个关于苦或乐的观念，当它回到心灵的时候，会产生新的关于欲望和厌恶、希望和恐惧的印象，这些可以被恰当地称作反省印象，因为它是由反省得来的。这些反省印象又再次被记忆和想象所复现，并成为观念；而这些观念可能又会产生别的印象和观念。因此这个反省印象只是在它们相应的观念前产生；但是却出现在感觉印象之后，而且它们来自于感觉印象。对感官的考察更多的是解剖学家和自然哲学家的事情，而不是精神哲学家的事情，所以现在我们不应该再研究了。更值得我们主要关注的应该是反省印象，也就是感情、欲望和情绪，既然它们多数是由观念产生，那么就有必要改变一开始看来最为自然的方法；为了解释人类心灵的本质和原则，我们需要先对观念做一番详细的描述，进而再去研究印象。因为这个原因，我在此选择观念作为我的开始。

第三节　论记忆观念和想像观念

我们通过经验发现，当任何印象出现在心灵中的时候，它会再次作为观念出现在那里；并且它是通过两种方法做到这一点的：或者是当它再次出现的时候，它仍然在相当程度上保留着它最初的那种生动程度，介于一个印象和一个观念之间；或者是它完全失去了它的生动性，而完全变成了观念。以第一种方式复现我们的印象的官能，就叫做记忆，而后者就叫做想象。显然在最初看来，记忆观念比想象观念要生动和强烈得多，并且前一种官能比后一种官能以更为鲜明的色彩描绘出它的对象。当我们想起过去发生的任何事件时，关于它的观念会以一种强烈的方式冲击我们的心灵；然而在想象中，知觉却是微弱和不活跃的，不能毫无困难地被心灵长期不变地保持，因此这两种观念之间有一个明显的差别，但是这一点可以留待后面详述。[1]

在这两种观念之间有另外一个同样明显的差别，即不论记忆的或者是想象的观念，不论生动或者微弱的观念，都不能在心灵中出现，除非它们相应的印象在它们之前已经为它们做好了铺垫，可是，想象没有受到和原初印象同样的顺序以及形式的束缚；而记忆在这方面却可以说受到了束缚，完全无力去改变。

一个历史学家，为了更为方便地叙事，或许会把事件的前后顺序颠倒；但是如果他注意精确性的话，他会注意到这种颠倒了的顺序；并且通过这种方法把那个后发生的事件的观念放到它应有的位置。记忆的主要作用不是保存简单观念，而是保存观念的顺序和位置。

我们的第二个原则也是很明显的，即想象可以自由地移动和改变它的观念。我们在诗歌和传奇里看到的故事完全显示了这一点。在这些故事里面自然完全被混淆了，提到的无非是飞马、火龙和可怕的巨人。这种幻想的自由不会显得奇怪，因为我们能想到，我们所有的观念都是我们印象的复本，没有任何两个印象是完全不能分离的。更不用说的是，这是把观念分为简单观念和复杂观念的一个明显的结果。无论何时，想象只要看到观念间的区别，它就能够很快地将之区分开来。

[1]第二章，第五节

第四节　论观念的联系或联结

假如观念之间是完全松散甚至是没有联系的，那么就只有偶然能够联结它们；各种观念之间如果没有合并的联系，如果没有相关的特性，能通过一个观念自然地引出另一个观念，那么这些简单观念不会有规律地联结成复合观念（而事实上却的确如此）。观念之间的联结原则不应当看作是不可分离的联系；因为这个原则已经被排除在想象之外。但我们也不是断言，没有这个原则心灵就不能联结两个观念；因为再没有比官能更为自由的东西了；我们只是把这种联系看作一个经常占优势的温和的力量；这种力量也是——虽然只是众多原因之一——各种语言为何如此紧密地互相呼应的原因。自然以某种方式向每一个人指出那些最适合联结成复合观念的简单观念。产生这种联结，并使得心灵以这种方式从一个观念流动到另一个观念的特性有三种，即类似、时间或者空间的接近、因果关系。

我相信上述特性在观念之间产生联结，并且在一个观念出现的时候自然地引出另一个，这无须证明。显然，在我们思考的过程中，在我们观念的经常转变中，我们的想象很轻易地从一个观念跳到另外一个类似的观念，而仅仅是这种特性本身就可以和想象充分地联结起来。同样明显的是，感官在改变它们对象的时候，必须有规律地改变它们，根据它们彼此相连的顺序接受它们，想象也必定因为长期的习惯获得同样的思考方法，并且在想象它的对象时逐个经过各部分的时间和空间。至于因果关系引起的联系，我们以后还有机会彻底考察它，所以现在不作详细研究。只需注意一下，没有一种关系会比因果关系在它的对象之间，在想象中产生更为强烈的联系，使得一个观念更快地召唤起另一个观念。

在这上述的三种关系中，因果关系是范围最广的。当一个对象是另一个对象活动或运动的原因时，或当前者是后者存在的理由时，这两个对象都可以被认为是因果关系。因为活动或运动以某种观点看来就是对象本身，而且当对象在不同情况下维持不变的时候，我们可以很容易想象，这种对象之间的交互影响力是如何在想象中把它们联系起来的。

我们可以把这个原则进一步推开来谈论，当两个对象一个使得另一个运动或活动，或当一个能够产生另一个的时候，它们都是被因果关系联系起来的。我们可以把这个看作所有利益和责任关系的根源，通过它去考察人类在社会中如何互相影响，如何被置于统治和从属关系之中。所谓主人就是这样一个人，通过暴力或者契约处于这样一种地位，有权力去在某些事项中支配我们称作奴隶的另一个人的行动。当一个人被赋予权力，他只需运用意志就能把权力转变为行动；这种转变在任何情况下都被认为是可能的，并且在很多情况下是极有可能的；对当权者来说尤其如此，下属的服从是上级的快乐和利益之源。

因此这就是我们简单观念之间的联结或结合原则，并且在想象中代替了记忆中这些观念相互结合、不可分离的联系。这是一种吸引作用，这种作用在自然界和精神世界都起着同样奇特的作用，并以同样繁多并富于变化的形式表现显示自身。它的作用在处处都非常明显；但是说到它的原因，却几乎不为人所知，必须归结于人性中的原始性质，而我并不打算妄加解释。

在这种观念的联结或者联系的效果当中，最为明显的是那些我们思考和推理的普通对象，它们一般产生于我们简单观念的联结原则的某种复合观念。这些复合观念可以被分为关系、模式和实体。在我们结束这一主题前——该主题被看作这个哲学的基本组成部分，我们将依次简略地考察它们，并将附带考察一下我们的一般和特殊的观念。

第五节　论关系

关系这个词通常被用做两个截然不同的意思。一个意义是指那种两个观念在想象中被联系起来，并且一者根据前述方式自然地引起另一者的那种性质；另一个意义是指那种特殊的情况，就是即使两个观念是在想象中被任意地联结在一起，我们也会理所当然地比较它们。在普通语言当中，前一种永远是我们用关系这个词时指的意义；仅仅在哲学中，我们才扩大这个词的意义，指那些没有联系原则的比较中的特殊对象。例如哲学家会把距离当作一个真正的关系，因为我们是通过比较各个对象而得到关于距离的观念；但是通常我们会说，再没有比这类事物之间更远的距离了，再没有比它们之间更少的关系了；就好像距离和关系是不相容似的。

列举所有那些可进行比较的对象，及使得哲学意义上的关系概念得以产生的性质，也许会被认为是一项无休止的任务。但是如果我们勤奋地去思考它们，我们会毫无困难地发现它们可以被归入七个总类里面，这七个总类可以被认为是所有哲学关系的根源。

1.第一是类似关系：离开这种关系，任何哲学上的关系都无法存在；因为如果没有某种程度上的相似，对象之间就不能被比较。但是，尽管对于所有的哲学关系来讲类似关系都是必要的，我们并不能认为它永远产生观念之间的联系或联结。当一种性质变得太过普遍，对大多数个体来讲成为共有的时候，它就无法使心灵直接注意到任何一个个体，因为同时出现的太多的选择，阻止想象固定在任何一个单一的对象上。

2.同一关系可以被看作是第二种关系。我这里所指的是那种在最严格意义上应用于恒常不变的对象的那种同一关系；先不去考察人格同一性的本质和基础，容后再述。在所有关系中，最为普遍的就是同一性关系，它是所有持续存在物所共有的一种关系。

3.同一性关系之后，最为普遍和总括的关系就是时空关系，这种关系是无数比较的来源，例如远、近、上、下、前、后等等。

4.凡是可以度量或者计数的所有对象，都可以在数目和数量方面加以比较；这是另一个关系的丰富来源。

5.当任何两个对象具有同样的性质时，它们各自在这种性质上的差异程度，就构成了第五种关系……

6.对立关系，初看起来，似乎是上述原则的一个例外：“没有某种程度的相似关系便不能构成任何关系”。但是让我们想想，没有两个观念是与自身相反的，除了存在和不存在这两个观念，而显然这两个观念也是相似的，因为两者都包含了关于那个对象的观念；尽管后者（即不存在观念）把那个对象从它所不应该存在的时空之中排除了出去。

7.所有其他的对象，比如火和水，热和冷，只是人们根据经验，根据它们的原因或结果的对立性发现了它们的相反性质；这种原因和结果的关系是哲学上的第七种关系，也是最自然的一种。这种关系中包含的相似关系，将在后面再作解释。

人们自然会期望我把差异加入这些关系之中。但是我认为差异是关系的否定，而不是任何真实或积极的东西。差异分为两种，一种是与同一性相反的差异，一种是与相似性相反的差异。第一种被叫做量的差异，而第二种是类的差异。

第六节　论模式和实体

和模式观念一样，实体观念只是简单观念的集合，这些简单观念被想象联合起来，有个加之于它们的特殊名字，借此我们可以回忆自己或者他人那个集合体。但是这些观念的差异在于，构成一个实体的特殊性质，通常指向某种未知物，这些性质本质上即属于这些事物；即使没有这些虚构，至少这些性质也会由于相互接近和因果关系而被紧密地联系起来。这样做的结果会是，我们无论发现什么新的简单性质和其余的性质有同样的联系，我们会立刻把这个性质加入其中，即使它原本并不在那个实体的最初概念里面。例如我们关于金子的观念可能最初是：黄色、有一定重量、有延展性和易熔性的物体；但是发现了它在王水中的可溶性之后，我们把这个性质加在了其他性质之后，假设它属于那个实体，就像从一开始它就是组成那个复合黄金观念的一部分一样。结合原则被认为是复合观念的主要部分，这个原则就接受了任何后来出现的，并且像最初出现的其他性质一样同样包含在那个复合观念中的性质。

显然，只要考察一下模式的本质，就会知道模式方面不会发生那样的情形。模式由之构成的简单观念，再现了那些不能被接近关系和因果关系所联结，而是分散在不同主体之中的种种性质；或者如果它们被联结起来了，联结原则也不会被看作是复合观念的基础。跳舞的观念是第一种模式的例子；美丽的观念是第二种模式的例子。复合观念为什么只要接受任何新的观念，便要改变用来区别样态的那个名字，其理由是明显的。

第七节　论抽象观念

关于抽象观念或者一般观念，已经有一个非常重要的问题被提了出来，即在心灵构想这些观念的时候，它们是一般的还是特殊的呢？一位伟大的哲学家（贝克莱博士）已经辩驳过在这个问题上公认的观念，并且断言，所有的一般观念都只是附加在一些特殊名词上的特殊观念，这些名词赋予那些特殊观念一种更为广泛的意义，使它们在需要时召唤起那些别的与它们相似的观念。由于我认为这是今年来学术界中最为伟大和有价值的发现之一，所以我在这里将尽力通过论证加以证实，希望这些论证会使它无可置疑。

显然，在我们形成即使不是全部，也是大多数的一般观念时，我们抽象出一切在性质和质量上的特殊度，而且一个对象也不会因为它在范围、持续时间和其他性质方面的小小改变，而不再属于原来的某个特殊的种类。因此可以认为这里有一个在决定那个抽象观念的本质方面的明显的困难，它为哲学家提供了许多思考。一个“人”的抽象观念代表了各种不同身材和品质的人；可以断言，要抽象出一个人的观念，或者通过同时再现所有可能的身材和所有可能的性质的方法；或者，通过再现一个没有任何特殊之处的身材和性质的方法。为前一个命题进行辩护已被认为是荒谬的，因为这就暗示着心灵有无限的能力，所以通常的推论都倾向于后者：那么我们的抽象观念就被假设为既不再现数量的特殊度，也不再现质量的特殊度。但是那个推论是错误的，我在这里想要尽力证明。第一，我要证明，对于任何质量或者数量如果没有形成一个准确的观念，就绝对无法设想这个质量或者数量；第二，我要指出，尽管心灵的能力并非是无限的，但是我们可以同时形成一个关于所有可能的质量和数量的观念，虽然这个方式并不完美，但至少可以达到所有思考和谈话的目的。

我们先从第一个命题开始，即心灵如果对于质量或数量的程度不能形成一个准确的概念，就不能对质量或数量形成任何概念。我们可以通过三个论证来证明这点。第一，我们已经说过，任何有差异的对象都是可以区别的，并且任何可以区别的对象都是可以被思考和想象所分离的。而且，我们在这里再说一句，这些命题反过来说也是同样正确的，即任何可以分离的对象都是可以区别的，任何可以区别的对象，都是有差异的。因此，为了知道抽象作用是否包含着分离作用，我们只需要在这个观点下进行考察，并且检验所有那些我们从一般观念中抽取出去的细节，是否和那些我们保留下来作为它们本质部分的细节相区别。这些观念是互相结合在概念之中的；关于一条线的一般观念，不论我们如何抽象和精确，当它出现在心灵中的时候总是具有一个精确的质量和数量上的程度；不管它如何被用来代表其他具有不同质量和数量程度差别的线。

第二，大家都会赞成，任何对象出现在感观的时候，或者换个说法，任何印象出现在心灵中的时候，其质量和数量总是被确定的……

第三，哲学上有一个公认的原则，即自然界中的任何事物都是独特的，假设确实具有一个没有确定比例的边角存在的三角形，是十分荒谬的。心灵中的意象只是关于某个特殊对象的，尽管我们在推理中运用它时好像它具有普遍性一样……

之所以超出其本质运用观念，是因为我们把观念的所有可能程度的质量和数量以这种并非完美的方法集中起来，以服务于人生的目的；这是我要提出说明的第二个命题。经常，当我们在几个对象之间发现一种相似性的时候，我们就把同一个名称用于它们全体，而不管我们在它们的质量和数量上看到了什么样的差异，也不管是否会有别的差异出现在它们中间。这个名词唤起了某个个别的观念，连同某种习惯；这个习惯也会唤起我们需要的任何其他的个别观念。但是由于在大多数情况下这个名词所指的所有观念不可能都产生出来，我们出于一种比较片面的考虑省略了这个工作，并且发现我们的推理并没有因为这个省略而产生什么不便。

因为我们现在讨论的问题有一个最为特殊的情况，即在心灵产生一个超越我们推理的个别观念之后，如果我们偶尔形成了与这个观念不相符合的任何推理，那么由一般名词或抽象名词所唤起的那种如影随形的习惯，很快就会提出任何别的个体来……

不仅如此，而且由于习惯的完整性，同一个观念能够附加于不同的词语之上，在不同的推理中被运用，而没有发生错误的危险。例如一个高为一寸的等边三角形，可以让我们用来谈论一个形状，一个直线形，一个规则形状，一个三角形，一个等边三角形……

为了确定“形状”这个词的含意，我们会在心中来回考虑不同大小和比例的圆形、正方形、平行四边形、三角形的观念，而不会仅仅停留在一个意象或一个观念上。无论如何，有一件事情是肯定的，任何时候当我们运用任何一般名词的时候，我们形成的是个体的观念；我们很少甚至绝不能穷尽所有个体；那些仍然留下来的观念，只是通过那种习惯而得到再现的，在任何有所需要的时候，这种习惯就能够唤起那些观念。这就是我们抽象观念和一般名词的本质；我们就以这种方式来说明前面提出的那个悖论：某些观念在本质上虽是特殊的，在再现时却是一般。一个特殊观念通过附加上一个一般的名词后，就变得一般了，也就是说，附在这样的一个名词上，由于习惯上的联系，这个名词和许多其他的特殊观念都有关系，因此能够很快地在想象中召唤出其他那些观念来。

第一，我要说，当我们提到任何大的数字，例如一千时，心灵一般没有对于它的恰当的观念，只能通过包括形成那个数字在内的十进制的恰当观念来形成它。但是我们观念中的这个缺点，在推理中却几乎不被感觉到；这似乎是和我们现在研究的普遍观念相平行的一个例子。

第二，我们有不少这种例子：习惯可以被某一个单独的单词唤起，例如，一个人通过死记硬背记住了一篇论文的几段，或几首诗，却想不起来的时候，只需提醒他篇首的一个词或者一个句子，他便会记起全文来。

第三，我相信任何人只要考察一下在推理时的心理状况都会同意我这一点，即我们不是在我们使用的每个词上都附加清晰完整的观念，在谈到政府、教会、谈判、征服时，我们很少会在心中展开构成这些复合观念的所有简单观念。但是我们可以注意到，尽管有这种缺点，我们还是可以避免在这些问题上胡言乱语，并且可以察觉到这些观念之间的不一致，就像我们可以充分理解它们一样。例如，如果不说在战争中弱者总是求助于谈判，而却说他们总是采用征服的手段，那么由于我们总是习惯于把某些关系附加在观念之上，所以那种习惯还是伴随着词语而来，并且使得我们立即察觉到那个命题的谬误。

第四，……想象极为快速地启发它的观念，并且能够立即在需要运用时再现它们，没有什么比这更加让人觉得奇妙了。想象在搜集属于任何题材的观念时，能够从宇宙的一端掠到宇宙的另一端。我们可以认为，整个智性世界已经全部呈现在我们眼前，我们只需拣出最合于我们目的的那些就可

在结束这个题目之前我要运用同样的原则来说明经院哲学中常被谈及却又很少为人理解的“理性的区别”问题。形状与被赋形的物体，运动与运动的物体就属于此类。解释这种区别的困难来自上述的那个原则，即所有有差异的观念都是可以分离的。因为根据那个原则，如果形状和物体是不同的，它们的观念必然可以分离也可以区分；如果它们并非不同，那么它们的观念既是不可分离的，也是不可区分的。理性的区别既没有包含着差异也没有包含着分离，那么这种理性的区别到底有什么意义呢？

要解决这种难题我们必须运用前面对抽象观念所作的说明。的确，心灵绝不会想到在被赋予形状的物体中去区分一个形状，因为两者在实际上是既不可区分，又没有差异，又不可分离的。例如，当一个白色大理石球出现在眼前时，我们只是接收了附着在某个形状上的白色的印象，我们无法从这种形状中分离区别出这种颜色。但是后来我们看到一个黑色的大理石球和一个白色的立方体，并把它们与前一个白色大理石球相比较时，我们发现了两种先前看来似乎无法分离的相似之处，经过几次这种实践之后，我们开始可以通过理性把形状与颜色区别开来。当我们仅仅考察一个白色大理石球的形状时，我们实际上形成了一个同时具备形状和颜色的观念，不过是在默默地关注它和黑色大理石球的相似性罢了。用同样的方法，当我们仅仅考察它的颜色时，我们就会把我们的注意力转向它和白色立方体的相似性。通过这种方法我们就在自己的观念上附加了一种反省，但是习惯在很大程度上使我们感觉不到这种反省。如果有人希望我们考察一个白色大理石球的形状而不准想到它的颜色，那么他就是在要求一件不可能的事情；但是他的意思只是，我们应该一并考察形状与颜色，但是我们仍然要关注它与黑色大理石球的相似关系，以及它与别的任何颜色或任何物质的球体的相似关系。

以了 ……

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第二章　论空间和时间观念

第一节　论空间和时间观念的无限可分性

任何带有似是而非性质的看法，和人类最初且最没有偏见的概念相反的那些看法，往往会被哲学家们贪婪地接受，好像这就表明了他们学说的优越性，表明了他们的学说发现远远超越于庸俗的看法。另一方面，哲学家对我们的任何可以引起惊奇和钦佩的建议，也使他们的心灵获得极大的满足，使得他们的心灵沉溺在那些惬意的情绪当中，他们绝不愿意被人说服去相信他们的快乐是完全没有根据的。从这些哲学家和他们的追随者的这种倾向中，产生了他们之间相互讨好的情形；前者提供了大量这样奇怪而无法说明的意见，而后者，即他们的学生就很快地相信了这些。关于这种互相讨好的情形，我可以举出一个最明显的例子，即无限可分性原理，我想以对无限可分性的考察，开始我对于空间和时间观念这个题目的研究。

人们普遍承认，心灵的能力是有限的，永远无法获得一个完全恰当的无限的观念。在否认了心灵有无限能力的时候，我们也就假设了心灵分割它的观念是有限的；没有什么办法可以逃避这个结论的明显性。

因此，可以确定，想象可以达到一个最小点，并且自身产生一个再也不能分割的观念，如果再要分割它便会完全消失。

感觉的印象和想象的观念情形相同。在纸上画一个墨点，盯住它，然后向后退，直到你看不见它为止；显然，在它即将消失的那一瞬间，那个意象或者印象是完全不可分割的。

由此我们可以发现通常看法的错误，即心灵的能力受到两方面的限制，而且想象不可能形成某个超过某种程度的极小物或者极大物的恰当观念。我们在想象中形成的某些观念，以及我们在感官中留下的意象可以达到的最小程度，没有什么比它们更为微小的了，因为有些观念和意象是完全单纯并不可分的。我们感官的唯一缺点就是，它们呈现给我们不合比例的关于事物的意象，把那些巨大而又由许多部分组成的事物再现得极为微小和单纯。

第二节　论空间和时间的无限可分性

凡是能无限分割的东西必然包含了无限的部分；否则我们会很快达到不可分的部分而停下来。因此，如果任何有限的广袤是可以无限分割的，那么可以毫不矛盾地假设，有限的广袤包含了有限的部分。反过来说，如果假设有限的广袤包括了无限的部分是一种矛盾，那么没有任何有限的广袤是可以被无限分割的。但是只要我考察一下我自己的明确的观念，我就能轻易地使自己相信后一种假设是不合理的。总而言之，我可以断言，具有无数个部分的观念和无限的广袤是同一个概念；任何有限的广袤都不可能包含无数的部分；因此有限的广袤是不可无限分割的。

我可以再附加一位非常著名的作家[1]提出来的另一个论证，它在我看来是非常有力且优美的。显然，存在本身只能属于单位，而决不能运用于数字，之所以运用了数字，是因为单位由数字组成。我们可以说存在着二十个人，但是只是因为他们中的一个、两个、三个、四个等等存在，如果你否定了后者的存在，前者当然也就不存在了。因此，要假设任何数字存在，却否定单位存在是完全荒谬的。单位这个词仅仅是虚构出来的一个名称，心灵把它运用到任何把它集合起来的物体的数量上；这样一个单位不能单独存在，正如数字不能单独存在一样，因为单位实际上是一个真正的数字。

这一切的推理都能够运用到时间的论证上。时间有不可分割的特性，并以此为其本质，那就是说时间的各个部分是互相连续的，而且任何部分无论多么相近，也不能共存。1737年和现在的1738年不能同时存在。根据同样的理由，每个瞬间都必须互相区别，不是在前，就是在后。

空间的无限可分性中蕴含着时间的无限可分性，这在运动的本质中明显地表现了出来。因此如果后者是不可能的，那么前者也必然同样不可能。

在这里我们可以说，假装问题可以得到证明，并试图通过这种方式来逃避它的力量与明晰性，是再荒谬不过的事情。证明和或然推论不一样，在其中不会有困难发生，一个论证与另一个论证也不会相互抵消，从而减少证明的权威。一个证明，如果是正确的，那么就不允许有相反的问题；如果是错误的，它就仅仅只是一个诡辩，而决不会成为困难。

在形而上学中有一个基本原理：凡是心灵能够清楚构想的东西，都包含可能存在的观念，换句话说，凡是我们能够想象的东西都是绝对可能的。我们能够形成一座金色山峦的观念，因此据此可以推断这样一座山峦实际上是可能存在的。我们不能形成没有山谷的山的观念，因此就把它看作是不可能的。

确实，我们有这样一个广袤观念，否则我们为什么谈论和推理它呢？同样确定的是，这样一个想象构想的观念，尽管可以分成许多部分或者更小的观念，却是不可能无限分割的，其数量也不可能是无限的：因为那就超过了我们有限的理解能力。

[1]马尔修先生。

第三节　论空间和时间观念的其他性质

当我睁开眼睛去看周围的对象时，我就感知了这许多可见的物体；当我再次闭上眼睛，去考虑它们之间的距离时，我就获得了关于广袤的观念。由于每个观念来自与它极为相似的那些印象，那么和广袤观念相似的印象必然或者是由视觉得来的感觉，或者是由这些感觉产生的内在印象。

我眼前的这张桌子，它的外观就足以给我广袤的观念。假设那个最初给我们以广袤观念的延展的物体由那些紫色的色点组合；那么每次重复那个观念时，我们不仅会以同样的秩序排列那些色点，而且还会把那些我们熟悉的颜色精确地加到上面。后来我们又体验到其他颜色：深紫色、绿色、红色、白色、黑色，以及这些颜色的不同组合，发现由这些颜色组成的色点的排列也有一种相似性，我们就尽可能地去除颜色的特性，仅仅从颜色的排列或是出现的方式中形成了抽象观念。

正如我们是根据可见和可触摸的物体的排列获得空间观念，我们的时间观念是根据观念和印象的延续而产生的，时间本身不可能单独出现，或被心灵注意到。一个酣睡的人或一个沉思于某事的人都感觉不到时间；根据他的知觉互相连续得或快或慢，同一段时间在他的想象中便显得或长或短。如果没有连续的知觉，我们就没有时间观念。从这些以及许多其他的现象中，我们可以断言，时间不能单独或者伴随着一个稳定不变的物体出现在心灵中，它总是因为一些可变对象的可知觉延续而被发现的。

我们已经发现，时间最初出现在心灵中的时候总是和可变对象的延续结合着的，否则它绝不会被我们注意到，现在我们必须考察，如果我们没有想到任何对象的延续，我们是否能够想象时间观念，以及时间是否可以单独地在想象中形成一个明晰的观念。

时间观念产生的特殊印象并不与其他印象相混合，能将其明显地与其他印象区别开来；时间观念完全是由印象呈现于心中时的那种方式产生的，而它却不是它们中的一个。心灵确实需要某些物体的观念，离开了这些观念它就不可能形成时间概念；既然这个概念不是作为原始的清晰印象出现的，显然就只能以某种方式，即相互连续的方式，来排列不同的观念、印象或者物体。

还有另外一个决定性的论证，它建立了我们当前关于空间和时间观念的学说，而且它只是建立在如下一个简单原则之上，即我们的时空观念是由不可分的部分组成的。这个论证可能值得考察。

空间观念由视觉和触觉两种感官传递到心中；任何看不到或摸不到的事物是不会显得广袤的。再现广袤的那个复合印象，是由许多较小的印象构成的，它们对于眼睛和感觉来说是不可分的，可以称为具有颜色和固体性的原子或粒子的印象。但是这还不是全部。这些原子需要有颜色和可触性，以使我们的感官发现它们；另外，我们也必须保持关于它们颜色或可触性的观念，才能通过想象理解它们。只有关于它们颜色或可触性的观念，才使得它们能够被我们的心灵所想象。如果把这些可感知的性质的观念去掉，它们对于思维或者想象来说就完全消失了。

部分的情况和整体一样。如果一个点不是被看作有颜色和可触摸的，它就不能给我们传达任何观念；因此由这些点的观念所组成的广袤的观念也绝不会存在。但是如果广袤的观念确实存在，我们就会意识到它确实是存在的，它的各个部分必须也存在；而为了要能存在，它就必须被认为是具有颜色和可触摸的。因此我们把空间或广袤看作是我们视觉或者感觉的一个对象，否则我们便无从知道它们。

同样的推理可以证明，时间的每个可分的瞬间必然也充斥了某种真实的物体或存在，它们的延续构成了时间的持续，并使得时间能够被心灵所想象。

第四节　论存在观念和外界存在观念

在结束这个题目之前，我们不妨解释一下存在和外界存在这两个观念；这些观念和空间和时间观念一样，也有它们的难解之处。通过这种方法，在我们完全理解了那些可能会进入我们推理中的一切特殊观念之时，我们就为我们考察知识和概然率做好了准备。

我们不能够意识到或者记忆起来的印象或观念，都不能作为存在物被想象；显然，从这种意识中我们得到了关于存在的最完善和最可确定的观念。由此我们可以形成一个能够想象到的最为清晰和最具结论性的二难推理，就是既然我们在想起任何观念或印象时总要赋予它存在，那么存在观念要么必然是来自和我们每个思考的知觉或对象相联系的独特的印象，要么就必然和知觉或对象的观念是同一的。

这个二难推理显然是这个原则的结论，即每个观念都来自一个相似的印象。所以我们无须更多怀疑在这个二难推理的命题之间所作的决定。不但完全没有任何独特印象伴随着每一个印象和每一个观念，而且我认为没有任何两个独特的印象是不可分离地联结在一起的。尽管某些感觉一度会联结在一起，但我们可以很快地发现它们可以分离，并可以分开呈现。因此，尽管我们记得的每个印象和观念都被认为是存在的，存在观念却并不是来自任何特殊的印象。

因此，存在观念和我们想象为存在的观念是同一的。只反省某个东西，和把它作为存在物反省并没有什么不同。存在观念与任何对象的观念联结在一起的时候，并没有为这个观念增加什么。无论我们想象什么，我们总是把它想象为存在的。我们乐意去形成的任何观念都是一个存在的观念；而一个存在的观念也就是我们所乐意形成的任何观念。

我们在前面[1]所作的推理，即观念没有实在的区别仍然可以区分，对此却没有帮助。那种区别是建立在同一个简单观念对于几个不同的观念可能有的不同的相似性上。但是没有任何对象能够在存在方面与某个对象相似，而在同一个方面却又与其他对象不同；因为每一个呈现出来的对象，必然都是存在的。

一个相似的推理可以说明外界存在的观念。我们可以说，哲学家们公认的，并且自身表现也非常明显的就是，除了心灵的知觉或印象和观念外，没有什么实际之物存在于心灵之中，并且外界对象仅仅是通过它们引起的知觉而为我们所知。恨、爱、思考、感觉、看见；这一切都是要去知觉的。

既然心灵中除了知觉之外再没有别的了，既然所有的观念都是来自先前存在于心灵的东西；因此我们不可能去想象或形成任何与观念和印象在种类上有区别的观念。我们尽可能地把注意力从我们自身移开：我们追逐着想象直到天堂，或是直到宇宙的最远的极限；但我们实际上一步也没有超越我们自身，而且除了出现在那个狭窄范围内的那些知觉之外，我们不能想象任何种类的存在。这就是想象的宇宙，除了这个宇宙产生出来的观念之外，我们再也没有任何观念了。

当我们假设外界对象与我们的知觉有种类上的差别时，我们对外界对象的想象所能达到的最大限度就是形成一个与它们相关的观念，而不是自以为理解了这些相关的对象。一般说来，我们并不假设它们在种类上有所不同；只是赋予它们不同的关系联结和维续。关于这点以后将要更充分地讨论。[2]

[1]第一章，第七节。

[2]第四章，第二节。

第三章　论知识和概然判断

第一节　论知识

有七种[1]不同的哲学关系，即类似、同一、时间和空间关系、数量或数字的比例、任何性质的程度、相反和因果关系。这些关系可以被分成两类：一类是完全依赖我们互相比较的那些观念，一类是不因为观念的变化而变化的。我们是从一个三角形的观念发现它的三个角等于两个直角这个等量关系；只要我们的观念不变，这种关系就不可变。相反，两个物体间的接近和距离仅仅通过改变它们的位置就会被改变，而无须依赖对象本身或者关于对象的观念而改变；并且这个位置决定于心灵所不能预见的成百个不同的偶然事件。同一关系和因果关系也是如此。两个物体尽管完全相似，甚至在不同时间出现在同一个地点，但是它们在数量上可以是不同的：并且由于一个对象产生出另一个对象的那种力量绝不会只从它们的观念中被发现，原因和结果显然是我们从经验中获得信息而得来的关系，而不是来自任何抽象的推理或者反思。没有一个现象，即使是最简单的现象，可以根据出现在我们面前的对象的特性而得到说明，或者是我们无须借助记忆和经验而可以预见的。

因此，在这七种哲学关系中，仅有四种是只依赖于观念，能够成为知识和确定性的对象。这四个是类似、相反、性质的程度、和数量或数字的比例。这些关系中的三个是第一眼就可以发现的，它们应当被恰当地归入直觉而作证明的范围。当任何对象互相类似的时候，这种类似性会首先刺激眼睛，或者不如说是刺激心灵；很少会需要再一次的考察。相反关系和数量或数字的比例的关系也是如此。在确定数量或数字的比例时，我们也可以继续按照同样的方法，很快就发现任何数字或形状之间的较大和较小，尤其在这种差异非常巨大和明显的时候。

因此，就剩下代数学和算术这两种仅有的科学，在这两门科学中，我们能够把连锁的推理推进到任何错综复杂的程度，而仍然保持着完善的精确性和确定性。当两个数字被联结起来，其中一个所含的单位和另一个的每一个单位总是相符合，我们就说它们是相等的；正是因为在外延中缺少这样一个相等的标准，几何学才难以被看作是完美的和无误的科学。

[1]第一章，第五节。

第二节　论概然判断以及因果观念

所有我认为必须说明的就是作为科学基础的那四种关系。至于其他三个，却并不依赖于观念，甚至在观念保持不变时可以存在也可以不存在，应该对它们做更为详细的说明。这三种关系是同一关系、时空中的位置和因果关系。

一切推理都只是比较或者发现两个或更多对象之间彼此具有的恒常或者不恒常的关系。当这两个对象连同它们的关系都出现在感官之前时，我们把它叫做知觉而不是推理；在这种情况下，恰当地说，没有运用任何思考或行动，仅仅只是被动地通过感官接受印象。根据这种思考方式，我们就不应该把我们关于同一关系、关于时间和空间关系所作的任何观察看作是推理；因为在这两种关系中，心灵都不能超越那些直接呈现于感官之前的对象，去发现对象的真实存在或关系。只有因果关系产生了这样一种联系，即通过一个对象的存在或活动使我们确信，在它之后或之前有某种其他的存在或活动；其他两种关系也只有在它们影响这种关系和被这种关系影响的情况下，才能运用在推理中。同样的推理可以扩展到同一关系中去。但是我们超出感官印象的这个结论只能建立在因果联系中；除此之外我们也不能保证对象不会发生改变，不论新的对象如何类似于先前出现在我们感官之前的那个对象。

因此，在上述三个不仅仅依赖于观念的关系中，唯一一个能够追溯到我们感官之外，向我们报告我们看不见也感觉不到的存在或物体的，就是因果关系。

因果关系的观念必然来自于对象之间的某种关系；现在我们必须力求发现那种关系。第一，我发现，无论被认为是原因还是结果的对象，它们总是接近的；并且，任何事物只要稍微离开它所存在的时间和地点，在其他的时间和地点中便不能发生作用。因此我们可以把接近关系认为是因果关系的必要条件；至少我们可以根据一般的意见这样去假设，直到我们可以发现[1]更合适的机会，通过考察什么对象可以被并置，可以被联合，而什么对象不可以被并置或联合，来澄清这个问题。

我所认为的作为原因和结果的必要条件的第二个关系，并未获得普遍承认，而且可能会引起一些争议。那就是在时间上原因先于结果。有些人主张原因并不是绝对必然地先于结果。但是如果任何原因可以和它的结果完全同时的话，根据这个原理可以确定一切的原因和结果都是如此；因为如果它们中的任何一个在一瞬间延迟了，在那个它原该活动的那个瞬间里没有发挥作用，它就不是一个恰当的原因。这一切的后果将不亚于毁灭了我们在世界上观察到的那种原因的连续；并且实际上是把时间完全消灭了。因为，如果一个原因和结果是同时的，这个结果又和它的结果是同时的，如此类推，显然，就不会有这样一个连续的现象，并且所有的对象都必然是共存的。

那么我们是否就应该满足于接近和连续两种关系，把它们看作是可以提供一个完整原因的观念呢？不是这样的。一个对象可以和另一个对象接近或者在它之前，却并不是它的原因。这里需要考虑一种必然的联系；而这种关系比上述任何一种关系都更重要。

对于那个进入我们因果观念的必然联系之本质的考察，我们必须要放弃直接的观察；要尽力去发现一些别的问题，对于这些问题的考察可能会提供澄清现有的困难的线索。这些问题有两个，我将继续进行考察。

第一，我们因为什么理由说，每个有其开始的事物都应该有一个原因，这是必然的呢？

第二，为什么我们可以断言，那样一个特定的原因必然会有那样一个特定的结果？而且我们把原因和结果进行互相推论的那个本质是什么，我们进行这个推论的信念的本质又是什么呢？

在我继续做更深入的研究之前，我只能说，虽然原因和结果的观念不但来自于感觉印象，也来自于反省印象，但是为了简短起见，我通常只提到感觉印象作为这些观念的起源；不过我希望我所说的关于感觉印象的话也能够推衍到反省印象上去。各种情感和它们的对象之间互相有联系，而且情感之间也互相有联系；外界物体也是如此这般地联系着。因此，属于感觉印象的因果关系，必然是感觉印象和反省印象所共有的。

[1]第四章，第五节。

第三节　为什么一个原因永远是必然的

先从原因的必然性这第一个问题开始研究：哲学中有一个一般原理，即一切开始存在的东西，必然有一个存在的原因。在所有的推论当中，人们总是把这当作是理所当然的，不给出任何证明，也不要求任何证明。

一切确定性都来自观念的比较，来自只要观念不变就不会变的那些关系的发现。这些关系是类似关系、数量和数字的比例关系、任何性质的程度关系，和相反关系；这些关系中没有一个是被包含在“任何有其开始的事物必然有一个存在的原因”这个命题之中。因此，那个命题没有直观的确定性。

我们只用这样说就够了，即当我们排除了一切原因的时候，我们真的就把它们都给排除了，既不假定虚无是存在的原因，也不假定对象本身是存在的原因；因此，不能根据这些假设的谬误推出一个论证来证明那种排除是谬误的。如果每个事物必须要有一个原因，那么，排除了其他原因之后，我们只能承认把事物本身或者虚无当作原因。但是引起争论之处却在于，每个事物是否必须要有一个原因；因此，根据所有正确的推理，我们绝不应该把它视作理所当然的。

还有一些更加轻率的人说，每个结果必然有一个原因，因为原因就包含在那个结果的观念里。每个结果必然以一个原因作为前提；结果是一个相对的名词，而它的原因和它是相互关联的。但是这并不能证明，每一个存在必然有一个先在的原因；正如我们不能说因为每个丈夫必然有一个妻子，因此每个男人都是结了婚的一样。这个问题的真实情况是这样：是否每一个开始存在的对象，都必然是由于一个原因才存在；而我断言其既没有直观上的确定性，也没有证明上的确定性，我希望我以上的论证已经对其进行了充分的证明。

既然我们认为每个新的产物必然有一个原因的这个看法，不是来自于知识或者任何科学上的推理，那么它必然是来自于观察和经验。那么下一个问题自然就是，经验是如何产生这样一个原则的呢？不过我发现，把这个问题理解为下面这个问题会更方便，即为什么我们可以断定，这样特定的原因必然导致这样特定的结果？为什么我们可以形成由这一个推到那一个的推论呢？我们把这个题目作为我们将来的研究问题。最终，我们可能会发现，同样的一个答案将会解决上面两个问题。

第四节　论因果推理的组成部分

尽管心灵在根据原因或者结果进行推理的时候，把它的视野扩展到它看到或者记得的那些对象之外，但是它绝不会完全看不到它们，或者仅仅依靠它自身的观念进行推理，而是混合着一些印象，或者至少混合着和印象相等的记忆观念。当我们从原因推论到结果，我们必须要确立这些原因的存在；要确立这些原因的存在，我们只有两种方法，或者是通过我们的记忆或者是通过感觉的直接的知觉，或者是根据其他原因进行推论，这些原因我们也必须再次按照同样的方法进行确认，或者是通过现在的印象，或者是根据它们的原因进行推论，依此类推，直到达到我们见过或者记得的某个对象为止。我们不可能把我们的推论推到无限；唯一能够让推论停下来的事情，就是记忆或者感觉的一个印象，超出了这些就没有怀疑和探询的余地了。

举一个例子，我们可以选择历史上的任何一个点，并且考察我们为什么相信它或者否定它。例如我们相信，恺撒是三月十五日在元老院被刺死的；这是因为这个事实是根据历史学家们一致同意的证据所确立的，他们一致给这个事件指定了这个精确的时间和地点。这里有某些符号或者文字呈现在我们的记忆或者感觉之前；我们也记得这些符号曾被用作是某些观念的标志；这些观念或者是存在于刺杀行为时正好在场，直接从这件事的存在中获得观念的那些人的心中；或者是从别人的证据那里得来，并且那个证据又是从另外的证据那里得来，通过这样明显可见的推进，直到达到那些事件的目击者或者旁观者那里。显然，这个论证的链条或因果联系，最初是建立在那些见过或者记得的文字和字母上的，如果没有记忆或者感觉的可靠性，我们整个的推理将会是异想天开和没有基础的。没有了根据，每个链条中的环节都将依靠另一个；但是没有能够支撑整体的任何东西固定在它的末尾处；因此将不会有任何信念或者证据。实际上任何假设论证，或者根据假设进行的推理都是这种情形；它们中没有任何现有的印象或者对一个真实存在的信念。

第五节　论感觉印象和记忆印象

我们关于因果的全部论证由这样两个部分组成，一是记忆印象或者感官印象，二是那个存在的观念，它产生这个印象的对象，或者被这个对象所产生。因此，我们在此有三件事情需要说明，第一是原始印象，第二是向有关的原因或者结果观念的推移过程，第三是那个观念的本质与特性。

至于那些感觉产生的印象，它们的最终原因在我看来是无法被人类理性所完全解释的，我们永远无法确切地断定，它们究竟是直接由那个对象所引起的，还是由心灵的创造力产生的，或者是从我们的造物主那里得来的。这样一个问题对我们现在的目的来讲也不重要。无论我们的知觉是真是假，无论它们是正确地再现了自然，还是仅仅只是感觉的幻象，我们都可以从它们的连贯性中得到一些推断；

在寻找那种区别记忆和想象的特征时，我们必定会立刻察觉到，那个特征不在于记忆呈现给我们的简单观念中；因为这两种官能都是由印象得到的简单观念，并且绝不会超出这些原始的知觉。这两种官能之间的差别同样也不在于它们的复合观念的排列方式。因为，虽然记忆的特性在于保存它的观念的原初顺序和位置，而想象却可以随意调换和改变它们的顺序和位置；可是这种差别并不足以使我们在运作中区分它们的作用，或者使我们能够辨别二者；我们不能唤回过去的印象，以便把它们和我们当前的观念加以比较，去看看它们的排列顺序是否精确地相似。记忆既不是通过它的复杂观念的顺序，也不是通过它的简单观念的本质而被人认知；因此，记忆和想象的区别在于记忆具有更大的影响力和活泼性。一个人可以放纵他的想象，去捏造任何过去冒险的情景；但想象的观念如果不是较为微弱和模糊的话，就无法把想象的情景与同样的记忆的情景区别开来。

一个记忆的观念，可能由于失去了它的影响力和活泼性而衰退到这样一个程度，以至于被当作是一个想象的观念；同样的，在另一方面，一个想象的观念可以获得这样的影响力和活泼性，以至于被认为是一个记忆的观念，并在信念和判断中仿制着和记忆同样的效用。这种情况可以在撒谎者身上看到：通过频繁地重复他们的谎言，最后他们就会把它们当作是事实而相信和记住它们；习俗和习惯在这种情况下也像在其他情况下一样，对心灵产生了和自然一样的影响力，并且给观念灌注了同样的影响力和活力。

只有知觉的强力和生动性才构成了判断的最初活动，并且当我们追溯因果关系时，奠定了我们根据这种判断进行推理的基础。

第六节　论从印象到观念的推断

我们只能根据经验从一个对象的存在推断另一个对象的存在。经验的本质就是这样。在研究进展中，我们根本想不到，完全在研究另一个题目的时候，会无意识地发现原因和结果之间的一个新关系。这个关系就是它们之间的恒常联结。我们要把讨论的思路继续下去；我们已经知道，在发现了任何对象的恒常联结之后，我们总是要从一个对象推断到另一个对象，现在我们要考察那个推断的本质，以及从印象到观念的推移过程的本质。最终我们可能会发现，是必要联系依赖于这个推断，而不是相反。

从呈现于我们记忆或者感觉的印象，到我们叫做原因或者结果的一个对象的观念的那个推移过程，看来是建立在过去的经验中，建立于我们对于它们的恒常联结产生的记忆上，那么下面的问题就是：经验是通过理解还是通过想象产生这个观念的呢？我们是被理性所决定做这种转变的呢，还是被知觉的某种联系或者关系所决定作这种转变的呢？如果是理性决定我们，那么它应该是按照下面这个原则进行：我们所没有经历过的例子，必然类似于我们经历过的例子，而自然的过程是永远不变地继续着的。为了澄清这个问题，让我们考虑假设为建筑在这样一个命题上的所有论据；并且因为这些论据必然来自知识或者概然推断，我们可以把目光转向这些论据的不同程度，看看它们是否可以提供这种本质的正确结论。

在概然判断中，心灵必然会呈现某些东西，或者是看见的，或者是记得的；我们正是根据这些来推断和它相关而没有被看见或者记得的某些东西。

能够引导我们超越记忆和感觉的直接印象的对象间的唯一联系或者关系，就是因果关系；因为它是作为我们从一个对象到另一个对象的正确推理的基础的唯一关系。原因和结果的观念来自于经验，经验使得我们了解，这样一些特殊的对象，在过去所有的例子中，彼此之间都是恒常联结的：假设一个与这些对象之一相类似的对象直接呈现在它的印象中时，我们会推定一个与它的通常伴随物相似的对象的存在。根据这个我认为在每一点上都无可置疑的说明，概然推断是建立在我们经历过的和我们没有经历过的那些对象之间的类似性的假设上；因此这个假设不可能来自概然推断。同样的原则不可能既是另一个原则的原因，又是它的结果；关于那个关系，这或许就是既有直观确定性又有证明确实性的唯一命题。

因此，不仅我们的理性不能发现原因和结果的最终联系，而且即使在经验向我们指出了它们的恒常联结之后，我们也不能根据我们的理性而信服，为什么我们必须把那种经验扩展到我们曾经观察过的特殊例子之外。我们只能假设，但是永远不能证明，我们经历过的那些对象和我们没有发现过的对象之间必然有一种类似性。

尽管因果关系是一种包含着接近、连续和恒常联结的哲学关系，只有当它是一种自然的关系，并且在我们的观念中产生了一种结合的时候，我们才能对它进行推理，或者从它推出任何结论。

第七节　论观念或者信念的本质

心灵的全部知觉分为两种，即印象和观念，两者的差别只在于强烈和生动的程度不同。我们的观念是由印象复制而来，并表现出印象的全部。当你想以任何方式改变一个特殊对象的观念时，你只能增加或者减少它的强烈程度或者生动程度。如果你对它作出了任何改变，那么它就再现了一个不同的对象或者印象。既然信念只改变我们想象对象的方式，所以它只能给我们的信念一种附加的强力和生动性。因此，一个意见或者信念可以很精确地被定义为：和一个现存的印象相关联或相联系的一个生动的观念。

这个定义与每个人的感觉和经验也是完全符合的。我们所同意的那些观念，比那些空中楼阁般的散漫幻想要更为强烈、牢固和生动，这是明显的。如果一个人坐下来把一本书当作小说来读，但是另一人却把它当作真实历史来读，他们显然都以同样的顺序接受到同样的观念；而相信与否都不妨碍他们对所读的书作出同样的理解。作者的文字在两者那里都产生了同样的观念；尽管他的证据对他们没有产生同样的影响。后者对于所有事件有一种更为生动的概念。他更为深切地体会到人物的遭遇：他对自己再现出他们的行动、性格、友情和敌意；他甚至对他们的性格、姿态和个性形成了一个概念。至于前一个人不相信作者的论据，他对于所有这些细节就只有一个较为模糊和黯淡的概念；除了文风的优美和布局的精巧之外，他从书中体会不到什么乐趣。

我会很乐意在人性科学中建立一个一般原理，即当任何印象呈现在我们面前的时候，它不但把心灵转移到和那个与它相关的一些观念之中，并且也把印象的一部分影响力和生动性传递给观念。（选自第八节）

为了保存通常的词义，并且同时又标志出证据的各个程度，把人类理性分成三个种类可能是比较方便的，即根据知识的理性、根据证据的理性和根据概然判断的理性。所谓知识，我指的是来自观念比较的确定性。所谓证据，我指的是来自因果关系，而完全不受怀疑和具有确定性的那些论据。所谓概然判断，我指的是仍然伴随着不确定性的那些证据。

概然判断或者推测性的推理，可以分为两类，即建立在机会上的和建立在原因上的。

机会，只是一个原因的否定，在心中产生了一个完全中立的状态；一个原因的否定和一个完全的中立状态永远不能比另一个原因的否定和另一个完全的中立状态更占优势或处于劣势；机会中必然混杂着一些原因，以便成为任何推理的基础。（选自第十一节）

第八节　论原因的概然性

原因的概然判断虽然存在着好几种；但是都是来自同一根源，即观念与一个现存印象的联结。既然产生这种联结的习惯来自对象之间的频繁结合，那么它一定是逐步达到了成熟程度，并且一定可以从我们观察到的每个例子中获得新的力量。

第一，我们可以说，无论概率性多大，总有相反的可能性；因为如果不是这样的话，它便不是一种可能性，而是一种确定性了。

第二，这种可能性的组成部分和概然性在本质上是相同的，只存在着数量上的差别，并无种类上的差异。

第三，我们可以建立一条确定原理，即在一切精神与自然现象中，当任何原因由多个部分组成，其结果也会随着组成部分数字变化而增减时，可以恰当地说，那个结果是一个复合结果，而且是由来自原因的各个部分的若干结果的联合而发生的。

既然概然性和可能性的组成部分从本质上来说是相似的，就必然会产生类似的结果；而它们结果的相似性就在于，它们各自再现了一个特殊对象的心像。但是尽管这些部分的本质相同，它们在数量和数目上还是非常不同的；并且这种差异必然也和相似性一样出现在结果中。不过它们所呈现的心像在两方面都是完全和完整的，并且包括了对象的所有部分，在这一点上不可能有任何差异；只有概然性中的那种由较多的心像的协作引起的更大的生动性，才能区别这些结果。所有这些概然性都被哲学家所接受，且被承认为信念和意见的合理基础。不过还有一些其他的概然性来自同样一些原则，尽管它们没有获得承认的好运气。

第九节　论非哲学的概然性

第四类非哲学的概然性来自我们自己随意形成的一般规则，它们就是我们所谓的偏见的来源。爱尔兰人不可能富有机智，法国人不庄重；因此，尽管与前者的交谈每次都令人愉快，尽管法国人的谈话非常明智，我们仍然对他们怀有很大的偏见；尽管他们通情达理，我们还是认为他们必然是傻瓜蛋或者纨绔子弟。人性总是易于受到这类错误的影响；我们这个民族和任何别的民族可能都是如此。

人们可能要问为什么人会形成通则，甚至在它与目前的观察和经验明显不同的时候还允许它们影响自己的判断？那么我会回答，在我看来，它们就是一切因果判断所依据的那些原则。

当一个对象在很多情况下与任何原因相类似的时候，想象自然地促使我们对它的通常结果形成一个生动的概念，尽管那个对象在最重要、最有效的条件方面与那个原因有差异。这是通则的第一个影响。但是，当我们重新审视这种心灵的活动，把它和知性的更为概括和更为可靠的活动相比较时，我们就会发现这种作用的不规则性，并且发现它会破坏一切最为确定的推理原则；由于这个原因，我们就把它排斥了。这是通则的第二个影响，并且有排斥第一个通则的含意。根据各人的心情和个性，有时这个通则占优势，有时另一个通则占优势。普通大众通常受第一个通则的指导，而明智的人则受第二个通则的指导。同时，怀疑主义者可能觉得高兴，因为在这里他们观察到了我们理性的一种新的明显的矛盾，并且看到全部哲学轻易被人性的一个原则所推翻，而随后又被同一个原则的一个新的方向所挽救了。遵循通则是一种极为非哲学的概然判断；可是也只有通过遵循它，我们才能改正这个和其他一切非哲学的概然判断。

第十节　判断原因和结果所依据的规则

根据前面的学说，如果只是观察，而不借助于经验，那么我们就不能确定某些对象是其他对象的原因；我们也不能用同样的方式来断定它不是原因。任何事物都可以产生其他事物。创造，消灭，运动，理性，意志，所有这些都可以互相产生，或是产生于我们所能想象的任何别的对象。如果我们将上述两个原则比较一下，那么这个说法就不会显得奇特了，第一，各个对象的恒常联结决定了它们的原因；第二[1]，恰当地说，除了存在和不存在之外，没有对象是互相对立的。

因此，既然一切对象都可能互为因果，那么如果确定一些通则，通过这些通则我们知道什么时候它们确实是那样，可能会是恰当的。

（1）原因和结果在空间和时间上必然都是相互接近的。

（2）原因必然先于结果。

（3）原因和结果之间必然有一种恒常的联合。构成因果关系的主要是这种性质。

（4）同样的原因必然产生同样的结果，同样的结果也永远只会产生同样的原因。这个原则来自我们的经验，并且是我们大部分哲学推理的根源。因为当我们借助任何清晰的实验发现了任何现象的原因或者结果的时候，我们不会等着最初的关系观念所得来的那个恒常的重复，就会立即把观察推广到每个同类的现象中去。

（5）还有另一个依赖此原则而形成的原则，即当几个不同的对象产生了同样的结果时，那一定是因为借助了我们所发现的它们具有的某个共同的性质。因为相似的结果包含了相似的原因，所以我们必然把那个原因归之于我们发现的互相类似的那个条件。

（6）下面的原则也是基于同样的理由。两个相似对象在结果中的差异，来自于它们相互差异的那一点。因为相似的原因既然产生相似的结果，那么如果在任何例子中我们的期望落空，我们必然会断言，那种不规则性是由原因中的某些差异得来的。

（7）当任何对象随着它的原因的增减而增减的时候，那个对象就应该被认为是一个复合的结果，它来自原因的几个不同部分产生的不同结果的联合。这里假设原因的一部分的不存在与存在，总会伴随着结果中一个相应部分的不存在或存在。这种恒常的结合充分证明了一个部分是另一个部分的原因。但是我们必须注意不要从少数实验中得出这样的结论。例如某种程度的热度会给人快乐，如果你减少那个热度，快乐就会减少；但是这并不是说，如果你把热度增加到超过某个程度，快乐也会增加；因为我们会发现快乐已经变成了痛苦。

（8）我要提出的第八条也是最后的原则是：一个对象如果完整地存在了任何一个时期而没有产生任何结果，那么它就不是这个结果的唯一原因，而要受到其他可以推动它的影响和运作的原则的协助。既然相似的结果必然在接近的时间和空间里伴随着相似的原因，它们的暂时分离就表明这些原因是不完全的原因。

这就是我所认为在推理中适合运用的全部逻辑；甚至这些逻辑也并不是必须的，而可以被人类知性的自然原则代替。所有这些本质的原则都非常容易发明，但是运用起来就极其困难；甚至那些看来最自然、最简单的实验哲学，也需要人类判断的极大努力。

[1]第一章，第五节。

第四章　怀疑主义和哲学的其他系统

第一节　理性的怀疑主义

在所有实证性的科学中，规则是确定的、没有错误的，但是当我们实施这些规则时，我们易犯错误且不确定的自身能力倾向于背离规则，从而深陷于错误之中。因此，我们必须在每一段推理中形成一个新的判断，以此来审核与考察我们的最初判断或者信念。我们应该扩大我们的视野，去领会各种情况发生的经过，检视其中我们的理解力欺骗我们的地方，把它们和那些在其领域之内公正和真实的情况相比较。我们的理性必须被看作一种原因，而真理是其自然的结果。但是，理性是容易受到其他原因侵扰的一个原因，而且由于我们精神力量的反复无常，它可能频繁地受到阻止。由此，所有的知识退化为可能性与我们经验过的理解力的准确或虚假，根据问题的简单或复杂，这种概然推断或大或小。

没有一个代数学家或者数学家在他的科学领域中如此地专业，以至于能够立刻完全相信他所发现的真理，而不是仅把它作为单纯的概然推断。每一次当他匆匆翻阅他的那些证明时，他的信心就大为增加，而且，由于他的朋友们的一致称赞，他的自信心更加充足，而在学界的普遍同意与一片掌声中，这种自信达到一个最高的程度。现在，很显然，这些自信的逐渐增加只不过是一些新的可能性的累积，并且来自于按照过去的经验和观察所得到的因果的恒常结合。

对于任何较长的或者重要的账目，商人们总是难以相信账目中的数字是准确无误的，他们对这些账目进行人为的计算，以超出于记账员的技术和经验，再制造出一种概然推断。因为计算自身就是某种程度的可能性，并且这种可能性会根据记账员是否具有经验程度和账目长度而呈现出不确定性和变化性。既然没有一个人能够确保，在一长串计算里我们的自信能超越概然推断，那么我可以断定，对于任何与数字有关的命题，我们缺乏一个比概然推断更完满的准确性。因为通过逐渐地减少数字，很容易把最长的加法系列归纳为最简单的问题，归纳为两个单独数字的相加。在这种假设的基础之上，我们将发现想要显示知识和概然推断的精确界限，或发现那个特别的数字，即知识终止于此概然推断开始于此的那个数字是不切实际的。但是，知识和概然推断是如此相互对立又相互分歧的两类东西，它们根本无法自然地不易觉察地融合在一起，另外必须存在或消失。除此之外，如果说任何单独的加算是确定的，每一个数字也将是确定的，因此全部的数目也应该是确定的，除非这个整体不同于它所有的部分。我几乎要说这是确定的了，但是我又进行了反省，像其他的推理一样，它必须减少它自己，通过这样的知识而退化为概然推断。

既然如此，所有的知识都被归结为可能性，并且最后变成与我们日常生活中所用的证据有同样特性的东西，因此我们必须检查后一种理性的属性，看着它是建立在什么基础之上的。

我们能够形成的每一个关于概然推断的判断，就像我们形成的每一个关于知识的判断一样，我们应该总是通过来自知性本性的另一个判断，来纠正来自于对象本性的第一个判断。可以确定，一个具有坚实判断力和长期经验的人，比一个愚蠢的、无知的人，应该并且的确常常更加确信他的观点，而且我们的情感，甚至是我们自己，随着我们的理性与经验程度的变化，也会有不同的权威程度。即使是一个具备最好的感知力与最长期经验的人，也不具有完全权威，因为就算这样的一个人也必将意识到发生在过去的许多错误，并且必将惧怕将来可能发生类似的错误。因此，在这里，就出现了一个新种类的概然推断，它可以用来纠正和调节第一次的概然推断，从而确定其正确的标准和比例。就像理证会受到概然推断的控制一样，概然推断也易于由精神的反省作用而得到一种新的纠正和知性本性，我们源于第一次的概然推断的推理成为这种反省作用的对象。

在每一个概然推断中，除了源于研究对象本身的原始不确定性以外，我们已经发现了一种新的不确定，这种不确定来自判断官能的弱点。我们已经把这两种不确定调整在一起，我们的理性迫使我们去增加一种新的怀疑，这种怀疑是由于我们在评估我们官能的真实可靠性的过程中所产生的概然推断的错误。

这是一种怀疑，并且，如果跟从理性，我们不可避免地会给出一个解决办法。但是这个解决办法，尽管它应该有利于我们以前所做出的判断，可是由于这些判断只是建立在概然推断的基础之上，所以必然会减弱我们起初的证据，并且它自身必将被同种类的第四种怀疑弱化，诸如此类，一直延续下去，直至最后再也不存在原始的概然推断，不论我们以为它多么巨大，也不论由于每一次新的不确定它减弱到多么小。没有任何有限的对象在无限反复的减少中还能够存在，甚至是那些人类能够想象到的数量最大的物体，也必将在这种方式下化为乌有。不管我们开始时的信念是多么的强大，经过许多次新的评估，而且每一次随着它的强力和活力的递减，它必将无可避免地全部消失。当我判断必然具有的易误性并进行反省时，我比仅仅考虑自己推理的对象时更缺乏信心，并且当我仍然继续前进时，随着一次接一次对自己官能的评估进行仔细检查，所有的逻辑规则逐渐地减少，直到最后，信念和证据被完全消灭。

如果有人问我是否真正同意我似乎不屈不挠坚持的这个论证，我是不是那坚称所有物都是不确定的众多怀疑者中的一个，是否我们对任何事物做出的判断不存在真实和虚伪的区分，我必将回答，这个问题是完全多余的，我与别的任何人都不能够真正地始终如一地坚持着这种观点。通过一种绝对且无法控制的必然性，自然已经决定我们必须做出判断，就像决定我们必须呼吸、必须感觉一样，由于一些对象和目前印象的习惯性联系，我们不能不再以一种更加强烈更加充分的眼光来看待一些确定的对象，这正如我们在清醒的时候思考，在灿烂的阳光下睁开的眼睛必将看到周围的事物一样。不管谁曾努力去反驳全部怀疑主义的毛病，他都是在进行没有一个对手的辩论，是在通过论证尽力去建立一个自然已经先在地被灌输到心灵里，且已不可避免地活动的才能。

之所以如此仔细地展现狂妄学派的这些论证，我的目的是使读者敏感地注意到我所假设的真实性，我的假设是：与原因和结果相关的所有推理都来自于习惯，信念是人本性的一种感性活动而非认知部分的活动。在这里，我已经证明，有一些极为相同的原则，能够使我们对任何题材形成一个定论，当我们检查这个题材的时候，我们可以通过思考这个题材时所运用的天赋、才能、心境来纠正这个定论。是的，我已经证实，这些相同的原则要继续深入，贯彻于每一个新的反映判断，必须逐渐地消除这些原始证据，直至最后减至没有，同时完全推翻所有的信念和观点。因此，如果说信念是一种单纯的思想活动，没有任何奇特的构想，没有任何一种强力或者活力的加入的话，它必将毫无例外地毁灭自己，并且在任何种情形下中止所有悬而未决的判断。但是，因为那些喜欢尝试的人相信经验，他在以前的那些论证中无法发现任何错误，因此他依然像平常那样继续相信、思考、推理，他可以准确地断定，他的推理和信念是感觉或者某种奇特的构想，不可能被单纯的观念和反省毁灭。

第二节　感观方面的怀疑主义

虽然怀疑主义者声称，他不能通过推理来维护他的理性，但是他仍然继续推理和相信，并且经由同样的规则他必须赞成有关物体存在的原则，他不能假装通过任何的哲学论证来确保那个原则的准确性。自然没有让怀疑主义者进行他的自由选择，并且毫无疑问地，重要之事因我们不确定的推理和思辨是不被信任的。我们很可能这样问：到底是什么原因使我们相信物体的存在？但是如果问：这里是否存在物体？这样问必然是徒劳的，毕竟在我们所有的推理中这是我们理所当然必须假定的一点。

因此，我们现在探讨的问题是：什么使我们相信物体的存在，在开始我的推理之前，我将确立一个初看起来完全多余的区别，但是它将为准确理解下面的内容提供很大帮助。我们应该分别审察平常被混淆在一起的两个问题，一个问题是，即使当物体根本不存在于我们的感官时，我们为什么仍然赋予它们继续的存在；另一个问题是，我们为什么假定它们具有一种不同于心灵与想像力的独立存在。最后，我总括了各个对象的情况和它们之间的关系，它们外在的位置和它们的存在以及作用的独立性。这两个关于物体继续存在和区别存在的问题是如此密密切相连。因此，如果我们的感觉对象继续存在，即使它们没有被感知到，它们的存在的确是独立并且区别于想像力的，反过来说，如果它们的存在独立且区别于想像力之外，它们必须继续存在，即使它们未被感知。但是尽管这一问题的解决决定了另一问题的解决，但为了我们能够更容易发现这种解决所需要的人类本性法则，我们将与这种区别同行，并且也将思考，产生这种继续存在或者区别存在观点的是感官、推理，还是想象？对于我们目前探讨的问题来说，这些问题是仅有的可以理解的问题。关于我们所认为的不同于我们知觉的外部存在的概念，我们已经指出了它的荒谬之处了。

先从感官开始谈起，很显然感官的对象不再出现在感官之后，这些官能是不可能产生出它们对象继续存在的概念的。因为这是一种术语矛盾，它假定即使这些感官在已经全部停止所有方式的活动以后仍然继续活动。因此，如果这些官能对目前的情况有任何影响，它们必将产生一种区别存在的概念，而不产生继续存在的概念，并且为了产生这种区别存在的概念，必将把它们的印象表现为形象和表象，或者把他们直接表现为区别存在和外部存在。

很明显地，我们的感官并非只把它们的印象呈现为某种区别的，或者独立的、外部的形象，因为它们传达给我们的只是一个单纯的知觉，并且绝不给我们任何其他事物的丝毫暗示。如果不是借助于理性和想象的一些推断，一个单纯的知觉绝不能产生双重存在的概念。当心灵能够看得比立即出现在它面前的东西更远时，它的结论决不仅仅归源于感官，而且当心灵能够把一个单纯的知觉推论为一个双重存在，并且假定它们之间有相似关系和因果关系时，那么它肯定是看得更远了。

因此，如果我们的感官能够提供出区别存在的任何观念，那么他们一定是通过一种错误和幻觉传达出那些印象的自身存在物。在这个问题上，我们可以观察到，所有的感觉都被心灵感觉到，就像它们真正如此一样，当我们怀疑它们是把自己作为特别的对象还是仅仅作为单纯的印象时，困难不在于感觉的本性，而在于它们之间的关系和处境。现在，如果这些感官把我们的印象呈现为外在于我们的独立之物，那么对象和我们自己都必须能够让我们的感官所感知，否则它们就不能被这些官能进行比较。所以，困难之处在于，我们究竟在多大程度上是我们感官的对象。

再次叙述一下我前面所说的关于感官的问题。感官给我们的并非继续存在的观念，因为它们不能在超越于它们真正活动的范围之外。同样地，感官也不能产生一个单独存在的观点，因为感官本身既不能把这种单独存在作为表象的东西呈现出来，也不能把它作为本源的东西呈现出来。如果要把这种存在作为表象的东西呈现，感官必须既呈现出一个对象，又呈现出一种想象。为了使这种存在像本源的东西那样呈现出来，感官本身必须传达出一种假象，而且这种假象必将存在于我们和对象间的关系和环境中，为了达到这一点，它们必须能够在对象和我们自己之间进行比较，在那样的情况下，感觉不能、当然也不可能欺骗我们。因此，我们可以断定，继续存在和区别存在的观念决不是来源于我们的感官。

为了证实这一点，我们可以观察一下由感官传达过来的三种不同类别的印象。第一种是物体本身的那些形状、体积、运动和坚固性的印象。第二种是关于物体的颜色、味道、气味、声音、热冷程度的印象。第三是对象接触到我们身体时所引起的痛苦和快乐，就像刀割到我们肉那样的疼痛，诸如此类的感觉。哲学家和普通人都认为第三种仅仅是一种知觉，因此是被中断的、独立的存在物。

这些庸俗的看法被否认了，我们必须寻找一些另外的假设，通过这些假设我们可以发现那些存在于我们的印象中，使我们赋予其以一种独立的、继续存在的那些特征。

稍加考察，我们将发现所有那些我们赋予其继续存在的对象都具有一种特殊的恒定性，这使那些对象区别于依靠我们的知觉而存在的那些印象。那些目前存在于我的眼睛中的高山、房屋、树木，总是以同样的次序出现在我的面前，当我闭上眼睛或者转过头看不到这些东西时，过不多久我就发现它们在我身后，改变。我的床、桌子、书和纸，也是以同样一致的方式将它们自己呈现在我面前，并不因为我的视觉和知觉打断它们而有所改变。对象被假定为有一种外在存在的所有印象都呈现出这种情形，而另外的印象却不是如此，不管它们是温和的还是强烈的，是随意的还是非随意的。

但是，无论我们如何努力地描述这个原则，我还是担心它太软弱以致无法单独支持一个如此巨大的体系：所有外在物体存在的持续性。我们必须把物体表现出的恒常性加在其一贯性之上，才能够给该观念一个满意的解释。这个解释将我引入一个相当大范围的深刻推理中，为了避免混乱，我想先给我的体系一个简短的纲要或者概括，然后再详细叙述它的每一部分，这样做应该是非常合适的。来自于我们知觉的恒常性的这些推论，像来自于一贯性的这些推论一样，产生出了物体继续存在的观念，这个观念是先于独立存在的观念的，并且产生出了后面的原则。

证明这个体系需要四个条件。第一，要解释一下个体化或同一性原则。第二，要给出一个理由，解释清楚为什么我们已经被破坏和中断的知觉的相似导致我们赋予它们一种同一性。第三，要说明那种倾向幻觉给我们的倾向，即通过继续存在来联合这些已中断了的表象的倾向。第四，也是最后要说明的一点，解释由倾向引发的想象的强力和

我相信，一个聪明的读者将会发现赞成这个体系是很容易的，而完全清楚地理解它却是困难的，稍一反省他们将会承认这个体系的每一部分都有自己的证明。非常明显，普通人假定他们的知觉是唯一的对象，同时相信物质的继续存在。所以我们必须在那个假定的基础之上来说明信念的起源。依据那个假定，我们的任何对象、任何知觉在中断一次之后仍然是相同的，这是一种错误的看法，因此有关知觉同一性的观点决非源于理性，而是来自于想象。其实想象只是由于某些知觉相似关系的诱惑而形成的一种观念，因此我们将会发现，我们所认为的相同的知觉实际上只是我们的相似知觉而已。给予我们的相似知觉同一性的这种倾向产生了继续存在的虚构，因此这种虚构和我们的同一性一样，其实是一种错误，这种错误是所有的哲学家都公认的，并且除了补救我们知觉的中断外，没有别的作用，且这种知觉的中断是与它们的同一性相反的唯一情况。最后，这种倾向通过目前的记忆印象引出观念，因为记不起以前的感觉，所以我们也绝不能产生出物体继续存在的观念。由此可看到，在考察所有这些部分时，我们会发现它们中的每一部分都有着最强大的证据支持，其中所有的部分合在一起形成一个统一的体系、一个完美得足以令人心悦诚服的体系。单独且没有任何现存印象的一个强烈倾向有时会引发一个信念或者观念，当有了那个条件（现存印象）帮助时，它是不是就会产生更多这样的信念呢？

关于外在存在的所有通俗的哲学体系，我已经给出说明，现在我不得不说明我在再次考察那些体系时所产生的一种看法。我在开始探讨这个题目时就说过，我们应该绝对信任我们的感官，这也是我从我的全部推理中得出的结论，但是坦白地说，我觉得我自己目前产生了一种相反的感觉，我不愿意像以前那样信任我的感官，而倾向于完全不相信自己的感官或者说想象。我设想，如此微不足道的想象特点，受到那些错误假定的引导，能够产生出坚固、合理的体系。想象的这些特点是我们知觉的一贯性和恒常性，就是它们使我们产生了知觉继续存在的观点。在知觉的这些特点和它的继续存在之间没有可以感知到的联系，我们知觉的一贯性产生了最强大的作用，然而同时也遇到了最大的困难。假定我们的相似知觉在数量上是同样的，这是一种完全的幻觉，这种幻觉使我们具有这样的观念：即这些知觉是不可中断的，即使当它们未呈现于我们的感官之前时，它们也仍然是存在的。这是我们的普遍体系所表现出的情形。至于我们的哲学体系，也将面临着同样的困难，并承载了这样的谬误，即这个体系一边很快否认但又马上建立起这种普遍假定。哲学家们否认我们的相似知觉是同样并不可中断的，但是同时他们又很易于相信有种知觉是同样的、不可中断的，因此他们专断地创造了一套新的知觉，并赋予它这些特点。我之所以说它是一套新的知觉，是因为我们一般来说能够很好地假定它，但却不可能清楚地感知它。从它们的本性来看，这些对象除了是和知觉同样的东西以外，还有可能是别的东西。从这些毫无根据的、离奇古怪的混乱观念中，我们除了能够找到错误与虚妄之外，还能希望找到别的什么呢？对于我们提出的那些意见，如果我们不具有任何信念，又怎么能够澄清自己呢？

怀疑主义者于理性和感官的疑惑是一种疾，这种疾不能从根本上得到根治，不管我们怎么驱赶它，甚至有时候似乎已经完全地摆脱掉了它，它还是会回到我们身上。不管以何种体系为基础，想要为我们的理解力和感官辩护都是不可能的，而当我们试图用这种方式证明它们是正当的时候，它们将会暴露得更多。怀疑主义者的疑惑自然源于对那些题目所做出的一个深刻强烈的反省，我们越反省，这种疑惑越加剧。无论这种反省是与疑惑相反还是相符合。只要漠不关心，毫不注意，我们就能弥补这一点。出于这个原因，我完全地依赖它们，并且理所当然地认为，不管在目前阶段读者的观点是什么，一个小时以后他将毫无疑问被说服，他将会认为这是一个既有外在同时又有内在的世界，而且他会把这种假定继续下去。我试图在对我们的印象进行进一步的特别考察之前，先考察一下那些古代和近代哲学家已提出的一些关于古代和近代的普通体系。最后，我们很可能会发现这种考察与我们现在的目的并不是毫无关联的。

活跃性。

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第三节　论古代哲学

许多道德学家建议我们在清晨的时候回忆自己的梦境，并且要用同样严格的态度考察这些梦境，就像我们用这样的态度审视我们最严肃的、最谨慎的行为一样，因为这是我们认识我们的内心、了解我们道德的进步过程的一种极好的方法。他们说，我们的性格是相同的，当诡计、恐惧、权谋都不存在，且人既不能欺骗自己也不能欺骗别人的时候，我们的性格将会彻底地表现出来。我们性情的宽容与卑劣、柔和与残忍、勇敢与懦弱影响着我们想象的虚构，并且以最鲜亮的色彩渲染它们自己。用同样的方式，我相信，古代哲学家可以通过对关于实体和实体的形式、偶有性和奥秘性质这些虚构所做出的批评，获得若干有用的发现。然而，不管这些虚构是多么不合理和反复无常，它们和人类本性的原则却有着紧密的联系。

最明智的哲学家也承认，我们对物体的看法只是由心灵的若干独立的、易察觉的特点的观念形成的集合体，这些特点是由对象组成的，我们可以发现它们非常紧密地结合在一起。

逍遥学派哲学声称所有物体中的原初物质都是完全同质的，并认为火、水、地球和空气这些同属于同一实体的物质，它们之间是顺次循环和逐渐改变的。与此同时，这个学派给予这些对象中的每一个一个特别的实体形式，并假设这些形式是它们具有的所有不同性质的来源，并且是每一个特别形式的单纯性、同一性的新基础。一切都取决于我们观察对象的方式。当我们从物体不可察觉的改变来观察事物时，我假定它们将成为同样的实体或本质。当我们考虑到它们易觉察到的差异时，我们赋予它们中的每一个以实体的或者本质的差异，同时，为了使我们自己沉迷于这两种考察对象的方式之中，我们假设所有的物体有一个实体以及实体的形式。

第四节　论近代哲学

那些古代哲学家的观点，即他们对实体和偶有性的虚构，他们关于实体形式和奥秘性质的推理，像黑暗中的幽灵一样，这些观点源于那些虽然如此普遍，但在人性中既不是普遍的又不是不可避免的原则。而近代哲学假装自己完全消除了这个缺点，认为自己是由坚实的、永恒的、一致的想象原则产生出来的。我们现在必须要探讨的问题是，这种自负是建立在什么基础之上的。

在我们的推理和我们的感官之间存在着一个直接的、完全的对立，或者更恰当地说，在我们从原因和结果得出的结论与那些使我们相信物体的继续存在与独立存在的物体之间有着一个这样的对立。当我们从原因和结果进行推理时，我们得出结论：既不是颜色、声音、滋味也不是气味，有一个继续和独立的存在，当我们排除那些易感知的性质时，在宇宙中也没有什么别的东西有一个这样的存在。

第五节　论灵魂的非物质性

因此，既不是通过考察观念的最初起源，也不是通过定义的方式，我们能够得出一个令人满意的关于实体的观念，对于我来说，这似乎是完全放弃关于灵魂的物质性和非物质性的一个充足的理由，是使我诅咒这个问题本身的一个充足理由。除了知觉以外，我们对任何东西都没有完美的观念。一个实体是完全不同于一个知觉的，因此，我们没有一个实体的观念。寓存于某些物体之中是被假定为一个必要条件的，它支持我们知觉的存在。可是似乎没有任何东西是支持我们知觉存在的必要条件。因此，我们就没有寓存的观念。可是当有人问，知觉是寓存于一个物质实体中还是寓存于一个非物质实体中时，当我们不是非常理解这个问题的含义时，我们怎么可能回答这个问题呢？

有这样一个论证被用来证实灵魂的非物质性，就我看来，它是引人注意的：任何能够延伸的东西都是由部分组成的，任何由部分组成的东西都是可以分割的，如果不是在实际上的分割，至少是在想象上的分割。

我断言，有关一个思维实体的非物质性、单纯性、不可分性的见解是一个真实的无神论观点，这恰好将为使斯宾诺莎恶名昭著的一切意见进行论辩。

斯宾诺莎无神论的基本原则就是：关于宇宙的单纯性和关于他所假定的思想和物质寓存于其中的实体的统一性的见解。他说，在世界上只存在一个实体，这个实体是简单的、完全不可分割的，存在于任何地方，而不是存在于局部。

由此可见，从整体来看，我们获得一个最终决定：关于灵魂实体的问题是绝对不可理解的，我们所有的知觉，包括可以延伸的和不可延伸的，都不容易受到空间结合的影响，在这些知觉中，有些属于这一种，有些属于另外一种，既然对象的恒常结合构成了原因与结果的本质，就我们对那种关系所具有的任何概念来说，物质和运动可能常被看作思想的原因。

第六节　论人格的同一性

有这样一些哲学家，他们想象着我们随时都能够亲切地意识到我们所谓的自我，我们可以感觉到它的存在和它在存在上的继续，他们确定，这种存在超越了事实所具有的那种完全的同一性和单纯性。他们说，这种最强烈的感觉、最激烈的热情，使我们背弃这种想法，而更加强烈地固定了它，并使我们通过对它们的苦痛与快乐的感知而感受到它们对自我的影响。如果试图对这一点提出进一步的证据，这将削弱证据本身，因为从我们能够亲切感知到的任何事实中都无法获得证据，而且，如果我们对此产生怀疑的话，这里也不存在我们能够确定的任何事物。

现在，我们继续进行我们对人格同一性本性的探讨，这个问题已经成为一个非常重要的哲学问题。尤其是最近几年的英国，所有深奥的科学都在满怀热情、废寝忘食地研究这个问题。很明显地，我们已经非常成功地解释了植物、动物、轮船、房屋，以及所有艺术或自然物复合的和可变的同一性，在这里，推理所采用的这些事实方法必须继续下去。实际上，我们所描述的人类心灵的同一性仅仅是一个虚构的同一性而已，这个虚构和我们所描述的植物的、动物的身体同一性是同一个种类的。因此，它不可能有一个不同的来源，而是必须发生于一个建立在相似物体基础上的想象力的作用。

因此，现在剩下的唯一的问题是，当我们考虑一个心灵或者正在思考的人的继续存在时，我们思想的不可间断的进程是产生于什么关系中的。在这里，非常明显地，我们必须把自己限制于相似关系和因果关系中，必须放弃接近关系，接近关系在目前情况下有很少的或者几乎没有影响。

全部的学说引导我们得出一个结论，这个结论在目前的情况下是非常重要的，即所有关于人格同一性的精密而又微妙的问题是绝不可能解决的，只能被看作是语法上而非哲学上的困难问题。同一性取决于各个观点之间的关系，这些关系通过非常容易的转变产生出同一性。这些关系、这些容易的转变在不知不觉中可能逐渐减少，因此我们没有公正的标准。通过这一个，我们可以平息任何争论，任何关于这些关系是何时获得或者失去同一性的名称的争论。所有关于相关联对象的同一性的争论仅仅是一些空话，从实际上看来，正像我们已经观察到的，这只是各个部分之间的关系产生出的一些虚构的或者想象的结合原则而已。

因此，我们已经完成了所要考察的关于理智世界和自然世界的各个哲学体系，在我们各种各样的推理方式中，我们已导入各种论题，这些论题既说明且证实了本书论题的前面的一些部分，又为我们以下观点的论证铺平了道路。现在是返回来对我们的论题进行更严密考察的时候了，在我们已经完全理解我们的判断和知性的本性之后，继续对人类本性进行精确的剖析。

第七节　本卷的结论

但是，现在，在我走入像海洋一样深的哲学中以前，我发现自己想在目前这一站上停留片刻，并且思考一下，那段我已经走过的毫无疑问需要最精湛的技巧和最勤奋的劳动才可以获得满意结果的航程。我想我是这样一个人，虽然遇到过很多浅滩，在经过较小的海口时几乎遇到了不可避免的危险，但是，在这样的情况下，我仍然表现得很勇敢，一个人在那艘破破烂烂不能抵挡风雨的船上航行，而且野心勃勃，打算在这样艰难的情况下进行环绕地球的航行。我过去的那些错误和混乱的记忆使我不相信未来，我必须提出的是，在我的这些论证中这些官能的不幸的状况、弱点和混乱增加了我的理解。为了弥补和纠正这些官能的不可能性，我几乎陷入到绝望的状态中，这让我决定在目前情况下宁愿在这块光秃秃的石头上灭亡，也不愿意葬身在没有尽头的大海里。在突然感觉到危险时，我非常没有信心，更严重的是，我沉溺在那种悲观透顶的情感中，目前所做的这个题目就使我产生了数不胜数的悲观感情，这让我的失望情绪成倍增加。

可能发生的最幸运的事就是，即使理性本身没有能力驱走这些疑云，可自然本身却足以达到那样的目标，能治愈我所有的哲学忧郁症和昏迷，或者是通过缓解我心灵的这种不良趋向，通过一些事务和关于感官的一些生动印象，把所有这些幻想消灭得一干二净。我吃饭、玩双六的游戏、闲聊，和我的朋友们说说笑笑，当经过三四个小时的娱乐之后，我又重新回来考虑这一类的思辩，这些思辩是如此冷酷、牵强、荒谬，因此我发现我再也无法让这些思辩进入我的内心了。

这些就是我的愤怒和懒散的情感，我必须承认，哲学对这些情感没有丝毫的反对理由，哲学期待的胜利来自于愉快心情的回归，而不是来自于理性和信念的力量。在人生的所有事件中，我们仍然应该维持我们的怀疑主义。如果我们相信，火能够温暖我们，而水可以使我们精神焕发，这仅仅是因为如果我们不这样想的话将会产生很大的苦痛。所以如果我们是哲学家，我们的哲学就应该是建立在怀疑主义的基础之上的，这是由于我们自己产生了一种喜欢哲学思考的倾向。不管在什么地方，只要理性是活生生的，并且把它自己和一些倾向融合在一起，它就应该是被赞同的。如果它不是这样的，那么它绝不具有对我们发生作用的权利。

即使我们具备怀疑主义的原则，我们还是应该不仅完全沉溺于那种最细致哲学领域的研究，而且屈服于那些在一些特殊点上（我们在特殊的时刻观察这些特殊点的观点）显示出的乐观、确定的倾向。我们可以非常容易地克制自我，不进行任何考察和询问，但却控制不住在如此自然的一种倾向上审查自己，并且努力抵挡住那种由于完全地观察对象而产生的精确信念。在这一种情形下，我们不仅易于忘记我们的怀疑主义，而且也易于忘记我们的谦虚品质，而习惯于运用像显然地、确定地、不可否认地等等诸如此类的词语，如果我们对大众还有着敬意，我们就应该制止这类词语。我可能在他之后就已经陷入了这种错误，但是，在这里，我反对大家对此可能提出的任何驳斥，我要声明的一点就是，这类的表达是由我通过对对象的目前看法所逼出来的，这里没有民主精神的暗示，也没有我对自己评判的自负看法，我很清楚地认识到这些看法根本不适合于任何一个个体，当然，更不适合于一个怀疑主义者。

BOOK 2　Of the Passions

PART 1　Of Pride and Humility

SECT.1　Division of the Subject

As all the perceptions of the mind may be divided into impressions and ideas,so the impressions admit of another division into original and secondary.Original impres-sions or impressions of sensation are such as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul,from the constitution of the body,from the animal spirits,or from the applica-tion of objects to the external organs.Secondary,or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these original ones,either immediately or by the interposition of its idea.Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses,and all bodily pains and pleasures：Of the second are the passions,and other emotions resembling them.

Tis certain,that the mind,in its perceptions,must begin somewhere；and that since the impressions precede their correspondent ideas,there must be some impres-sions,which without any introduction make their appearance in the soul.Bodily pains and pleasures are the source of many passions,both when felt and consider d by the mind；but arise originally in the soul,or in the body,whichever you please to call it,without any preceding thought or perception.A fit of the gout produces a long train of passions,as grief,hope,fear；but is not deriv d immediately from any affection or idea.The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds,viz.the calm and the violent.Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action,composition,and exter-nal objects.Of the second are the passions of love and hatred,grief and joy,pride and humility.The subject of the human mind being so copious and various,I shall here take advantage of this vulgar and spacious division,that I may proceed with the greater or-der；and having said all I thought necessary concerning our ideas,shall now explain those violent emotions or passions,their nature,origin,causes,and effects.

When we take a survey of the passions,there occurs a division of them into direct and indirect.By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil,from pain or pleasure.By indirect suchas proceed from the same principles,but by the conjunction of other qualities.This distinction I cannot at present justify or ex-plain any farther.I can only observe in general,that under the indirect passions I com-prehend pride,humility,ambition,vanity,love,hatred,envy,pity,malice,generosi-ty,with their dependants.And under the direct passions,desire,aversion,grief,joy,hope,fear,despair and security.I shall begin with the former.

SECT.2　Of Pride and Humility；their Objects and Causes

The passions of PRIDE and HUMILITY being simple and uniform impressions,tis impossible we can ever,by a multitude of words,give a just definition of them,or in-deed of any of the passions.But as these words,pride and humility,are of general use,and the impressions they represent the most common of any,every one,of himself,will be able to form a just idea of them,without any danger of mistake.For which reason,not to lose time upon preliminaries,I shall immediately enter upon the examination of these passions.

Tis evident,that pride and humility,tho directly contrary,have yet the same OB-JECT.This object is self,or that succession of related ideas and impressions,of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness.Whatever other objects may be compre-hended by the mind,they are always consider d with a view to ourselves；otherwise they would never be able either to excite these passions,or produce the smallest encrease or diminution of them.When self enters not into the consideration,there is no room either for pride or humility.

But tho that connected succession of perceptions,which we call self,be always the object of these two passions,tis impossible it can be their CAUSE,or be sufficient a-lone to excite them.For as these passions are directly contrary,and have the same ob-ject in common；were their object also their cause；it cou d never produce any degree of the one passion,but at the same time it must excite an equal degree of the other；which opposition and contrariety must destroy both.Tis impossible a man can at the same time be both proud and humble；and where he has different reasons for these passions,as frequently happens,the passions either take place alternately；or if they encounter,the one annihilates the other,as far as its strength goes,and the remainder only of that,which is superior,continues to operate upon the mind.

We must therefore,make a distinction betwixt the cause and the object of thesepassions；betwixt that idea,which excites them,and that to which they direct their view,when excited.Here then is a passion plac d betwixt two ideas,of which the one produces it,and the other is produc d by it.The first idea,therefore,represents the cause,the second the object of the passion.

To begin with the causes of pride and humility；we may observe,that their most obvious and remarkable property is the vast variety of subjects,on which they may be plac d.Every valuable quality of the mind,whether of the imagination,judgment,memory or disposition；wit,good-sense,learning,courage,justice,integrity；all these are the cause of pride；and their opposites of humility.Nor are these passions confin d to the mind but extend their view to the body likewise.A man may he proud of his beau-ty,strength,agility,good mein,address in dancing,riding,and of his dexterity in any manual business or manufacture.But this is not all.Our country,family,children,re-lations,riches,houses,gardens,horses,dogs,cloaths；any of these may become a cause either of pride or of humility.

From the consideration of these causes,it appears necessary we shoud make a new distinction in the causes of the passion,betwixt that quality,which operates,and the subject,on which it is plac d.A man,for instance,is vain of a beautiful house,which belongs to him,or which he has himself built and contriv d.Here the object of the pas-sion is himself,and the cause is the beautiful house：Which cause again is sub-divid-ed into two parts,viz.the quality,which operates upon the passion,and the subject in which the quality inheres.The quality is the beauty,and the subject is the house,consider d as his property or contrivance.Beauty,consider d merely as such,unless plac d upon something related to us,never produces any pride or vanity；and the stron-gest.relation alone,without beauty,or something else in its place,has as little influ-ence on that passion.Since,therefore,these two particulars are easily separated and there is a necessity for their conjunction,in order to produce the passion,we ought to consider them as component parts of the cause；and infix in our minds an exact idea of this distinction.

SECT.3　Whence these Objects and Causes are Deriued

Tis evident in the first place,that these passions are derermin d to have self for their object,not only by a natural but also by an original property.No one can doubt but this property is natural from the constancy and steadiness of its operations.Tis-always self,which is the object of pride and humility；and whenever the passions look beyond,tis still with a view to ourselves,nor can any person or object otherwise have any influence upon us.

We may,perhaps,make it a greater question This doubt we shall soon remove,if we cast our eye upon human nature,and consider that in all nations and ages,the same objects still give rise to pride and humility；and that upon the view even of a stranger,we can know pretty nearly,what will either encrease or diminish his passions of this kind.If there be any variation in this particular,it proceeds from nothing but a differ-ence in the tempers and complexions of men；and is besides very inconsiderable.Can we imagine it possible,that while human nature remains the same,men will ever be-come entirely indifferent to their power,riches,beauty or personal merit,and that their pride and vanity will not be affected by these advantages？

But tho the causes of pride and humility be plainly natural,we shall find upon ex-amination,that they are not original,and that tis utterly impossible they shou d each of them be adapted to these passions by a particular provision,and primary constitution of nature,Beside their prodigious number,many of them are the effects of art,and arise partly from the industry,partly from the caprice,and partly from the good fortune of men,Industry produces houses,furniture,cloaths.Caprice determines their particular kinds and qualities.And good fortune frequently contributes to all this,by discovering the effects that result from the different mixtures and combinations of bodies.Tis ab-surd,therefore,to imagine,that each of these was foreseen and provided for by nature,and that every new production of art,which causes pride or humility；instead of adap-ting itself to the passion by partaking of some general quality,that naturally operates on the mind；is itself the object of an original principle,which till then lay conceal d in the soul,and is only by accident at last brought to light.As this appears evidently ridicu-lous,we must conclude,that each cause of pride and humility is not adapted to the pas-sions by a distinct original quality；but that there are some one or more circumstances common to all of them,on which their efficacy depends.

Here,therefore,moral philosophy is in the same condition as natural,with regard to astronomy before the time of Copernicus.The antients,tho sensible of that maxim,that nature does nothing in vain,contriv d such intricate systems of the heavens,as seem d inconsistent with true philosophy,and gave place at last to something more sim-ple and natural.To invent without scruple a new principle to every new phenomenon,instead of adapting it to the old；to overload our hypotheses with a variety of this kind；are certain proofs,that none of these principles is the just one,and that we only desire,by a number of falsehoods,to cover our ignorance of the truth.

SECT.4　Of the Relations of Impressions and Ideas

Thus we have establish d two truths without any obstacle or difficulty,that tis from natural principles this variety of causes excites pride and humility,and that tis not by a different principle each different cause is adapted to its passion.We shall now proceed to enquire how we may reduce these principles to a lesser number,and find among the causes something common,on which their influence depends.

In order to this we must reflect on certain properties of human nature,which tho they have a mighty influence on every operation both of the understanding and passions,are not commonly much insisted on by philosophers.The first of these is the association of ideas,which I have so often observ d and explain d.Tis impossible for the mind to fix itself steadily upon one idea for any considerable time；nor can it by its utmost efforts ever arrive at such a constancy.But however changeable our thoughts may be,they are not entirely without rule and method in their changes.The rule,by which they proceed,is to pass from one object to what is resembling,contiguous to,or produc d by it.When one idea is present to the imagination,any other,united by these relations,naturally follows it,and enters with more facility by means of that introduction.

The second property I shall observe in the human mind is a like association of im-pressions.All resembling impressions are connected together,and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow.Grief and disappointment give rise to anger,anger to envy,envy to malice,and malice to grief again,till the whole circle be compleated.In like manner our temper,when elevated with joy,naturally throws itself into love,gener-osity,pity,courage,pride,and the other resembling affections.Tis difficult for the mind,when actuated by any passion,to confine itself to that passion alone,without any change or variation.Human nature is too inconstant to admit of any such regularity.Changeableness is essential to it.And to what can it so naturally change as to affections or emotions,which are suitable to the temper,and agree with that set of passions,which then prevail？Tis evident,then,there is an attraction or association among im-pressions,as well as among ideas；tho with this remarkable difference,that ideas are associated by resemblance,contiguity,and causation；and impressions only by rese-mblance.

In the third place,tis observable of these two kinds of association,that they very much assist and forward each other,and that the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same object.Thus a man,who,by any injury from another,is very much discompos d and ruffled in his temper,is apt to find a hundred subjects of discontent,impatience,fear,and other uneasy passions；especially if he can discover these subjects in or near the person,who was the cause of his first passion.Those prin-ciples,which forward the transition of ideas,here concur with those,which operate on the passions；and both uniting in one action,bestow on the mind a double impulse.The new passion,therefore,must arise with so much greater violence,and the transition to it must be render d so much more easy and natural.As the different colours of a picture,when they are well disposed,set off one another,and receive an additional beauty from the advantage of the situation.In this phaenomenon we may remark the association both of impressions and ideas,as well as the mutual assistance they lend each other.

SECT.5　Of Beauty and Deformity

Whether we consider the body as a part of ourselves,or assent to those philoso-phers,who regard it as something external,it must still be allowd to be near enough connected with us to form one of these double relations,which I have asserted to be nec-essary to the causes of pride and humility.Wherever,therefore,we can find the other relation of impressions to join to this of ideas,we may expect with assurance either of these passions,according as the impression is pleasant or uneasy.But beauty of all kinds gives us a peculiar delight and satisfaction；as deformity produces pain,upon whatever subject it may be plac d,and whether survey d in an animate or inanimate ob-ject.If the beauty or deformity,therefore,be plac d upon our own bodies,this pleasure or uneasiness must be converted into pride or humility,as having in this case all the cir-cumstances requisite to produce a perfect transition of impressions and ideas.These op-posite sensations are related to the opposite passions.The beauty or deformity is closely related to self,the object of both these passions.No wonder,then our own beauty be-comes an object of pride,and deformity of humility.

But this effect of personal and bodily qualities is not only a proof of the present sys-tem,by shewing that the passions arise not in this case without all the circumstances I have requir d,but may be employ d as a stronger and more convincing argument.If weconsider all the hypotheses,which have been form d either by philosophy or common reason,to explain the difference betwixt beauty and deformity,we shall find that all of them resolve into this,that beauty is such an order and construction of parts,as either by the primary constitution of our nature,by custom,or by caprice,is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul.This is the distinguishing character of beauty,and forms all the difference betwixt it and deformity,whose natural tendency is to produce uneasiness.Pleasure and pain,therefore,are not only necessary attendants of beauty and deformity,but constitute their very essence.

Tis not the beauty of the body alone that produces pride,but also its strength and force.Strength is a kind of power；and therefore the desire to excel in strength is to be consider d as an inferior species of ambition.For this reason the present phaenomenon will be sufficiently accounted for,in explaining that passion.

Concerning all other bodily accomplishments we may observe in general,that what-ever in ourselves is either useful,beautiful,or surprising,is an object of pride；and it s contrary,of humility.

In this phenomenon are contain d two curious experiments,which if we compare them together,according to the known rules,by which we judge of cause and effect in anatomy,natural philosophy,and other sciences,will be an undeniable argument for that influence of the double relations above-mention d.By one of these experiments we find,that an object produces pride merely by the interposition of pleasure；and that be-cause the quality,by which it produces pride,is in reality nothing but the power of pro-ducing pleasure.By the other experiment we find,that the pleasure produces the pride by a transition along related ideas；because when we cut off that relation the passion is immediately destroy d.A surprising adventure,in which we have been ourselves engag d,is related to us,and by that means produces pride：But the adventures of oth-ers,tho they may cause pleasure,yet for want of this relation of ideas,never excite that passion.What farther proof can be desired for the present system？

There is only one objection to this system with regard to our body：which is,that tho nothing be more agreeable than health,and more painful than sickness,yet com-monly men are neither proud of the one,nor mortify d with the other.This will easily be accounted for,if we consider the second and fourth limitations,propos d to our general system.It was observ d,that no object ever produces pride or humility,if it has not something peculiar to ourself；as also,that every cause of that passion must be in somemeasure constant,and hold some proportion to the duration of our self,which,is its ob-ject.

We are asham d of such maladies as affect others,and are either dangerous or disa-greeable to them.Of the epilepsy；because it gives a horror to every one present：Of the itch；because it is infectious：Of the king s-evil；because it commonly goes to posteri-ty.Men always consider the sentiments of others in their judgment of themselves.This has evidently appear d in some of the foregoing reasonings；and will appear still more ev-idently,and be more fully explain d afterwards.

SECT.6　Of External Advantages and Disadvantages

But tho pride and humility have the qualities of our mind and body,that is self,for their natural and more immediate causes,we find by experience,that there are many other objects,which produce these affections,and that the primary one is,in some measure,obscur d and lost by the multiplicity of foreign and extrinsic.We found a vani-ty upon houses,gardens,equipages,as well as upon personal merit and accomplish-ments；and tho these external advantages be in themselves widely distant from thought or a person,yet they considerably influence even a passion,which is directed to that as its ultimate object,This,happens when external objects acquire any particular relation to ourselves,and are associated or connected with us.

But here tis remarkable,that tho the relation of resemblance operates upon the mind in the same manner as contiguity and causation,in conveying us from one idea to another,yet tis seldom a foundation either of pride or of humility.If we resemble a per-son in any of the valuable parts of his character,we must,in some degree,possess the quality,in which we resemble him；and this quality we always chuse to survey directly in ourselves rather than by reflexion in another person,when we wou d found upon it any degree of vanity.So that tho a likeness may occasionally produce that passion by sug-gesting a more advantageous idea of ourselves,tis there the view fixes at last,and the passion finds its ultimate and final cause.

There are instances,indeed,wherein men shew a vanity in resembling a great man in his countenance,shape,air,or other minute circumstances,that contribute not in any degree to his reputation；but it must be confess d that this extends not very far,nor is of any considerable moment in these affections.

The relation,therefore,of contiguity,or that of causation,betwixt the cause andobject of pride and humility,is alone requisite to give rise to these passions；and these relations are nothing else but qualities,by which the imagination is convey d from one i-dea to another.Now let us consider what effect these can possibly have upon the mind,and by what means they become so requisite to the production of the passions.Tis evi-dent,that the association of ideas operates in so silent and imperceptible a manner,that we are scarce sensible of it,and discover it more by its effects than by any immediate feeling or perception.It produces no emotion,and gives rise to no new impression of any kind,but only modifies those ideas,of which the mind was formerly possess d,and which it cou d recal upon occasion.From this reasoning,as well as from undoubted ex-perience,we may conclude,that an association of ideas,however necessary,is not a-lone sufficient to give rise to any passion.

Tis evident,then,that when the mind feels the passion either of pride or humility upon the appearance of related object,there is,beside the relation or transition of thought,an emotion or original impression produc d by some other principle.The ques-tion is,whether the emotion first produc d be the passion itself,or some other impres-sion related to it.This question we cannot be long in deciding,For besides all the other arguments,with which this subject abounds,it must evidently appear,that the relation of ideas,which experience shews to be so requisite a circumstance to the production of the passion,wou d be entirely superfluous,were it not to second a relation of affections,and facilitate the transition from one impression to another.If nature produc d immedi-ately the passion of pride or humility,it wou d be compleated in itself,and wou d re-quire no farther addition or encrease from any other affection.But supposing the first e-motion to be only related to pride or humility,tis easily conceiv d to what purpose the relation of objects may serve,and how the two different associations,of impressions and ideas,by uniting their forces,may assist each other s operation.

This will appear still more evidently in particular instances.Men are vain of the beauty of their country,of their county,of their parish.Here the idea of beauty plainly produces a pleasure.This pleasure is related to pride.The object or cause of this pleas-ure is,by the supposition,related to self,or the object of pride.By this double relation of impressions and ideas,a transition is made from the one impression to the other.

Men are also vain of the temperature of the climate,in which they were born；of the fertility of their native soil；of the goodness of the wines,fruits or victuals,produc d by it；of the softness or force of their language；with other particulars of that kind.These objects have plainly a reference to the pleasures of the senses,and are originally consider d as agreeable to the feeling,taste or hearing.How is it possible they cou d ev-er become objects of pride,except by means of that transition above-explain d？

There are some,that discover a vanity of an opposite kind,and affect to depreciate their own country,in comparison of those,to which they have travell d.These persons find,when they are at home,and surrounded with their countrymen,that the strong re-lation betwixt them and their own nation is shar d with so many,that tis in a manner lost to them；whereas their distant relation to a foreign country,which is form d by their hav-ing seen it and liv d in it,is augmented by their considering how few there are who have done the same.For this reason they always admire the beauty,utility and rarity of what is abroad,above what is at home.

Since we can be vain of a country,climate or any inanimate object,which bears a relation to us,tis no wonder we are vain of the qualities of those,who are connected with us by blood or friendship.Accordingly we find,that the very same qualities,which in ourselves produce pride,produce also in a lesser degree the same affection,when discover d in persons related to us.The beauty,address,merit,credit and honours of their kindred are carefully display d by the proud,as some of their most considerable sources of their vanity.

As we are proud of riches in ourselves,so to satisfy our vanity we desire that every one,who has any connexion with us,shou d likewise be possest of them,and are asham d of any one,that is mean or poor,among our friends and relations.For this rea-son we remove the poor as far from us as possible；and as we cannot prevent poverty in some distant collaterals,and our forefathers are taken to be our nearest relations；upon this account every one affects to be of a good family,and to be descended from a long succession of rich and honourable ancestors.

I have frequently observ d,that those,who boast of the antiquity of their families,are glad when they can join this circumstance,that their ancestors for many generations have been uninterrupted proprietors of the same portion of land,and that their family has never chang d its possessions,or been transplanted into any other county or prov-ince.I have also observ d,that tis an additional subject of vanity,when they can boast,that these possessions have been transmitted thro a descent compos d entirely of males,and that the honour,and fortune have never past thro any female.Let us en-deavour to explain these phenomena by the foregoing system.

This evident,that when any one boasts of the antiquity of his family,the subjects of his vanity are not merely the extent of time and number of ancestors,but also their riches and credit,which are suppos d to reflect a lustre on himself on account of his re-lation to them.He first considers these objects；is affected by them in an agreeable manner；and then returning back to himself,thro the relation of parent and child,is el-evated with the passion of pride,by means of the double relation,of impressions and i-deas.Since therefore the passion depends on these relations,whatever strengthens any of the relations must also encrease the passion,and whatever weakens the relations must diminish the passion.Now'tis certain the identity of the possesion strengthens the rela-tion of ideas arising from blood and kindred,and conveys the fancy with greater facility from one generation to another,from the remote ancestors to their posterity,who are both their heirs and their descendants.By this facility the impression is transmitted more entire,and excites a greater degree of pride

The case is the same with the transmission of the honours and fortune thro a suc-cession of males without their passing thro any female.Tis a quality of human nature,which we shall consider afterwards,that the imagination naturally turns to whatever is important and considerable；and where two objects are presented to it,a small and a great one,usually leaves the former,and dwells entirely upon the latter.As in the soci-ety of marriage,the male sex has the advantage above the female,the husband first en-gages our attention；and whether we consider him directly,or reach him by passing thro related objects,the thought both rests upon him with greater satisfaction,and arrives at him with greater facility than his consort.

Tis easy to see,that this property must strengthen the child s relation to the father,and weaken that to the mother.For as all relations are nothing but a propensity to pass from one idea ma another,whatever strengthens the propensity strengthens the relation；and as we have a stronger propensity to pass from the idea of the children to that of the father,than from the same idea to that of the mother,we ought to regard the former rela-tion as the closer and more considerable.This is the reason why children commonly bear their father s name,and are esteem d to be of nobler or baser birth,according to his family.And tho the mother shou d be possest of a superior spirit and genius to the fa-ther,as often happens,the general rule prevails,notwithstanding the exceprion,ac-cording to the doctrine above-explain d.Nay even when a superiority of any kind is so great,or when any other reasons have such an effect,as to make the children rather re-present the mother s family than the father s,the general rule still retains such an effica-cy that it weakens the relation,and makes a kind of break in the line of ancestors.The imagination runs not along them with facility,nor is able to transfer the honour and credit of the ancestors to their posterity of the same name and family so readily,as when the transition is conformable to the general rules,and passes from father to son,or from brother to brother.

and v anity.

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PART 2　Of Love and Hatred

SECT.1　Of the Object and Causes of Love and Hatred

It is altogether impossible to give any definition of the passions of love and hatred；and that because they produce merely a simple impression,without any mixture or com-position.It wou d be as unnecessary to attempt any description of them,drawn from their nature,origin,causes and objects；and that both because these are the subjects of our present enquiry,and because these passions of themselves are sufficiently known from our common feeling and experience.This we have already observ d concerning pride and humility,and here repeat it concerning love and hatred；and indeed there is so great a resemblance betwixt these two sets of passions,that we shall be oblig d to be-gin with a kind of abridgment of our reasonings concerning the former,in order to ex-plain the latter.

As the immediate object of pride and humility is self or that identical person,of whose thoughts,actions,and sensations we are intimately conscious；so the object of love and hatred is some other person,of whose thoughts,actions,and sensations we are not conscious.This is sufficiently evident from experience.Our love and hatred are al-ways directed to some sensible being external to us；and when we talk of self-love,tis not in a proper sense,nor has the sensation it produces any thing in common with that tender emotion which is excited by a friend or mistress.Tis the same case with hatred.We may be mortified by our own faults and follies；but never feel any anger or hatred.except from the injuries of others.

But tho the object of love and hatred be always some other person,tis plain that the object is not,properly speaking,the cause of these passions,or alone sufficient to excite them.For since love and hatred are directly contrary in their sensation,and have the same object in common,if that object were also their cause,it wou d produce theseopposite passions in an equal degree；and as they must,from the very first moment,de-stroy each other,none of them wou d ever be able to make its appearance.There must,therefore,be some cause different from the object.

If we consider the causes of love and hatred,we shall find they are very much diversify d,and have not many things in common.The virtue,knowledge,wit,good sense,good humour of any person,produce love and esteem；as the opposite qualities,hatred and contempt.The same passions arise from bodily accomplishments,such as beauty,force,swiftness,dexterity；and from their contraries；as likewise from the ex-ternal advantages and disadvantages of family,possession,cloaths,nation and climate.There is not one of these objects,but what by its different qualities may produce love and esteem,or hatred and contempt.

From the view of these causes we may derive a new distinction betwixt the quality that operates,and the subject on which it is plac d.A prince,that is possess d of a stately palace,commands the esteem of the people upon that account；and that first,by the beauty of the palace,and secondly,by the relation of property,which connects it with him.The removal of either of these destroys the passion；which evidently proves that the cause Is a compounded one.

It wou d be tedious to trace the passions of love and hatred,thro all the observa-tions which we have form d concerning pride and humility,and which are equally appli-cable to both sets of passions.It will be sufficient to remark in general,that the object of love and hatred is evidently some thinking person；and that the sensation of the former passion is always agreeable,and of the latter uneasy.We may also suppose with some shew of probability,that the cause of both these passions is always related to a thinking being,and that the cause of the former produce a separate pleasure,and of the latter a separate uneasiness.

One of these suppositions,viz.that the cause of love and hatred must be related to a person or thinking being,in order to produce these passions,is not only probable,but too evident to be contested.Virtue and vice,when consider d in the abstract；beauty and deformity,when plac d on inanimate objects；poverty and riches when belonging to a third person,excite no degree of love or hatred,esteem or contempt towards those,who have no relation to them.A person looking out at a window,sees me in the street,and beyond me-a beautiful palace,with which I have no concern：I believe none will pretend,that this person will pay me the same respect,as if I were owner of the palace.It is not so evident at first sight,that a relation of impressions is requisite to these passions,and that because in the transition the one impression is so much confounded with the other,that they become in a manner undistinguishable.But as in pride and hu-mility,we have easily been able to make the separation,and to prove,that every cause of these passions,produces a separate pain or pleasure,I might here observe the same method with the same success,in examining particularly the several causes of love and hatred.But as I hasten a full and decisive proof of these systems,I delay this examina-tion for a moment：And in the mean time shall endeavour to convert to my present pur-pose all my reaaonings concerning pride and humility,by an argument that isfounded on unquestionable experience.

There are few persons,that are satisfy d with their own character,or genius,or for-tune,who are nor desirous of shewing themselves to the world,and of acquiring the love and approbation of mankind.Now it is evident,that the very same qualities and circum-stances,which are the causes of pride or self-esteem,are also the causes of vanity or the desire of reputation；and that we always put to view those particulars with which in ourselves we are best satisfy d.But if love and esteem were not produc d by the same qualities as pride,according as these qualities are related to ourselves or others,this method of proceeding wou d be very absurd,nor cou d men expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person,with those themselves have entertain d.Tis true,few can form exact systems of the passions,or make reflections on their general nature and resemblances.But without such a progress in philosophy,we are not subject to many mistakes in this particular,but are sufficiently guided by common experience,as well as by a kind of presentation；which tells us what will operate on others,by what we feel immediately in ourselves.Since then the same qualities that produce pride or humil-ity,cause love or hatred；all the arguments that have been employ d to prove,that the causes of the former passions excite a pain or pleasure independent of the passion,will be applicable with equal evidence to the causes of the latter.

SECT.2　Experiences to Confirm This System

Upon duly weighing these arguments,no one will make any scruple to assent to that conccusion I draw from them,concerning the transition along related impressions and i-deas,especially as tis a principle,in itself,so easy and natural.But that we may place this system beyond doubt both with regard to love and hatred,pride and humility,it will be proper to make some new experiments upon all these passions,as well as to recal a few of these observations,which I have formerly touch d upon.

In order to make these experiments,let us suppose I am m company with a person,whom I formerly regarded without any sentiments either of friendship or enmity.Here I have the natural and ultimate object of all these four pas sions plac d before me.Myself am the proper object of pride or humility；the other person of love or hatred.

Regard now with attention the nature of these passions,and their situation with re-spect to each other.Tis evident here are four affections,plac d,as it were,in a square or regular connexion with,and distance from each other.The passions of pride and hu-mility,as well as those of love and hatred,are connected together by the identity of their object,which to the first set of passions is self,to the second some other person.These two lines of communication or connexion form two opposite sides of the square.A-gain,pride and love are agreeable passions；hatred and humility uneasy.This similitude of sensation betwixt pride and love,and that betwixt humility and hatred form a new connexion,and may be consider d as the other two sides of the square.Upon the whole,pride is connected with humility,love with hatred,by their objects or ideas：Pride with love,humility with hatred,by their sensations or impressions.

I say then,that nothing can produce any of these passions without bearing it a double relation,viz.of ideas to the object of the passion,and of sensation to the pas-sion itself.This we must prove by our experiments.

First Experiment.To proceed with the greater order in these experiments,let us first suppose,that being plac d in the situation above-mentioned,viz.in company with some other person,there is an object presented,that has no relation either of impres-sions or ideas to any of these passions.Thus suppose we regard together an ordinary stone,or other common object,belonging to neither of us,and causing of itself no emo-tion,or independent pain and pleasure：Tis evident such an object will produce none of these four passions.Let us try it upon each of them successively.Let us apply it to love,to hatred,to humility,to pride；none of them ever arises in the smallest degree i-maginable.Let us change the object,as oft as we please；provided still we choose one,that has neither of these two relations.Let us repeat the experiment in all the disposi-tions,of which the mind is susceptible.No object,in the vast variety of nature,will,in any disposition,produce any passion without these relations.

Second Experiment.Since an object,that wants both these relations can never-produce any passion,let us bestow on it only one of these relations；and see what will follow.Thus suppose,I regard a stone or any common object,that belongs either to me or my companion,and by that means acquires a relation of ideas to the object of the pas-sions：Tis plain,that to consider the matter a priori,no emotion of any kind can rea-sonably be expected.For besides,that a relation of ideas operates secretly and calmly on the mind,it bestows an equal impulse towards the opposite passions of pride and hu-mility,love and hatred,according as the object belongs to ourselves or others；which opposition of the passions must destroy both,and leave the mind perfectly free from any affection or emotion.This reasoning a priori is confirm d by experience.No trivial or vulgar object,that causes not a pain or pleasure,independent of the passion,will ever,by its property or other relations,either to ourselves or others,be able to produce the af-fections of pride or humility,love or hatred.

Third Experiment.Tis evident,therefore,that a relation of ideas is not able alone to give rise to these affections.Let us now remove this relation,and in its stead place a relation of impressions,by presenting an object,which is agreeable or disagreeable,but has no relation either to ourself or companion；and let us observe the consequences.To consider the matter first a priori,as in the preceding experiment；we may conclude,that the object will have a small,but an uncertain connexion with these passions.For be-sides,that this relation is not a cold and imperceptible one,it has not the inconvenience of the relation of ideas,nor directs us with equal force to two contrary passions,which by their opposition destroy each other.But if we consider,on the other hand,that this transition from the sensation to the affection is not forwarded by any principle,that pro-duces a transition of ideas；but,on the contrary,that tho the one impression be easily transfus d into the other,yet the change of objects is suppos d contrary to all the princi-ples,that cause a transition of that kind；we may from thence infer,that nothing will ever be a steady or durable cause of any passion,that is connected with the passion merely by a relation of impressions.What our reason wou d conclude from analogy,after balancing these arguments,wou d be,that an object,which produces pleasure or uneas-iness,but has no manner of connexion either with ourselves or others,may give such a turn to the disposition,as that may naturally fall into pride or love,humility or hatred,and search for other objects,upon which by a double relation,it can found these affec-tions；but that an object,which has only one of these relations,tho the most advanta-geous one,can never give rise to any constant and establish d passion.

Most fortunately all this reasoning is found to be exactly conformable to experience,and the phenomena of the passions.Suppose I were travelling with a companion thro a country,to which we are both utter strangers；tis evident,that if the prospects be beau-tiful,the roads agreeable,and the inns commodious,this may put me into good humour both with myself and fellow-traveller.But as we suppose,that this country has no rela-tion either to myself or friend.it can never be the immediate cause of pride or love；and therefore if I found not the passion on some other object,that bears either of us a closer relation,my emotions are rather to be considerd as the overflowings of an elevate or hu-mane disposition,than as an establish d passion.The case is the same where the object produces uneasiness.

Fourth Experiment.Having found,that neither an object without any relation of i-deas or impressions,nor an object,that has only one relation,can ever cause pride or humility,love or hatred；reason alone may convince us,without any farther experiment,that whatever has a double relation must necessarily excite these passions；since tis evi-dent they must have some cause.But to leave as little room for doubt as possible,let us renew our experiments,and see whether the event in this case answers our expectation.I choose an object,such as virtue,that causes a separate satisfaction：On this object I bestow a relation to self；and find,that from this disposition of affairs,there immediate-ly arises a passion.But what passion？That very one of pride,to which this object bears a double relation.Its idea is related to that of self,the object of the passion：The sensa-tion it causes resembles the sensation of the passion.That I may be sure I am not mis-taken in this experiment,I remove first one relation；then another；and find,that each removal destroys the passion,and leaves the object perfectly indifferent.But I am not content with this.I make a still farther trial；and instead of removing the relation,I only change it for one of a different kind.I suppose the virtue to belong to my companion,not to myself；and observe what follows from this alteration.I immediately perceive the affections wheel to about,and leaving pride,where there is only one relation,viz.of impressions,fall to the side of love,where they are attracted by a double relation of im-pressions and ideas.By repeating the same experiment,in changing anew the relation of ideas,I bring the affections back to pride；and by a new repetition I again place them at love or kindness.Being fully convinc d of the influence of this relation,I try the effects of the other；and by changing virtue for vice,convert the pleasant impression,which a-rises from the former,into the disagreeable one,which proceeds from the latter.The effect still answers expectation.Vice,when plac d on another,excites,by means of its double relations,the passion of hatred,instead of love,which for the same reason arises from virtue.To continue the experiment,I change anew the relation of ideas,and sup-pose the vice to belong to myself.What follows？What is usual.A subsequent change of the passion from hatred to humility.This humility I convert into pride by a new change of the impression；and find after all that I have compleated the round,and have by these changes brought back the passion to that very situation,in which I fir

But to make the matter still more certain,I alter the object；and instead of vice and virtue,make the trial upon beauty and deformity,riches and poverty,power and servi-tude.Each of these objects runs the circle of the passions in the same manner,by a change of their relations：And in whatever order we proceed,whether thro pride,love,hatred,humility,or thro humility,hatred,love,pride,the experiment is not in the least diversify d.Esteem and contempt,indeed,arise on some occasions instead of love and hatred；but these are at the bottom the same passions,only diversify d by some cau-ses,which we shall explain afterwards.

Fifth Experiment.To give greater authority to these experiments,let us change the situation of affairs as much as possible,and place the passions and objects in all the dif-ferent positions,of which they are susceptible.Let us suppose,beside the relations a-bove-mention d,that the person,along with whom I make all these experiments,is closely connected with me either by blood or friendship.He is,we shall suppose,my son or brother,or is united to me by a long and familiar acquaintance.Let us next sup-pose,that the cause of the passion acquires a double relation of impressions and ideas to this person；and let us see what the effects are of all these complicated attractions and relations.

Before we consider what they are in fact,let us determine what they ought to be,conformable to my hypothesis.Tis plain,that,according as the impression is either pleasant or uneasy,the passion of love or hatred must arise towards the person,who is thus connected to the cause of the impression by these double relations,which I have all along requir d.

This is the reasoning I form in conformity to my hypothesis；and am pleas d to find upon trial that every thing answers exactly to my expectation.The virtue or vice of a son or brother not only excites love or hatred,but by a new transition,from similar causes,gives rise to pride or humility.Nothing causes greater vanity than any shining quality inour relations；as nothing mortifies us more than their vice or infamy.This exact con-formity of experience to our reasoning is a convincing proof of the solidity of that hypoth-esis,upon which we reason.

Sixth Experiment.This evidence will be still augmented,if we reverse the experi-ment,and preserving still the same relations,begin only with a different passion.Sup-pose,that instead of the virtue or vice of a son or brother,which causes first love or ha-tred,and afterwards pride or humility,we place these good or bad qualities on our-selves,without any immediate connexion with the person,who is related to us：Experi-ence shews us,that by this change of situation the whole chain is broke,and that the mind is not convey d from one passion to another,as in the preceding instance.We nev-er love or hate a son or brother for the virtue or vice we discern in ourselves；tho it evi-dent the same qualities in him give us a very sensible pride or humility.The transition from pride or humility to love or hatred is not so natural as from love or hatred to pride or humility.This may at first sight be esteem d contrary to my hypothesis；since the rela-tions of impressions and ideas are in both cases precisely the same.Pride and humility are impressions related to love and hatred.Myself am related to the person.It shou d,therefore,be expected,that like causes must produce like effects,and a perfect transi-tion arise from the double relation,as in all other cases.This difficulty we may easily solve by the following reflections.

Tis evident,that as we are at all times intimately conscious of ourselves,our senti-ments and passions,their ideas must strike upon us with greater vivacity than the ideas of the sentiments and passions of any other person.But every thing,that strikes upon us with vivacity,and appears in a full and strong light,forces itself,in a manner,into our consideration,and becomes present to the mind on the smallest hint and most trivial re-lation.For the same reason,when it is once present,it engages the attention,and keeps it from wandering to other objects,however strong may be their relation to our first object.The imagination passes easily from obscure to lively ideas,but with difficulty from lively to obscure.In the one case the relation is aided by another principle：In the other case,tis oppos d by it.

Now I have observ d,that those two faculties of the mind,the imagination and pas-sions,assist each other in their operations when their propensities are similar,and when they act upon the same object.The mind has always a propensity to pass from a passion to any other related to it；and this propensity is forwarded when the object of the one passion is related to that of the other.The two impulses concur with each other,and render the whole transition more smooth and easy.But if it shou d happen,that while the relation of ideas,strictly speaking,continues the same,its influence,in causing a transition of the imagination,shou d no longer take place,tis evident its influence on the passions must also cease,as being dependent entirely on that transition.This is the reason why pride or humility is not transfus d into love or hatred with the same ease,that the latter passions are chang d into the former.If a person be my brother I am his like-wise：but tho the relations be reciprocal they have very different effects on the imagina-tion.The passage is smooth and open from the consideration of any person related to us to that of ourself,of whom we are every moment conscious.But when the affections are once directed to ourself.the fancy passes not with the same facility from that object to any other person,how closely so ever connected with us.This easy or difficult transition of the imagination operates upon the passions,and facilitates or retards their transition,which is a clear proof,that these two faculties of the passions and imagination are con-nected together,and that the relations of ideas have an influence upon the affections.Besides innumerable experiments that prove this,we here find,that even when the rela-tion remains；if by any particular circumstance its usual effect upon the fancy in produ-cing an association or transition of ideas,is prevented；its usual effect upon the pas-sions,in conveying us from one to another,is in like manner prevented.

Some may,perhaps,find a contradiction betwixt this phenomenon and that of sym-pathy,where the mind passes easily from the idea of ourselves to that of any other object related to us.But this difficulty will vanish,if we consider that in sympathy our own person is not the object of any passion,nor is there any thing,that fixes our attention on ourselves；as in the present case,where we are suppos d to be actuated with pride or humility.Ourself,independent of the perception of every other object,is in reality nothing：For which reason we must turn our view to external objects；and tis natural for us to consider with most attention such as lie contiguous to us,or resemble us.But when self is the object of a passion,tis not natural to quit the consideration of it,till the passion be exhausted：in which case the double relations of impressions and ideas can no longer operate.

Seventh Experiment.To put this whole reasoning to a farther trial,let us make a new experiment；and as we have already seen the effects of related passions and ideas,let us here suppose an identity of passions along with a relation of ideas；and let usconsider the effects of this new situation.Tis evident a transition of the passions from the one object to the other is here in all reason to be expected；since the relation of ide-as is suppos d still to continue,and identity of impressions must produce a stronger con-nexion,than the most perfect resemblance,that can be imagin d.If a double relation,therefore,of impressions and ideas is able to produce a transition from one to the other,much more an identity of impressions with a relation of ideas.Accordingly we find,that when we either love or hate any person,the passions seldom continue within their first bounds；but extend themselves towards all the contiguous objects,and comprehend the friends and relations of him we love or hate.Nothing is more natural than to bear a kind-ness to one brother on account of our friendship for another,without any farther exami-nation of his character.A quarrel with one person gives us a hatred for the whole fami-ly,tho entirely innocent of that,which displeases us.Instances of this kind are every where to be met with.

There is only one difficulty in this experiment,which it will be necessary to account for,before we proceed any farther.Tis evident,that tho all passions pass easily from one object to another related to it,yet this transition is made with greater facility,where the more considerable object is first presented,and the lesser follows it,than where this order is revers d,and the lesser takes the precedence.Thus tis more natural for us to love the son upon account of the father,than the father upon account of the son；the servant for the master,than the master for the servant；the subject for the prince,than the prince for the subject.In like manner we more readily contract a hatred against a whole family,where our first quarrel is with the head of it,than where we are displeas d with a son,or servant,or some inferior member.In short,our passions,like other ob-jects,descend with greater facility than they ascend.

That we may comprehend,wherein consists the difficulty of explaining this phe-nomenon,we must consider,that the very same reason,which determines the imagina-tion to pass from remote to contiguous objects,with more facility than from contiguous to remote,causes it likewise to change with more ease,the less for the greater,than the greater for the less.Whatever has the greatest influence is most taken notice of；and whatever is most taken notice of,presents itself most readily to the imagination.We are more apt to over-look in any subject,what is trivial,than what appears of considerable moment；but especially if the latter takes the precedence,and first engages our atten-tion.Thus if any accident makes us consider the Satellites of Jupiter,our fancy is na-turally determin d to form the idea of that planet；but if we first reflect on the principal planet,tis more natural for us to overlook its attendants.The mention of the provinces of any empire conveys our thought to the seat of the empire；but the fancy returns not with the same facility to the consideration of the provinces.The idea of the servant makes us think of the master；that of the subject carries our view to the prince.But the same relation has not an equal influence in conveying us back again.And on this is founded that reproach of Cornelia to her sons,that they ought to be asham d she shou d be more known by the title of the daughter of Scipio than by that of the mother of the Gracchi.This was,in other words,exhorting them to render themselves as illustrious and famous as their grandfather,otherwise the imagination of the people,passing from her who was intermediate,and plac d in an equal relation to both,wou d always leave them,and denominate her by what was more considerable and of greater moment.On the same principle is founded that common custom of making wives bear the name of their husbands,rather than husbands that of their wives；as also the ceremony of giving the precedency to those,whom we honour and respect.We might find many other in-stances to confirm this principle,were it not already sufficiently evident.

Nou since the fancy finds the same facility in passing from the lesser to the greater,as from remote to contiguous,why does not this easy transition of ideas assist the transi-tion of passions in the former case,as well as in the latter？The virtues of a friend or brother produce first love,and then pride；because in that case the imagination passes from remote to contiguous,according to its propensity.Our own virtues produce not first pride,and then love to a friend or brother；because the passage in that case wou d be from contiguous to remote,contrary to its propensity.But the love or hatred of an inferi-or causes not readily any passion to the superior,tho that be the natural propensity of the imagination：While the love or hatred of a superior,causes a passion to the inferior,contrary to its propensity.In short,the same facility of transition operates not in the same manner upon superior and inferior as upon contiguous and remote.These two phe-nomena appear contradictory,and require some attention to be reconcil d.

As the transition of ideas is here made contrary to the natural propensity of the i-magination,that faculty must be overpower d by some stronger principle of another kind；and as there is nothing ever present to the mind but impressions and ideas,this princi-ple must necessarily lie in the impressions.Now it has been observ d,that impressions or passions are connected only by their resemblance,and that where any two passions place the mind in the same or in similar dispositions,it very naturally passes from the one to the other：As on the contrary,a repugnance in the dispositions produces a diffi-culty in the transition of the passions.But tis observable,that this repugnance may a-rise from a difference of degree as well as of kind；nor do we experience a greater diffi-culty in passing suddenly from a small degree of love to a small degree of hatred,than from a small to a great degree of either of these affections.A man,when calm or only moderately agitated,is so different,in every respect,from himself,when disturbed with a violent passion,that no two persons can be more unlike；nor is it easy to pass from the one extreme to the other,without a considerable interval betwixt them.

The difficulty is not less,if it be not rather greater,in passing from the strong pas-sion to the weak,than in passing from the weak to the strong,provided the one passion upon its appearance destroys the other,and they do not both of them exist at once.But the case is entirely alter d,when the passions unite together,and actuate the mind at the same time.A weak passion,when added to a strong,makes not so considerable a change in the disposition,as a strong when added to a weak；for which reason there is a closer connexion betwixt the great degree and the small,than betwixt the small degree and the great.

The degree of any passion depends upon the nature of its object；and an affection directed to a person,who is considerable in our eyes,fills and possesses the mind much more than one,which has for its object a person we esteem of less consequence.Here then the contradiction betwixt the propensities of the imagination and passion displays it-self.When we turn our thought to a great and a small object,the imagination finds more facility in passing from the small to the great,than from the great to the small；but the affections find a greater difficulty：And as the affections are a more powerful principle than the imagination,no wonder they prevail over it,and draw the mind to their side.In spite of the difficulty of passing from the idea of great to that of little,a passion di-rected to the former,produces always a similar passion towards the latter；when the great and little are related together.The idea of the servant conveys our thought most readily to the master；but the hatred or love of the master produces with greater facility anger or good-will to the servant.The strongest passion in this case takes the preced-ence；and the addition of the weaker making no considerable change on the disposition,the passage is by that means render d more easy and natural betwixt them.

As in the foregoing experiment we found,that a relation of ideas,which,by anyparticular circumstance,ceases to produce its usual effect of facilitating the transition of ideas,ceases likewise to operate on the passions；so in the present experiment we find the same property of the impressions.Two different degrees of the same passion are surely related together；but if the smaller be first present,it has little or no tendency to introduce the greater；and that because the addition of the great to the little,produces a more sensible alteration on the temper,than the addition of the little to the great.These phaenomena,when duly weigh d,will be found convincing proofs of this hypothesis.

And these proofs will be confirm d,if we consider the manner in which the mind here reconciles the contradiction,I have observ d betwixt the passions and the imagina-tion.The fancy passes with more facility from the less to the greater,than from the grea-ter to the less：But on the contrary a violent passion produces more easily a feeble,than that does a violent.In this opposition the passion in the end prevails over the imagina-tion；but tis commonly by complying with it,and by seeking another quality,which may counter-ballance that principle,from whence the opposition arises.When we love the father or master of a family,we little think of his children or servants.But when these are present with us,or when it lies any ways in our power to serve them,the near-ness and contiguity in this case encreases their magnitude,or at least removes that oppo-sition,which the fancy makes to the transition of the affections.If the imagination finds a difficulty in passing from greater to less,it finds an equal facility in passing from re-mote to contiguous,which brings the matter to an equality,and leaves the way open from the one passion to the other.

Eighth Experiment.I have observ d that the transition from love or hatred to pride or humility,is more easy than from pride or humility to love or hatred；and that the dif-ficulty,which the imagination finds in passing from contiguous to remote,is the cause why we scarce have any instance of the latter transition of the affections.I must,howev-er,make one exception,viz.when the very cause of the pride and humility is plac d in some other person.For in that case the imagination is necessitated to consider the per-son,nor can it possibly confine its view to ourselves.Thus nothing more readily pro-duces kindness and affection to any person,than his approbation of our conduct and character：As on the other hand,nothing inspires us with a stronger hatred,than his blame or contempt.Here tis evident,that the original passion is pride or humility,whose object is self；and that this passion is transfus d into love or hatred,whose object is some other person,notwithstanding the rule I have already establish d,that the im-agination passes with difficulty from contiguous to remote.But the transition in this case is not made merely on account of the relation betwixt ourselves and the person；but be-cause that very person is the real cause of our first passion,and of consequence is inti-mately connected with it.Tis his approbation that produces pride；and disapprobation,humility.No wonder,then,the imagination returns back again attended with the related passions of love and hatred.This is not a contradiction,but an exception to the rule；and an exception that arises from the same reason with the rule itself.

Such an exception as this is,therefore,rather a confirmation of the rule.And in-deed,if we consider all the eight experiments I have explain d,we shall find that the same principle appears in all of them,and that tis by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas,pride and humility,love and hatred are produc d.An object without a relation,or with but one,never produces either of these passions；and tis found that the passion always varies in conformity to the relation.Nay we may observe,that where the relation,by any particular circumstance,has not its u-sual effect of producing a transition either of ideas or of impressions,it ceases to operate upon the passions,and gives rise neither to pride nor love,humility nor hatred.This rule we find still to hold good even under the appearance of its contrary；and as relation is frequently experienc d to have no effect；which upon examination is found to proceed from some particular circumstance,that prevents the transition；so even in instances,where that circumstance,tho present,prevents not the transition,tis found to arise from some other circumstance,which counter-balances it.Thus not only the variations resolve themselves into the general principle,but even the variations of these variations.

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SECT.3　Difficulties Solvd

After so many and such undeniable proofs drawn from daily experience and obser-vation,it may seem superfluous to enter into a particular examination of all the causes of love and hatred.I shall,therefore,employ the sequel of this part,First,In removing some difficulties,concerning particular causes of these passions.Secondly,In exami-ning the compound affections,which arise from the mixture of love and hatred with other emotions.

Nothing is more evident,than that any person acquires our kindness,or is expos d to our ill-will,in proportion to the pleasure or uneasiness we receive from him,and that the passions keep pace exactly with the sensations in all their changes and va-riations.Whoever can find the means either by his services,his beauty,or his flattery,to render himself useful or agreeable to us,is sure of our affections：As on the other hand,whoever harms or displeases us never fails to excite our anger or hatred.When our own nation is at war with any other,we detest them under the character of cruel,perfidious,unjust and violent：But always esteem ourselves and allies equitable,moder-ate,and merciful.If the general of our enemies be successful,tis with difficulty we al-low him the figure and character of a man.He is a sorcerer：He has a communication with daemons；as is reported of Oliver Cromwell,and the Duke of Luxembourg：He is bloody-minded,and takes a pleasure in death and destruction.But if the success be on our side,our commander has all the opposite good qualities,and is a pattern of vir-tue,as well as of courage and conduct.His treachery we call policy：His cruelty is an evil inseparable from war.In short,every one of his faults we either endeavour to exten-uate,or dignify it with the name of that virtue,which approaches it.Tis evident the same method of thinking runs thro common life.

There are some,who add another condition,and require not only that the pain and pleasure arise from the person,but likewise that it arise knowingly,and with a particu-lar design and intention.A man,who wounds and harms us by accident,becomes not our enemy upon that account,nor do we think ourselves bound by any ties of gratitude to one,who does us any service after the same manner.By the intention we judge of the actions,and according as that is good or bad,they become causes of love or hatred.

But here we must make a distinction.If that quality in another,which pleases or displeases,be constant and inherent in his person and character,it will cause love or hatred independent of the intention：But otherwise a knowledge and design is requisite,in order to give rise to these passions.One that is disagreeable by his deformity or folly is the object of our aversion,tho nothing be more certain,than that he has not the least intention of displeasing us by these qualities.But if the uneasiness proceed not from a quality,but an action,which is produc d and annihilated in a moment,tis necessary,in order to produce some relation,and connect this action sufficiently with the person.that it be deriv d from a particular fore-thought and design.Tis not enough,that the ac-tion arise from the person,and have him for its immediate cause and author.This rela-tion alone is too feeble and inconstant to be a foundation for these passions.It reaches not the sensible and thinking part,and neither proceeds from any thing durable in him,nor leaves any thing behind it；but passes in a moment,and is as if it had never been.On the other hand,an intention shews certain qualities,which remaining after the action is perform d,connect it with the person,and facilitate the transition of ideas from one to the other.We can never think of him without reflecting on these qualities；unless repen-tance and a change of life have produc d an alteration in that respect：In which case the passion is likewise alter d.This therefore is one reason,why an intention is requisite to excite either love or hatred.

But we must farther consider,that an intention,besides its strengthening the rela-tion of ideas,is often necessary to produce a relation of impressions,and give rise to pleasure and uneasiness.For tis observable,that the principal part of an injury is the contempt and hatred,which it shews in the person,that injures us；and without that,the mere harm gives us a less sensible uneasiness.In like manner,a good office is a-greeable,chiefly because it flatters our vanity,and is a proof of the kindness and esteem of the person,who performs it.The removal of the intention,removes the mortification in the one case,and vanity in the other,and must of course cause a remarkable diminu-tion in the passions of love and hatred.

I grant,that these effects of the removal of design,in diminishing the relations of impressions and ideas,are not entire,nor able to remove every degree of these rela-tions.But then I ask,if the removal of design be able entirely to remove the passion of love and hatred？Experience,I am sure,informs us of the contrary,nor is there any thing more certain,than that men often fall into a violent anger for injuries,which they themselves must own to be entirely involuntary and accidental.This emotion,indeed,cannot be of long continuance；but still is sufficient to shew,that there is a natural con-nexion betwixt uneasiness and anger,and that the relation of impressions will operate upon a very small relation of ideas.But when the violence of the impression is once a little abated,the defect of the relation begins to be better felt；and as the character of a person is no wise interested in such injuries as are casual and involuntary,it seldom happens that on their account,we entertain a lasting enmity.

To illustrate this doctrine by a parallel instance,we may observe,that not only the uneasiness,which proceeds from another by accident,has but little force to excite our passion,but also that which arises from an acknowledg d necessity and duty.One that has a real design of harming us,proceeding not from hatred and ill-will,but from justice and equity,draws not upon him our anger,if we be in any degree reasonable；notwith-standing he is both the cause,and the knowing cause of our sufferings.Let us examinea little this phenomenon.

Tis evident in the first place,that this circumstance is not decisive；and tho it may be able to diminish the passions,tis seldom it can entirely remove them.How few criminals are there,who have no ill-will to the person,that accuses them,or to the judge,that condemns them,even tho they be conscious of their own deserts？In like manner our antagonist in a law-suit,and our competitor for any office,are commonly re-garded as our enemies；tho we must acknowledge,if we wou d but reflect a moment,that their motive is entirely as justifiable as our own.

Besides we may consider,that when we receive harm from any person,we are apt to imagine him criminal,and tis with extreme difficulty we allow of his justice and inno-cence.This is a clear proof,that,independent of the opinion of iniquity,any harm or uneasiness has a natural tendency to excite our hatred,and that afterwards we seek for reasons upon which we may justify and establish the passion.Here the idea of injury produces not the passion,but arises from it.

Nor is it any wonder that passion shou d produce the opinion of injury；since other-wise it must suffer a considerable diminution,which all the passions avoid as much as possible.The removal of injury may remove the anger,without proving that the anger a-rises only from the injury.The harm and the justice are two contrary objects,of which the one has a tendency to produce hatred,and the other love；and tis according to their different degrees,and our particular turn of thinking,that either of the objects prevails,and excites its proper passion.

SECT.4　Of the Love of Relations

Having given a reason,why several actions,that cause a real pleasure or uneasi-ness,excite not any degree,or but a small one,of the passion of love or hatred towards the actors；it will be necessary to shew,wherein consists the pleasure or uneasiness of many objects,which we find by experience to produce these passions.

According to the preceding system there is always requir d a double relation of im-pressions and ideas betwixt the cause and effect,in order to produce either love or ha-tred.But tho this be universally true,tis remarkable that the passion of love may be excited by only one relation of a different kind,viz,betwixt ourselves and the object；or more properly speaking,that this relation is always attended with both the others.Who-ever is united to us by any connexion is always sure of a share of our love,proportion dto the connexion,without enquiring into his other qualities.Thus the relation of blood produces the strongest tie the mind is capable of in the love of parents to their children,and a lesser degree of the same affection,as the relation lessens.Nor has consanguinity alone this effect,but any other relation without exception.We love our country-men,our neighbours,those of the same trade,profession,and even name with ourselves.Ev-ery one of these relations is esteem d some tie,and gives a title to a share of our affec-tion.

There is another phenomenon,which is parallel to this,viz,that acquaintance,without any kind of relation,gives rise to love and kindness.When we have contracted a habitude and intimacy with any person；tho in frequenting his company we have not been able to discover any very valuable quality,of which he is possess d；yet we cannot forebear preferring him to strangers,of whose superior merit we are fully convinc d.These two phaenomena of the effects of relation and acquaintance will give mutual light to each other,and may be both explain d from the same principle.

Those,who take a pleasure in declaiming against human nature,have observ d,that man is altogether insufficient to support himself；and that when you loosen all the holds,which he has of external objects,he immediately drops down into the deepest melancholy and despair.From this,say they,proceeds that continual search after a-musement in gaming,in hunting,in business；by which we endeavour to forget our-selves,and excite our spirits from the languid state,into which they fall,when not sustain d by some brisk and lively emotion.To this method of thinking I so far agree,that I own the mind to be insufficient,of itself,to its own entertainment,and that it nat-urally seeks after foreign objects,which may produce a lively sensation,and agitate the spirits.On the appearance of such an object it awakes,as it were,from a dream：The blood flows with a new tide：The heart is elevated：And the whole man acquires a vig-our,which he cannot command in his solitary and calm moments.Hence company is naturally so rejoicing,as presenting the liveliest of all objects,viz.a rational and think-ing Being like ourselves,who communicates to us all the actions of his mind；makes us privy to his inmost sentiments and affections；and lets us see,in the very instant of their production,all the emotions,which are caus d by any object.Every lively idea is agree-able,but especially that of a passion,because such an idea becomes a kind of passion,and gives a more sensible agitation to the mind,than any other image or conception.

This being once admitted,all the rest is easy.For as the company of strangers isagreeable to us for a short time,by inlivening our thought；so the company of our rela-tions and acquaintance must be peculiarly agreeable,because it has this effect in a grea-ter degree,and is of more durable influence.Whatever is related to us is conceiv d in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related object.Custom also,or acquaintance facilitates the entrance,and strengthens the conception of any object.The first case is parallel to our reasonings from cause and effect；the second to education.And as reasoning and education concur only in producing a lively and strong idea of any object；so is this the only particular,which is common to relation and acquaintance.This must,therefore,be the influencing quality,by which they produce all their com-mon effects；and love or kindness being one of these effects,it must be from the force and liveliness of conception,that the passion is deriv d.Such a conception is peculiarly agreeable,and makes us have an affectionate regard for every thing,that produces it,when the proper object of kindness and goodwill.

Tis obvious,that people associate together according to their particular tempers and dispositions,and that men of gay tempers naturally love the gay；as the serious bear an affection to the serious.This not only happens,where they remark this resemblance betwixt themselves and others,but also by the natural course of the disposition,and by a certain sympathy,which always arises betwixt similar characters.Where they remark the resemblance,it operates after the manner of a relation,by producing a connexion of ideas.Where they do not remark it,it operates by some other principle；and if this lat-ter principle be similar to the former,it must be receiv d as a confirmation of the forego-ing reasoning.

The idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us,and conveys a sensible de-gree of vivacity to the idea of any other object,to which we are related.This lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression；these two kinds of perception being in a great measure the same,and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity.But this change must be produc d with the greater ease,that our natural temper gives us a pro-pensity to the same impression,which we observe in others,and makes it arise upon any slight occasion.In that case resemblance converts the idea into an impression,not only by means of the relation,and by transfusing the original vivacity into the related i-dea；but also by presenting such materials as take fire from the least spark.And as in both cases a love or affection arises from the resemblance,we may learn that a sympathy with others is agreeable only by giving an emotion to the spirits,since an easy sympathy and correspondent emotions are alone common to relation,acquaintance,and resem-blance.

The great propensity men have to pride may be consider d as another similar phe-nomenon.It often happens,that after we have liv d a considerable time in any city；however at first it might be disagreeable to us；yet as we become familiar with the ob-jects,and contact an acquaintance,tho merely with the streets and buildings,the aver-sion diminishes by degrees,and at last changes into the opposite passion.The mind finds a satisfaction and ease in the view of objects,to which it is accustom d,and natu-rally prefers them to others,which,tho,perhaps,in themselves more valuable,are less known to it.By the same quality of the mind we are seduc d into a good opinion of ourselves,and of all objects,that belong to us.They appear in a stronger light；are more agreeable；and consequently fitter subjects of pride and vanity,than any other.

It may not be amiss,in treating of the affection we bear our acquaintance and rela-tions,to observe some pretty curious phaenomena,which attend it.Tis easy to remark in common life,that children esteem their relation to their mother to be weaken d,in a great measure,by her second marriage,and no longer regard her with the same eye,as if she had continu d in her state of widow-hood.Nor does this happen only,when they have felt any inconveniences from her second marriage,or when her husband is much her inferior；but even without any of these considerations,and merely because she has become part of another family.This also takes place with regard to the second marriage of a father；but in a much less degree：And tis certain the ties of blood are not so much loosen d in the latter case as by the marriage of a mother.These two phenomena are re-markable in themselves,but much more so wh

In order to produce a perfect relation betwixt two objects,tis requisite,not only that the imagination be convey d from one to the other by resemblance,contiguity or causation,but also that it return back from the second to the first with the same ease and facility.At first sight this may seem a necessary and unavoidable consequence.If one object resemble another,the latter object must necessarily resemble the former.If one object be the cause of another,the second object is effect to its cause.Tis the same case with contiguity：And therefore the relation being always reciprocal,it may be thought,that the return of the imagination from the second to the first must also,in ev-ery case,be equally natural as its passage from the first to the second.But upon farther examination we shall easily discover our mistake.For supposing the second object,beside its reciprocal relation to the first,to have also a strong relation to a third object；in that case the thought,passing from the first object to the second,returns not back with the same facility,tho the relation continues the same；but is readily carry d on to the third object,by means of the new relation,which presents itself,and gives a new impulse to the imagination.This new relation,therefore,weakens the tie betwixt the first and second objects.The fancy is by its very nature wavering and inconstant；and considers always two objects as more strongly related together,where it finds the passage equally easy both in going and returning,than where the transition is easy only in one of these motions.The double motion is a kind of a double tie,and binds the objects to-gether in the closest and most intimate manner.

The second marriage of a mother breaks not the relation of child and parent；and that relation suffices to convey my imagination from myself to her with the greatest ease and facility.But after the imagination is arriv d at this point of view,it finds its object to be surrounded with so many other relations,which challenge its regard,that it knows not which to prefer,and is at a loss what new object to pitch upon.The ties of interest and duty bind her to another family,and prevent that return of the fancy from her to my-self,which is necessary to support the union.The thought has no longer the vibration,requisite to set it perfectly at ease,and indulge its inclination to change.It goes with fa-cility,but returns with difficulty；and by that interruption finds the relation much weaken d from what it wou d be were the passage open and easy on both sides.

Now to give a reason,why this effect follows not in the same degree upon the sec-ond marriage of a father：we may reflect on what has been prov d already,that tho the imagination goes easily from the view of a lesser object to that of a greater,yet it returns not with the same facility from the greater to the less.When my imagination goes from myself to my father,it passes not so readily from him to his second wife,nor considers him as entering into a different family,but as continuing the head of that family,of which I am myself a part.His superiority prevents the easy transition of the thought from him to his spouse,but keeps the passage still open for a return to myself along the same relation of child and parent.He is not sunk in the new relation he acquires；so that the double motion or vibration of thought is still easy and natural.By this indulgence of the fancy in its inconstancy,the tie of child and parent still preserves its full force and influ-ence.A mother thinks not her tie to a son weaken d,because tis shar d with her hus-band：Nor a son his with a parent,because tis shar d with a brother.The third object ishere related to the first,as well as to the second；so that the imagination goes and comes along all of them with the greatest facility.

en com pared.

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PART 3　Of the Will and Direct Passions

We come now to explain the direct passions,or the impressions,which arise imme-diately from good or evil,from pain or pleasure.Of this kind are,desire and aversion,grief and joy,hope and fear.

Of all the immediate effects of pain and pleasure,there is none more remarkable than the WILL；and tho,properly speaking,it be not comprehended among the pas-sions,yet as the full understanding of its nature and properties,is necessary to the ex-planation of them,we shall here make it the subject of our enquiry.I desire it may be observ d,that by the will,I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of,when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body,or new per-ception of our mind.This impression,like the preceding ones of pride and humility,love and hatred,tis impossible to define,and needless to describe any farther；for which reason we shall cut off all those definitions and distinctions,with which philoso-phers are wont to perplex rather than dear up this question；and entering at first upon the subject,shall examine that long disputed question concerning liberty and necessity；which occurs so naturally in treating of the will.

Tis universally acknowledg d,that the operations of external bodies are necessary,and that in the communication of their motion,in their attraction,and mutual cohesion,there are nor the least traces of indifference or liberty.Every object is determin d by an absolute fate to a certain degree and direction of its motion,and can no more depart from that precise line,in which it moves,than it can convert itself into an angel,or spirit,or any superior substance.The actions,therefore,of matter are to be regarded as instances of necessary actions；and whatever is in this respect on the same footing with matter,must be acknowledg d to be necessary.That we may know whether this be the case with the actions of the mind,we shall begin with examining matter,and consider-ing on what the idea of a necessity in its operations are founded,and why we conclude one body or action to be the infallible cause of another.

第二卷　论情感

第一章　骄傲与谦卑

第一节　题目的划分

因为对于精神的所有都可以划分为印象与观念，所以对印象的描绘又可以进一步划分为初始的和次级的。最初的印象或者感性印象并不来自灵魂、身体构造、动物精神或者客体对外部器官的应用。次级或者说经过思考的认识，则是或突然或由于观念的介入通过这些初始的认识得到的。第一类认识。都是通过感觉或者身体的愉悦和疼痛得到的；而第二类则源自情感或者其他类似的感情。

可以确定的是，精神的感觉必然起源于某处；由于印象先于与之相关的观念，那么肯定有不需要任何向导就可以出现在脑中的印象。当身体的疼痛和愉悦都被精神感受和考虑的时候，它们就是一些情感的来源，但是这些情感最初起源于灵魂，起源于身体——无论你叫它们什么，不带有任何先在的想法或感知。一部分趣味来自长期对情感的训练，比如悲伤、希望和恐惧，但它们并不会马上被任何倾向或者观念摆布。经过考虑的认识可以被分为两部分，即静默的和猛烈的。前者是对行为、构成和外部课题美丑的认识。后者则是爱戴与厌恶、悲伤和欢乐、骄傲与谦卑的情感。关于人类思想的主题太包罗万象，我将利用这通俗而又广博的分别，按照更好的顺序继续进行。我已经说过所有我认为必然与观念有关的事物，现在将解释猛烈的感情或者情感，以及它们的形态、起源、动机和效果。

当我们对情感进行调查的时候，它们分为了直接的和间接的。我认为直接的来自于直观感受，如善良与邪恶、愉悦和伤痛。而间接的则由相同原则产生，但是联系了其他的性质。这里我没有办法对这种区别进行进一步的阐释。我只能简单地评述为，所谓间接情感，我觉得是由骄傲、谦卑、野心、空虚、爱慕、厌恶、妒忌、怜悯、怨恨、慷慨以及它们的附属所组成。而直接情感下则包括欲望、反感、悲伤、愉悦、希望、恐惧、绝望和安全感。下面我将从前面的部分开始说起。

第二节　骄傲与谦卑，它们的对象和动机

骄傲与谦卑的情感是单纯而一致的印象，我们不管用多少话也不能对两者或者说任何一种其他的情感下个准确的定义。我们所能达到的最大限度，就是列举伴随这些情感的种种条件，并对它们一一进行描述。不过骄傲与谦卑这两个名词既然通用，且两者表达之印象又显而易见，所以每个人都会自己对它们产生一个最正确的观念，而不至于有错误之虞。所以，为了不在绪论上多费工夫，我将马上考察这些情感。

显然骄傲与谦卑是正好相反的，但它们有同一个对象。这个对象就是自我，或我们很容易记忆和意识到的连续的相关观念和印象。心灵不论接纳其他什么对象，考虑它们的时候总要着眼于我们自己，否则这些对象便永远不能刺激这些情感，或者使它们或多或少产生些变动。当自我不被考虑的时候，就没有了骄傲或谦卑存在的余地。

但是我们所谓自我的那一系列连续的知觉，尽管总是这两种情感的对象，但自我却并不能成为这些情感的动机，或者仅仅依靠自身就足以刺激起这些情感。因为这些情感既然正好是相反的，并且有一个共同的对象；所以假使它们的对象也是它们的动机，那么，这个对象一旦产生了任何程度的一种情感，同时就不能不刺激起相等程度的另一种情感来；这种对立必然导致互相消灭。一个人不可能同时骄傲和谦卑；常常发生的是，当他有不同的理由发生这些情感时，这些情感或者交替发生，或者在相遇时，一方尽其所能去消灭对方，结果是占优势的一方的剩余力量还在继续影响着心灵。

因此，我们必须区别这些情感的动机和对象；必须区别刺激起情感的那个观念和那个情感被刺激起来后我们所要找的那个观念。当有一个情感处于两个观念之间时，其中一个是产生情感的，另一个是被情感所产生的。因此，第一个观念表象着情感的动机，第二个则表象着情感的对象。

先从骄傲和谦卑的动机谈起；可以说，它们最明显最可注目的特性就是这两种情感可以由此而发生的那些主体的极大多样性。心灵的每一种有价值的性质，不论其属于想象判断记忆，或者属于性情，如机智、见识、学问、勇敢、正义、正直，所有这些都是骄傲的动机，而其反面则是谦卑的动机。这些情感并不限于发生在心灵方面，而将它们的观点扩展到身体方面。一个人也可以由于美貌、体力、敏捷、体态、熟练的态、骑术、剑术，以及他在任何体力或者技艺劳动方面的灵巧而感到骄傲。我们的国家、家庭、儿女、亲戚、财富、房屋、花园、衣服，任何一样都可以成为骄傲或谦卑的动机。

考虑到这些动机后，看来我们必须对这种情感的动机做一个新的区分了，即区分那种发生作用的性质和那种性质所寓存的主体。例如一个人对属于自己的美丽的房子或自己所设计和建造的房子感到骄傲。这里，情感的对象就是他自己，而其动机则是那所美丽的房屋。这个动机又可以再分为两个部分，即作用于情感上的性质，和那个性质所寓存的主体。性质就是那种美，而主体即是视为他的财产或由他所设计的那所房子。美如果不寓存于与我们有关系的某种东西，单就其自身来说，永远不能产生任何骄傲或虚荣；但如果没有美或者代替美的其他任何事物，单靠最强的关系也很少影响到那种情感。这两个项目既然很容易分开，而且两者必须结合起来才能产生那种情感，因此我们应该将两者看作这个动机的组成部分，并在自己心中确定对这种区分的精确观念。

第三节　这些对象和动机从何而来

显而易见，这些情感将自我作为它们的对象，不仅是被自然的特性，而且还是被一种原始的特性所决定。正因为其长期而稳定的作用，所以没有人能够怀疑它们不自然。骄傲与谦卑的对象永远是自我；每当这些情感向外观察的时候，它们总要着眼于我们自身，否则任何人或对象就不能对我们产生任何影响。

这个问题也许可以被当成一个更重大的问题来看。这个疑惑是可以立刻消除的。如果我们对人性进行观察，认为同样的对象永远产生骄傲和谦卑，即使当我们看到一个素不相识的人的时候也是如此，这种事情出现在一切民族和时代中，我们也知道，什么可以增加或减少这一类情感。在这一方面如果产生差异了，那也只是因为人类的性情和脾气的差异，并且这种差异也不是很大。我们能够想象，只要人性保持同一不变，人们会完全不关心他们的权力、财富、美貌或个人的优点，而他们的骄傲和虚荣也不会被这些优点所影响吗？

但骄傲和谦卑的动机显得自然而然，可是在我们查看以后，将会发现这些动机并不是原始的，而且它们绝不可能让自然的一种特殊规定和原始结构适用于这些情感。这些动机数量惊人，许多都是艺术的产品，有的部分来自人的勤劳，有的部分来自人的喜好，有的部分来自人的幸运。勤劳产生了房屋、家具、衣服。爱好决定它们的特殊种类和性质。幸运则显示了进行不同组合后物体所产生的结果，所以往往有助于上述一切工作。因此，我们不能想象，这些物体每种都产生自然预见和规定；我们不能想象，引起骄傲或谦卑的每件新的艺术品，不是因为其具有共同的自然而然影响心灵的性质，才与情感相适合，而是本身就是一个最初原则的对象，而这个原则过去一直存在在灵魂中，被人发现则纯属偶然；这样设想是荒谬的。所以我们必须断言，骄傲和谦卑的每一个动机，并不是借着一种个别而原始的性质适用这些情感的，而一定有或多或少的条件是这些情感所共有的，给它们的效能以依据。

因此，在这里精神哲学和哥白尼时代以前的自然科学所处的情况是一样。古代的人们虽然知道自然从不虚妄的格言，但仍然精心设计了和真正哲学不相符合的繁复的天体体系，而最后那些体系却不得不让位于一个比较简单而自然的体系。如果我们毫不犹豫地给每个新的现象都发明新的原则，而不让它适用于旧原则，那就确实地证明了这些原则中没有一条是正确的，而我们只是想借一堆虚妄的学说来掩盖自己对真理的无知罢了。

第四节　论印象和观念的关系

就这样，在毫无障碍和困难的情况下，我们就确定了两条真理，首先这些多样化的原因是在自然的原则下激起骄傲和谦卑的；另一条是：每个不同的原因并非借不同的原则来表达情感。现在我们将就此进行进一步的探讨，我们如何将这些原则归入小一些的数目，并且在它们中间发现这些影响所依据的某种共有的成分。

为了达到这个目的，我们必须思考某些人性的特性，它们虽然能强烈影响知性和情感的作用，可是哲学家们一般不强调这一点。这种影响首先就是我们曾多次讲述和说明过的观念的连接。心灵不可能在长时间内固定在一个观念上，即使尽其全力，它也绝不可能达到永久的恒定状态，不过无论我们的思想如何容易被改变，它们的变化并不是完全没有任何规则和方法的。思想依之进行的规则，是由一个对象行进到与之类似、接近或为它所产生的对象。当一个观念呈现在想象中时，被这些关系结合起来的其他任何观念就自然地随之而来，并由于这种导引而比较顺利地进入人的心灵。

我在人类心灵中所观察到的第二种特性，就是和它相近的印象的连接。所有相近的印象都联系在一起，只要一个印象发生，其他的也就会跟着发生。悲伤和失望产生愤怒，愤怒产生妒忌，妒忌产生恶意，恶意又产生悲伤，一直到完成全部的轮回为止。同理可知，在我们的性情被喜悦鼓舞起来的时候，它就顺理成章地进入爱慕、慷慨、怜悯、勇敢、骄傲和其他类似的感情。一旦心灵为任何情感感动，它就很难局限在一种单独的情感中而不发生任何改变。人性是不断变化的，不可能容忍那样的规律。容易发生改变正是人性的要素。既然如此，那么人性不是很自然地朝那些合适人的性情并且符合优势感情的那一套感情或者情绪发展吗？所以，在印象间也和在观念间一样，显然都互相吸引和连接；不过显然两者之间有这样一种差别，即观念是被相似、接近和因果关系所连接的，而印象只是被相似的关系所连接的。

第三种观察到的是，两种连接关系是相互协助的。两种连接如果在同一个对象身上出现，便会更容易完成推进作用。比如当一个人被他人损害，性情转向混乱和暴躁的时候，就能产生几百种引起不满、焦急、恐惧和其他不安情绪的东西，他能够发现这些东西来自引起他最初情感的那个人的身上，或者那个人的附近。那些促进观念推进的原则在这里和影响情感的那些原则结合在一起了，从而让心灵双重冲动。所以，新情感就会以更强烈的形式爆发，而向这种情感的推进也必然变得更加顺利和自然。正如一幅画中的各种颜色如果配置得很好，便可以互相衬托，因而相得益彰，增添了它的美一样。在这个现象中，我们可以注意到印象和观念的连接，以及它们之间交互的协助。

第五节　论美与丑

不管我们是否把身体看作我们自己的一部分，或者赞成一些哲学家的看法，把身体看作外在之物，必须承认的一点就是：身体与我们有足够近的关系，这形成了我们已经认可的骄傲与谦卑的原因所必需的双重关系之一。因此，不管我们在哪里发现印象的另一种关系和这种观念结合在一起，根据这种印象是快乐的还是痛苦的，我们可以期待这些情感中的任何一个的发生。但是所有的美给予我们一种特别的高兴和满足，就好像丑产生出痛苦一样，不论它是建立在什么主体之上，也不管它是在有生命的物体还是无生命的物体中被观察到。因此，如果美或者丑是建立在我们所拥有的身体之上，快乐或者痛苦必须被转化为骄傲和谦卑，毕竟在这样的情形下，所有的条件是充分的，能够产生出一种印象和观念之间的完美转换。这些对立着的感觉和这些对立着的情感是联系在一起的。丑或美是和作为这些情感的对象的自我密切关联着的。毋庸置疑地，我们所拥有的美成为了一个骄傲的对象，而同时丑就理所当然成为谦卑的对象了。

相貌和身体特点的这个作用不仅表明以上所说的这两种情感只能发生在我所需要的条件全部具备的情形之下，证明了目前的这个体系，而且这个作用可以作为一种更强有力、更令人信服的论证出现。如果我们考虑一下通过哲学或常识已经形成的用来解释美和丑之间区别的所有假定，我们将发现所有这些假设都可以总结为一点：美是各个部分之间的一种秩序和结构，它既可以通过我们本性的原始组合，又可以通过习惯或者爱好，给我们的灵魂一种快乐和满足。这是美的突出特性，并且这形成了它和丑之间的所有区别，而丑的自然倾向就是产生不快。因此，快乐和痛苦，不仅是美和丑的必然伴随物，而且组成了美和丑的本质。

不单单是身体的美产生骄傲，身体的强度和力度也产生骄傲。强力是一种力度，因此超越身体力度的欲望被认为是一种低劣的野心。因为这个原因，目前的现象将充分地说明并进而解释那种情感。

我们可以观察到的所有有关身体方面的其他优点，我们自己所拥有的有用的、美丽的，或者令人惊奇的东西是骄傲的对象，反之，就是谦卑的对象。

在这个现象里，包含了两种奇怪的实验，如果根据我们在解剖学、自然哲学和别的科学中对因果关系的评价所得出的已知原则，把这两种实验放在一起比较，那么它们对以上所涉及的双重关系的影响，将成为一种不可否认的论证。通过这两种实验中的一种，我们发现一个对象产生骄傲仅仅由于快乐的中介作用，并且因为它产生骄傲的这个特点，实际上仅仅是产生了快乐的力量。通过另一个实验，我们发现通过相关观念的转换，快乐会产生骄傲，因为当我们切断那种关系时，情感立即便被毁坏。一个我们自己亲自加入到其中的令人惊奇的事迹是和我们相关的，并且通过那种方式产生了骄傲：但是别人的事迹，它们可能引起快乐，然而由于观念关系的缺乏，这种骄傲情感无法被刺激起来，就目前的体系来说，还有进一步的证据吗？

关于我们的身体，这里仅仅有一种对这个体系的反驳：没有什么东西比健康更让人开心，也没有什么比疾病更让人痛苦，然而通常地，人类既不为前者骄傲，也不为后者羞耻。如果我们考虑到第二和第四种限制，提出我们的总体体系，这将是非常容易说明问题的。很容易观察到，如果没有对象具有对我们来说特殊的东西，就不会产生骄傲或谦卑，那种情感的每一个原因必须是永久的，并且与构成它们对象的我的“自我”存在形成比例。

对于那些影响别人、有危险、令别人不愉快的疾病，我们是感到羞耻的。癫痫症让人羞愧，因为它带给在场的每一个人恐怖，疥疮也让人感到羞耻，因为它是可以传染的；瘰疠会带给我们羞耻，因为通常情况下这种病可以遗传。人们在对自己进行评价时，总是会考虑别人的情感。在前面的推理中这已经明显地体现出来，在以后的推理中它将更加明显地体现出来，并将得到更加充分的解释。

第六节　论外在的有利条件与不利条件

虽然骄傲和谦卑把我们心灵和身体的特点——也就是我自己——作为它们自然的和更为直接的原因，但是通过经验我们发现这里存在很多产生一些影响的别的对象，并且我们发现，这些原始的对象在某些程度上被各种各样外在和外来的对象所湮没而丢失了。我们发现一种建立在房子、花园、家具之上的虚荣，这就像我们为个人的业绩和成就而感到骄傲一样，这些外在的有利条件自身在很大程度上区别于思想和人格，然而它们却对直接把人格作为其最后对象的情感影响很大，当外在的对象获得了和我们自己有关的任何特别关系时，当它们和我们紧密结合或关联时，这种情况的发生就在所难免。

但是在这里，非常突出的一点就是，在从一种观念向另一种观念传达给我们的过程中，类似关系以和接近关系、因果关系相同的方式作用于心灵，但是这种关系几乎不是作为骄傲或谦卑的基础而存在的。如果我们与一个人性格方面任何有价值的部分相类似，在某种程度上，我们必须具有这些和他相似的特点，当我们想在这些特点上建立虚荣心时，我们总是宁愿直接把这些特点直接传达给我们自己，而不愿意从其他人的反映中得来。因此，通过假定一个更加有利的自我观念，一种相似关系可能偶然地会产生出那种骄傲的情感，但是在最后，这种观点终于固定在自我观念上，并且这种情感发现了它最后和最终的原因。

的确，这里有一些例子，当人们在相貌、体形、风度，或者其他在任何程度上对其名誉没有一点贡献的细小方面与一个伟大的人相似时，他会感觉到一种虚荣心，但是必须承认的是这样的情形不能延伸太远，而且在这些情感中也没有任何大的重要性。

因此，存在于骄傲与谦卑的原因和对象之间的接近关系或者因果关系，是产生这些情感的唯一的必要条件，并且这些关系仅仅只是让想象从一个观念传达到另一个观念的性质。现在让我们考虑一下，它们能够对我们的心灵产生怎样的作用，考虑一下通过什么方式它们成为这些情感产生的必需条件。非常明显地，观念的结合是以一种如此沉默、又不易觉察的方式进行的，我们很少能够感知到它，我们只能通过它的作用而不能通过任何直接的感觉和感知发现这种结合。它不产生感情，也不产生任何新种类的印象，只是改变那些心灵以前就具有的、偶尔能够回忆起的那些观念，从这条推理和毫无疑的经验来看，我们可以断定，任何观念之间的结合不管是多么必要，它本身都不能充分地产生出任何情感。

因此，很明显，当心灵感觉到建立在相关对象表象上的骄傲或谦卑的情感时，除了思想的关联和转换之外，还有一种情感或原始的印象通过另外的一些原则产生出来。问题是，首先产生的情绪是情感本身呢？还是和它相关的另外一些的印象？解决这个问题不算困难，因为除了这个主题所包含的所有其他论证外，明显呈现出的一点就是，经验所指出的产生这种情感必要条件的观念之间的关系，如果不是协助情感之间的关系，进而推动一种印象向另一种印象的转换，那么这种关系将是完全多余的。如果自然直接地产生出骄傲或谦卑的情感，那么骄傲和谦卑就是自给自足的了，并且不需要从任何其他情感中获得更多的增加或补足。但是若假定最初的情绪仅仅是与骄傲或谦卑相关，我们很容易想到，对象间的关系究竟是服务于什么目的，而且印象和观念这两种不同知觉通过联合自己的力量怎样能够相互协作和相互促进。

在特殊的例子中，这一点将更加明显地呈现出来。人们为其国家、郡州、教区的美丽而感到骄傲，在这里，美的观念普遍地产生了一种快乐，这种快乐是和骄傲相关联的。这种快乐的对象或原因是假定和自我，或和骄傲的对象相关的。由于印象之间和观念之间的双重关系，从一个印象转向另一个印象的转换发生了。

人们也因他们出生地方的温度或者气候而感到自豪，因他们本地土壤的肥沃、美酒的香醇、水果的甜美、粮食的精美而感到骄傲，因他们所用语言的柔美或有力而自豪，也因别的同样特别的事情而骄傲。这些对象普遍地都和感官的快乐相关，并且原本是被看作使感觉、味觉、听觉获得快感的。这些对象除了通过以上所说明的那种转换方式以外，是不能成为骄傲的对象的。

有这样一些人，他们具有一种相反的虚荣心，会有意地贬低他们自己的国家，同时过于赞美他们曾经游历过的那些国家。当他们呆在自己国家，并被同胞所包围时，他们就会发现自己和国家之间的强烈关系是同时被许多人一起分享的，在这种情况下，这种关系对于他们来说就无足轻重了。反之，他们通过观光旅游居住在别的国家，以这种方式所形成的与别的国家间的关系是疏远的，而当他们考虑到很少人能像他们这样观光旅游、居住在别的国家，这种疏远的关系反而更强了。由于这个原因，他们总是赞美国外事物的美丽、有用、稀少，而看不起国内的事物。

即使我们能够为一个国家、国家的气候或任何和我们有关的无生命之物而产生虚荣，不足为奇的是，我们理所当然会为和我们相关的人的血统和友谊而感到虚荣。因此，我们发现那些属于我们自身的那些可以产生骄傲的特点出现在别人身上时会产生程度较小的同样的情感。骄傲的人对他们亲人的美貌、举止、功绩、名声、荣誉总是会竭力地夸大，以此作为满足他们虚荣心的最大来源。

我们为自己所拥有的财富感到骄傲，因此，为了满足我们的虚荣心，我们希望每一个和我们有关的人，都能同样成为财富的占有者，同时为那些在我们的朋友和亲人中贫穷而地位低下的人感到羞耻。因此，我们就尽可能让那些贫穷的人远离我们。对于一些远亲，我们无法阻挡他们的贫穷。我们的祖先被看作我们最近的亲属，在此情形下，几乎每一个人都装作出身于高贵之家，好像他们是从富贵的、声名显赫的祖先一代代传承下来的。

我经常注意到，那些总是炫耀他们家庭古老的人，总是很乐于加上下面所说的这个条件：他们的好多代祖先毫无间断地做着同样多土地的主人，从未改变过他们的财产，也没有移居到任何别的郡县或省份。我还注意到，当他们能够炫耀他们所有的财产完全由他们家庭的男性来继承，这种家庭的荣誉和财产绝不可以由任何女性继承时，这些就成为了他们虚荣心的一种附加的主体。下面让我们通过以前的体系来解释这些现象。

很明显，当任何人炫耀他家庭的古老时，其虚荣心的主题不仅仅在于时间的久远和祖先人数的众多，还在于他们所拥有的财富和声誉，由于他与之有关，故而光辉似乎也反射到了他身上。首先他考察这些对象，以一种快乐的方式受其影响，然后回归自身，通过印象之间与观念之间的双重关系，骄傲的情感得以产生，他们得到一种开心的感觉。由于这些骄傲的情感取决于这些关系，所以加强任何关系的东西，同时也加强这种情感，而减弱这种关系的东西也必然减弱这种情感。现在，确定的一点是，所有权的一致加强了这种源于血统与亲戚的观念关系，非常顺利地从一代到另一代传达这种想象，从离得最远的祖先传到他们的后代，这些后代既是他们的继承者，同时又是他们的子孙。通过这种顺利的传承，印象被完整地传递，并且刺激起更高程度的骄傲和

当荣誉和财富经由男性的传承来完成，没有经过任何女性时，这种情形也是同样的。人类本性有这样一种特点，我们今后将加以考察，即想像力自然地转向任何重要而庞大的东西上，当一大一小两个对象出现在它面前时，想象常常丢弃前者，而专注于后者。因此在婚姻关系里，男性优于女性。我们首先注意到丈夫，而且不管我们是直接地考虑他，还是根据别的和他有关的对象考虑到他，我们的思想总是更愿意停留在他这里，与其配偶相比，我们的思想会更顺利地到达他这一方。

显然，这种特性必将加强父亲和孩子间的关系而减弱母亲和孩子间的关系。因为所有的关系都具有从一种观念转移到另一种观念的倾向，任何加强这种倾向的东西也加强这种关系。我们可以感觉到由孩子转到父亲的倾向强于由孩子转向母亲的倾向，所以我们认为前者的关系是相当亲密和重大的。这是为什么孩子普遍随父亲姓、他们出身的高贵或低贱也是由父亲的家世所决定的原因。当然，母亲可能比父亲有更优越的精神和才智，这是常有的事。按照以上所解释的这些学说，普遍的规则是非常流行的，并不因为例外情况而有所改变。甚至当母亲占有绝对优势或因为其他原因使孩子们宁愿追随母亲的家庭而不是父亲的家庭时，这种通常的规则仍然保持很大的效力，以致减弱了这种关系，使祖先的关系出现中断。在这种情况下想像力并非非常顺利地运转，也不可能迅速把祖先的荣誉和声名转移到同样名字和同样家庭的后代那里，不可能像那些遵循普遍规则的转移，即由父亲转移到儿子，或者由兄长转移到弟弟那里一样。

虚荣心。

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第二章　论爱恨

第一节　论爱恨的对象与原因

对于爱和恨没有定义可下：因为它们都只是一个简单的印象，既没有混合也没有组合。我们同样也无需试图用性质、来源、成因和对象来描述。这是因为爱恨才是我们研究的主题，同时也因为我们普遍的感觉和经验已经告诉了我们这些情感。我们已经提到了骄傲与谦卑，在这里，爱恨也同骄傲与谦卑一样有着类似的关系，所以我们不得不先追溯一下前面对于骄傲与谦卑的推理，以便来说后面那对情感——爱与恨。

因为骄傲与谦卑的直接对象是自己或我们深切认识到的思想、行为和感觉的同一人格；而爱与恨的对象则是另一个人，我们意识不到他的思想、行为和感觉。这一点在经验中得到了充分的表现。我们的爱与恨永远指向我们之外的另一个有感情的人。当我们谈到自爱时，那不是就爱的本意而言的，况且自爱的感觉与一个朋友或情人所激起的柔情也并无共同之处。恨也是一样。我们会因为我们的过失和愚蠢感到羞愧，可是只有他人的伤害才会让我们感到愤怒和仇恨。

但是，虽然爱和恨的对象永远是他人，但是确切地说，对象并不是这些情感的原因，而且，对象不能独立激起这些情感。因为爱和恨在它们所引起的感觉方面恰恰相反，并且有着共同的对象，所以如果那个对象也是原因，那么它就会产生同等程度的两种相反情感，这两种情感从开始时就相互消灭，所以两者都无法出现。因此，一定有异于对象的某种原因。

如果我们想想爱与恨的原因，我们就会发现原因是多种多样的，而且它们在很多方面并不相同。人们的德行、知识、智慧、见识、幽默会引起爱和尊重；相反则会引起恨和歧视。美丽、体力、敏捷、灵巧等身体优点和它们的缺点一样，会引起同样的爱和恨的情感；而由家庭、财产、衣服、民族和气候等外在优点和缺点，也一样能引发爱恨。这些对象都可以因不同的性质引起爱和尊重，或者引起恨和歧视。

根据对这些原因的观察，我们可以在起作用的性质和性质主题中得到新的区分。国王因占有雄壮的宫殿得到人民的尊敬；首先这是由于宫殿的美丽，其次是由于财产权把他和宫殿联系在了一起。这两个条件中只要少了一个就消灭了那种情感，这就证明这个原因是复合原因。

对于骄傲与谦卑的讨论同样适用于爱和恨，但是在描述爱恨方面的情感时对前者作重新陈述未免繁复，因此只做一个概括的评述就足够了，那就是：爱和恨的对象很显然是一个有思想的人，前一种情感所引起的感觉永远是愉快的，而后一种情感的感觉则永远是不愉快。我们还可以大致假设，这两种情感的原因永远与一个有思想的人有关系，前者的原因产生独立的快感，后者则产生独立的不快。

有一种假设不但是可能的，而且是毋庸置疑的，那就是：当爱和恨的原因必然和一个人或有思想的存在有关系时，方能产生爱和恨和情感。善恶，如果抽象考虑；美丑，如果存在于无形；贫富如果属于第三者，对和它们没关系的人，便产生不了任何程度的爱恨、尊重或轻视。如果有人向窗外观望，看到我在街上行走，看到一座和我无关的美丽宫殿，我相信没有人会说这个人对我的尊重是缘于我是宫殿的主人。

乍看之下并不明显的是这些情感需要与印象相联系，这是因为在推移过程中，一个印象和另一个印象互相混淆，无法区别。但是在骄傲和谦卑方面，我们既然可以轻易分辨证明这些感情的成因在于产生独立的痛苦和快感，我们在考察爱恨的时候自然也可以采取一些方法取得同样的成功。不过因为我急于要给这些体系做一个充分的确证，我要暂时搁置这种考察；同时，我将试图通过毫无疑问的论证来使我关于骄傲和谦卑的推理得出我的目的。

对自己的性格、天赋、财富满意的人大多愿在世人面前显露自己，以便取得众人的爱和赞美。显然造成我们骄傲、自负的原因正是造成虚荣心和功利心的原因，而我们还喜欢把这些自豪的特点在人前加以炫耀。但是假设爱和尊重与骄傲并不同因，（它们的区别仅仅在于这些性质或是与我们自己有关，或是与他人有关），那么这种比较方式就非常荒谬，人们也不能期望他人的情绪和他们自己的情绪能够一一对应。虽然很少有人能形成精确的感情系统，或是考察它们的本质和类型关系。但是纵然在哲学中没有进展，我们也不会犯多大错误，一半的经验和预感给了我们充分的指导；这些经验和预感借我们内心的直接感受告诉我们哪些会对他人产生作用。因为产生骄傲谦卑的原因也导致爱恨，所以证明前面一对感情的原因所用的全部论证，证明了独立于情感之外的痛苦或快乐，也将同样适用于后面的一对情感。

第二节　证明体系的实验

根据论证，在相关的印象和观念的推移中得出了结论；在充分衡量这些论证之后，没有人会不同意这个结论，因为这个原则简单而自然。不过为了使这个体系在爱恨与骄傲谦卑两方面没有丝毫疑问，我们可以对所有这些情感做实验，并回顾之前我的考察。

为了做实验，我们假设我和一个对我没有任何友谊或敌视情感的人在一起。这样，我有了全部四种情感的自然终极对象。我自己是骄傲与谦卑的对象，另一个人是爱或恨的对象。

现在我们来关注情感的本质和彼此的地位。显而易见，这四种情感好像处于一个方块中，它们彼此之间有种有规律的联系和距离。骄傲与谦卑这两种感情和爱恨一样，和它们的对象联系在一起，第一对的对象是自己，第二对的对象是另外的某个人。两条交通线或曰联系线形成相对的两边。另外，骄傲和爱是愉悦的情感，谦卑和恨是不快的情感。骄傲和爱、谦卑和恨形成感觉上类似的新联系，这可以被认为是方块的另两边。总的来说，骄傲和爱、谦卑和恨是由它们的感觉或印象联系起来的。

因此我认为，所有产生这些情感的东西，对于那种情感都具有双重关系，即观念与情感对象的关系，以及感觉与情感本身的关系。我们必须用实验来证明。

第一实验。为了更有条理地做这些实验，让我们首先假设，当我们身处上述情况，即与另一个人处在一起时，有一个对象呈现出来，那个对象和任何一种情感既没有印象的关系也没有观念的关系。假设我们一起观察一块普通的石头，或者是任何一个普通对象，这个对象既不属于我们中的任何一个人，其本身也不能引起情绪或者独立的苦和乐来；那么显然这个对象不能引起四种感情中的任何一种。我们可以把这四种感情依次加以实验。我们把这个对象应用于爱、恨、谦卑、骄傲；其中任何一种都绝不能发生。让我们任意更改对象；假定我们所选择的是一个没有这两种关系的对象。让我们在这个实验中来重复我们心灵容易感受的思想倾向的每个方面。我们发现在人性的各个方面，如果没有这种关系，任何物体都不可能产生出情感来。

第二实验。既然不同时具备这些情感对象就不能产生任何情感，那么让我们把其中一种关系置诸其上，来看看会发生什么。假设我看到一块石头或任何普遍的对象，那么这块石头属于我，或属于我的同伴，并借此与情感的对象获得一种观念关系，那么显然，先验地考察，任何情感按理都不应该出现。因为这个观念关系秘密而又平静地作用于我们的心灵，随着那个对象属于我或者属于另一个人，把平等的冲动赋予骄傲与谦卑、爱与恨这些对立的情感，这种情感上的对立必然互相抵消，使心灵完全没有任何感情。这种先验的推理被证实了。没有任何平凡普通的对象，可以不产生独立于情感之外的痛苦或者快乐，就能借助对象对我们或者对其他人的财产关系或其他关系而产生骄傲、谦卑、爱或恨的感情。

第三实验。很明显仅是观念上的联系还不足以产生这些情感。现在让我们把这些联系都除去，而代之以印象联系，就会呈现出令人愉快或不快的对象来，而这个对象与我们或同伴都没有关系，让我们来观察结果。首先，如果我们像先前的实验那样先验地考量这个问题，就可以断言，那个对象的这些情感将有一种微小但不确定的联系。这个对象与感情有细微的联系，是因为这个关系并不是冷淡而不能察觉的关系，而且也没有观念关系的那种缺点，也不能用相等的力量把我们引导向两种互相对立的情感，而这两种情感则会因为彼此间的对立而互相灭亡。但是我们如果从另一方面考量这种由感觉到感情的转移不因任何产生观念转移的原则所推进，结果正相反，一个印象虽然容易转到另一个印象，但是对象的变化却和引起变化的起因相抵触；那么我们可以断言，如果只是凭借印象关系和情感发生联系，任何事物不能成为感情稳定或持久的原因。在衡量了这些论证以后，依照类比推理规则，我们可以理性地断言：如果有这样一个对象，它和我们自己或者他人没有任何联系，但是却可以产生快乐或者不快，那么它可以给予人们一种心理倾向，使爱或骄傲、恨或谦卑自然流露，并找到别的对象，在双重的联系中建立所有这些情感；但是一个只具有这些联系中的某一种联系的对象，哪怕是最有利的联系，也不能产生任何确定而永恒的感情。

最幸运的是，所有这些理论都恰恰与经验符合、与情感符合。假设我和一个同伴在我们俩从未到过的一个国家旅行，如果风景美丽、道路平坦，如果旅馆舒适，这种环境显然会使我对自己和同伴都感到满意。但是我们的假设是这个国家与我自己和我朋友都没有关系，所以它就不能成为骄傲和爱的直接原因；所以，如果我不把情感建立在与我或他有比较密切关系的对象上，那么我的情绪可视为一种舒畅心情的流露，而不是确定的情感。当对象引起了不快情绪时，情形也是一样的。

第四实验。我既然发现一个毫无观念关系或印象关系的对象，或者一个只有一种关系的对象，都不能引起爱恨、骄傲、谦卑来，那么无需进一步实验，单单是理性就可以使我们相信，只要对象有双重关系，就能刺激起这些情感来。因为这些感情都不是空穴来风。但是为了彻底消除怀疑，让我们重新做几次实验，看看结果是不是符合我们的期望。我选定了一个能够引起独立快感的对象，比方美德；在这个对象上，我加上一个以自我为客体的关系；结果发现，由于这样的安排，立刻发生了情感。但是这是什么情感呢？正是骄傲，这个对象对它是有双重关系的。关于对象的观念和关于自我的观念发生了关联：那个对象所产生的感觉和那种情感的感觉相类似。为了确定自己在这个实验中不发生错误，我首先除去一个关系，然后再除去另一个关系；结果发现每一次除去之后都消灭了那种情感，而使那个对象成为无关者。但是我还不满足。我还更进一步试验；我不把关系除去，而是用另一种关系取而代之。我假设那种美德属于我的同伴，而不属于我自己；并且观察这样改变之后，会有什么结果。我马上看到感情转变了方向，离开了只有一种关系的骄傲，而转到爱那边去了。在这个方面，感情被印象观念的双重关系吸引了。再重复一个试验，把观念关系重新变化一下，就又把感情带回骄傲方面；再重复，又把感情转回爱。在彻底相信了这个关系之后，我又试验了另一个对象，把善换成恶，这样就把善所产生的愉快印象变成了恶所产生的不快印象，而结果依然和预期一致。恶存在于他人身上时，其双重关系就激起憎恨的感情来，却刺激不起同样应该由善而产生的爱来。为了继续试验，我重新改变观念关系，假设恶属于我自己。结果呢？仍然一样。结果是情感由憎恨转变成谦卑。我把形象重新改换，这种谦卑转为骄傲；结果我发现，我绕了一个圈子，而情感在这些变化中又回到了它的最

为了使问题更明确，我又改变对象；我除去善恶，而在美丑、贫富、权力和奴役方面进行试验。所有这些对象都通过它们自己的关系进行改变，以同一方式转了一个情感的圈子：不管我们按什么顺序安排，不论是通过骄傲、爱、恨、谦卑，或是谦卑、恨、爱、骄傲，实验结果没有任何改变。的确，尊重和鄙视，在某种情况下代替了爱和恨，但是这些归根到底是同样的情感，只是由于某些原因才有一些变化（这些原因我们将在以后加以说明）。

第五实验。为了让实验具有更高的权威性，我们可以尽量使情况变化，把各个情感和对象置于它们可能处于的各种不同的位置中。让我们假设，除了上述关系之外，和我一起进行实验的那个人和我或有血统关系，或有友谊关系。假设我们是父子或者兄弟，或者他和我长期友好。其次，再假设，情感的原因对他产生了印象和观念的双重关系；让我们看看，这些复杂的关系会有些什么结果。

在我们考虑实质结果之前，我们可以推断，根据假设结果应该如何。显然随着印象是愉快或不快，我对于那个因双重关系（我一向要求这两种关系）而与印象的原因联系着的人，必然有爱或恨。

这是按照我们的假设形成的推理；而我在试验以后，很高兴地发现一切都符合我的预期。一个儿子或兄弟的善与恶不但刺激起爱恨来，而且借着一个新的推移过程，因相似原因而产生了骄傲和谦卑。没有东西能比亲属的任何辉煌品质更能引起我们虚荣，就像没有什么比他们的恶更令人耻辱一样。经验和我的推理的精确符合令人信服地证明了我们用以推理的假设的可靠性。

第六实验。我们把实验颠倒过来，保持同样的关系，但从另一种不同的情感入手：这样就会增加我们理论的明晰性。上面说过，一个儿子或兄弟的善或恶先引起爱或恨，随后又引起骄傲和谦卑，现在假设我们把这些好的坏的品质置于我自己身上，使它们与那个和我们有关系的人没有任何直接关系：那么，经验告诉我们，情况改变以后，整个连锁就被打断了，心灵不再从一个情感转到另一个情感，就像先前那个例子一样。我们从来不会因为我们自己的善和恶去爱或恨儿子或兄弟，虽然他自己的这些品质会使我们感到明显的骄傲和谦卑。乍看之下似乎与我的假设相反；因为印象关系和观念关系在这两种情形下恰恰是同样的。骄傲和谦卑是和爱与恨相关的印象。我自己又和那个人相关。因此，我们应该期望，类似的原因必然产生类似的结果，而完全转移的过程会由这个双重关系产生，这和其他的所有情况相同。通过以下考虑，我们可以顺利解决这个困难。

显然，我们在任何时候都清楚地意识到自我，意识到我们的情绪和情感，所以它们的观念必然比任何别人的情绪和情感观念更多地刺激我们。但是任何强烈地刺激我们，并以充分而强烈的方式出现的事物必然强迫我们对其加以考虑，并用最小的暗示和最细微的关系呈现在我们心中。由于同样的理由，那个东西一旦呈现出来，就会吸引我们的注意，并使注意力不会飘到别的对象上去，不论那些对象和我们最初的对象有多么强烈的关系。想象容易从晦涩的概念转到生动的概念，却不容易从生动的观念转到晦涩的概念。在一种情况下，那种关系得到原则性的帮助，而在另一种情况中，那种关系却遭到反对。

我已经说过，心灵的那两个功能，想象和情感，它们的倾向互相类似，并且作用于同一对象上时其作用是互相促进的。心灵永远有从一种感情转到其他任何相关情感上的倾向；而当一种感情的对象和另一种感情的对象相关时，这种倾向被推进了。那两种冲动会合起来，使得整个推动过程简捷顺利。但是如果严格地说，观念关系继续不变，而且失去了引起想象转移的那种影响，这种关系在情感的上影响也显然要停止，因为这种影响依靠着这种转移。正是这个缘故，骄傲、谦卑转移到爱或恨，就不如后来的那对感情转化为前一对情感那样容易，如果某人是我兄弟，那我当然也是他的兄弟；到那时这些关系虽然是相互的，但是它们在想象上却有很不同的作用。先考虑和我们有关系的某个人，再考虑我们时刻意识到的自我，这个过程是顺利通畅的。但是感情一旦转向我们的自我时，想象便不能同样顺利地过渡到其他人，不管那个人和我有多么亲密的关系。想象的这种顺利的或者困难的推移，对情感起着推进或阻止其转移的作用；这就清楚地证明了，情感和想象这两种官能是相互联系的，而观念的关系对于感情则产生一种影响。除了证明这点的无数实验之外，我们还发现，即使关系继续存在，如果由于某种特殊情况，它对想象的一般影响受到阻碍，不能产生观念间的联结或转移，那么它对感情所有的一般影响也同样受到了阻碍，不能使我们由一种情感转到另一种情感。

有人可能会在这种现象与同情之间发现一种矛盾，因为若有同情，心灵就很容易从“我们自己”的观念转到和我们相关的任何其他对象的观念。但是如果我们考虑到以下情况，这种困难就会消失，即：于同情而言，我们并不是任何情感的对象，而且也没有任何东西像目前这种我们假定为骄傲或谦卑所激发的情况那样，使我们自己把注意力集中在我们自己身上。我们的自我，如果离开对其他东西的感觉，事实上就一无所有：正因如此，我们就一定要把观点转向对象，并且自然要以极大的注意去考虑那些和我们接近或类似的对象。但当自我成为一种情感的对象时，在那种情感终结之前，对自我停止考虑便是不自然的；只有在情感终结的时候，印象和观念的双重关系才不起作用了。

第七实验。为了进一步证明全部推理，让我们再依次做新的实验。我们前面已经看到各种相关情感和观念的结果，现在让我们在这里假设有同一种感情和同一种观念关系，并考究这种新的情况的结果。显而易见，在此我们极有理由预期那些情感要由一个对象转移到另一对象；因为根据假设，两个观念之间的关系继续不变，而同一个印象（印象的同一性）必然要比最完美的类似关系更能产生更强烈的联系。印象间和观念间的双重关系如果能够产生一个向另一个的转移，那么同一个印象加上一个观念关系自然就更会产生这种转移。因此我们发现，当我们爱或恨任何人时，那些情感很少继续停留在它们的最初阶段，总要扩展到一切接近的对象，包括我们所爱的或所恨的那个人的亲人或朋友。如果我们和某人是朋友，那么我们对他的兄弟自然也会产生好感，而不是去进一步考察他兄弟的性格。我们如果和某一个人吵架，则对其全家都发生憎恨，虽然其实全家都没有参与过使我们不快的事情。这一类例子到处都可以遇到。

这个实验只有一个困难：在我们更进一步之前，必须先加以说明。显而易见，一切情感虽然都容易从一个对象转移到另一个对象，但是比较重要的对象先呈现出来，次要对象接着而来，这比颠倒过来，次要人物先来这种转移更容易。例如我们因其父而爱其子，比因其子而爱其父更容易、更自然。因主爱仆比因仆爱主更自然；因王爱民，比因民爱王更自然。同样，当我们先和某家家长争吵，比起我们对这个家庭的儿子和仆人不满意来更容易对全家发生憎恨。简而言之，我们的感情也和其他对象一样，容易下降，难以上升。

为了了解说明这种现象有多么困难，我们必须考虑，决定想象易由远而近，而不易由近而远的理由，也使想象易由小而大，不易由大而小。影响最大的东西也最容易引人注意，最被人注意的东西，也最容易呈现于想象中。在任何问题上比起那些看起来非常重要的事物来，我们更容易忽略其中细微的东西；尤其是那些看上去重要的事物先行出现、首先引起我们的注意时，情形更是这样。例如假使有任何事情使我们考究到木星的卫星，我们的想象就自然要去形成那个行星的观念，但是我们如果首先考虑木星，我们自然比较容易忽略它的卫星。说到任何帝国的省份，我们自然会联想到那个帝国的都城；但我们的想象却不容易返回来考虑各个省份。关于仆人的想法使我们想到他的主人，关于臣民的想法让我们想到国王。但是同样的关系却不会让我们把联想关系颠倒过来。科尼利亚之所以斥责她的儿子们说，如果她以西皮奥之女的名义见闻于世，不以格拉奇弟兄的名义见诸于世，他们应该引以为耻，就是这个原因。换句话说，这就是督促他们也像他们的外祖父那样显赫有名，否则人们的想象在由她为中心的具有相同关系的双方推进的时候，总是会离开她的儿子们，而以更伟大更重要的父亲来称呼她。习惯上之所以是妻子用丈夫的姓，而不是丈夫使用妻子的姓，也是根据这个原则；而我们对我们所崇拜敬仰的人，所以依礼让先，其缘故也在这里。如果这个原则不是已经充分明显的话，我们还可以找到其他许多例子来加以证明。

想象在由小到大时既然也和由远到近一样地感到容易，那么观念间这种顺利的转移在前一种情况下为什么不和后一种情况一样帮助情感推移呢？一个朋友或者兄弟的美德首先产生了爱，尔后产生了骄傲，因为在这种情况下，想象依照倾向由远到近。我们自己的美德并不首先产生骄傲，然后又产生了对朋友兄弟的爱，因为这种情况是由近到远，违反想象的那种倾向的。但是对于一个身份较低的人的爱和恨并不容易产生对身份较高者的感情，虽然这也是想象的自然倾向；而对身份较高的人的爱恨就会引起对于身份较低的人的情感，这是和想象力相反的。简单地说，那种顺利的转移在尊卑方面和在远近方面的方式并不一样。这两种现象看似矛盾，但是稍加注意就能调和。

在这里，观念的转移既然变得违反想像力的自然倾向，想象必然被另外一种比较强烈的原则控制住了；但是在心灵之中只有印象和观念，所以这个原则必然在印象方面。但是我们已经说过，印象或感情只是被它们的类似关系联系着的，当两种情感在心灵处于同等地位的时候，心灵就很自然地从一个过渡到另一个，反之，种种心灵矛盾使情感难以转移。但是我们可以看到，这种矛盾既可以由种类的差别而发生，也可以由程度的差别而产生。经验告诉我们，由较浅的爱恨转到较深的爱恨更简单。一个人如果处于平静状态，或者只有轻微激动，就与他在受到强烈感情的干扰时截然相反，判若两人；而且如果在两种极端之间相隔不是很久，则两者间的过渡是很不容易的。

假设一种情感一出现就消灭了另一种情感，而且两者之间不能共存，那么由强烈情感转到微弱情感，和由微弱情感转到强烈情感相比同样困难，甚至困难更大。但是当两种情感联合起来同时激动心灵的时候，情形就不同了。一个微弱的情感加上一个强烈的情感时，比不上一个强烈的情感加上一个微弱的情感能够在心灵倾向中造成那么大的变化；因为这个缘故，所以很大程度的情感与很小程度的情感联系比很小程度的情感与很大程度的情感联系更为密切。

任何情感的程度都取决于对象的本性；那些指向在我们眼中重要的人物的情感，比较不重要的人物的情感，更为充分地占据我们的心灵。在这里情感与想像两者之间倾向的差异便呈现出来。当我们的思想转向大小两个对象的时候，想象感到由小到大比由大到小更容易，但是在感情上却有较大的困难。而且情感原则既然比想象原则更强，所以理所当然，感情战胜了想象，把心灵拉到了自己这边。由于较大对象和较小对象有某种关系，关于仆人的观念最容易把我们的思想转到主人身上，但是对于主人的爱恨则较为迅速地产生了对于仆人的好感或者愤怒。在这种情形下，最强的情感占先；加上一个微弱的情感，既然使心理倾向不发生重大的变化，它们之间的过渡就比较容易也比较自然了。

在前一个实验中，我们发现，观念间的关系因为任何特殊的情况不再产生促进观念转移的那种通常效果，那么它对情感也就停止了作用；同样，我们也发现了情感也有这一特性。同类不同程度的情感的确是互相联系的，但是如果较弱的情感首先发生，它并没有移向较强的情感的倾向；这是因为强的情感加在弱的情感之上，比弱的情感加在强的情感之上时，在心情上要产生一种更为明显的变化。充分衡量这些现象之后，就会发现有关这个假设的证明是令人信服的。

我们如果考虑一下心灵调和在情感和想象之间所观察到的矛盾的方式，这些证明就将得到证实。想象由小到大比由大到小更容易；但是相反，强烈的情感容易产生微弱的情感，而微弱的情感却不容易产生较强的情感。在这种对立中，情感终于战胜想象，不过这种胜利之所以取得往往依据想象，并借以寻找另一种形式，抵消产生对立的那个原则。当我们爱某家的父亲或主人时，我们很少想到他们的儿女或者仆人，但是当这些人在我们面前，或者我们有能力为他们服务之后，在这种情况下接近和亲近就很重要，或者至少消除了想象对情感的转移所做的对抗作用。想象虽然很难由大及小，可是它却同样很难由远及近，这就让难易趋于平衡，而使得由一种情感至另一种情感的道路畅通无阻。

第八实验。我已经说过，由爱恨转移到骄傲或谦卑，比由骄傲或谦卑转移到爱恨容易，而我们之所以很难把后面的感情转移是因为想象不容易由近及远。但是我们必须提出一个例外，那就是当骄傲、谦卑的原因本身存在于他人身上的时候。因为在那种情形之下，想象就必须考虑到他人，并且不能用观点限制我们自己。例如，一个人对我们的行为和性格的赞许最易让我们对他发生好感，另一方面，他的谴责和鄙视最易让我们产生最大的憎恨。这里，显而易见，原始情感是骄傲或谦卑。它的对象是自己。这个情感转移到爱恨上，但爱恨的对象是他人，虽然这违背了我们确立的“想象难以由近及远”的原则，但是在这种情况下的转移，并不仅仅根据我们自己同他人之间的关系，还因为那个他人是我们第一种感情的确凿原因，因而是与那种感情密切相关的。产生骄傲的原因就是他人的赞许，产生谦卑的原因就是他人的谴责。所以无怪乎想象又带着相关的爱恨而反转回来。这和规则并不抵触，而且那个规则又是一个例外；那个例外与规则本身却是同理的。

因此，宁可说这样的例外是那个规则的证实。的确，我们如果考察我所证明的这八个实验，我们将发现，同一个原则都出现于全部实验中，而且骄傲或谦卑与爱恨都借由印象和观念的关系而产生。没有任何关系或者只有一个关系的对象永远也不能产生这些情感，而且我们发现，情感总是随着关系变换。不仅如此，我们还可以说，当一种关系由于任何特殊情况而没有通常的作用，即不能产生观念间或印象间的推移时，那么它也就不能对情感再起作用，既不产生骄傲或爱，也不产生谦卑和恨。即使在相反的情况下，我们也发现这个规则依然有效。在经验中，关系虽然没有产生作用，但是经过考察之后，我们发现这是由于某种情况阻碍了转移；同样，即使在这种情况下没有阻碍转移，我们也会发现有其他的抵消这种作用的情况。可见，不仅各种变化还原到一般原则，而且这些变化的变化也还是还原到一般原则。

初状态。

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第三节　解决疑难

我们既然从日常经验和观察中得出了那么多不可否认的证明，那么再详细考察爱恨的全部原因，就有些多余。所以我们要利用本章的其余部分，首先来消除关于这些情感的特殊原因的某些疑难；其次来考察由爱恨和其他情绪混合而成的复合情感。

任何人都是随着我们从他那里得到的快乐或不快来获得我们的好感或恶感的，而且这些情感都随着我们对他的感觉的变化而变化：这一点是非常明显的。任何人都能够通过他的服务、相貌或花言巧语使他对我们有用，或者使我们愉快从而获得我们的爱；而另一方面，任何人伤害了我们，或让我们不快，就会激起我们的愤怒或憎恨。当我们的民族和其他民族交战的时候，我们就憎恨他们，说他们残忍、凶暴、背信弃义、非正义，而总是认为自己和我们的同盟是公正、温和与宽大的。如果我们的敌人将获胜，我们很难承认他有一个正常人的形象和性格。他是一个和恶魔交往的巫师，就像人们对于克伦威尔和卢森堡公爵的传言那样；他凶暴嗜血，喜欢破坏和制造死亡。但是如果我方获胜，那么我们的司令即有一切良好品质，不但是勇敢和作战指挥的榜样，同时也是道德楷模。他的奸计在我们看来就成为策略，我们认为他的残忍是战争造成的不可避免的祸害。简单地说就是对于他的种种过错，我们或是加以掩饰或是解释成合乎道德的并加以歌颂。显而易见，这个思想方式在日常生活中也通用。

有些人又加上另一条件，要求痛苦和快乐不但是由于某个人而发生，而且那种苦乐是由他的有目的的行为所引发的，是由特殊的意图和意向而发生的。一个偶然伤害我们的人，我们并不因此而与之成为仇敌，而某人如果在无意中给我们有所效劳，我们对他也没有感激的义务。我们根据意向判断行为，并随着意向的善恶而使行为成为爱恨的原因。

在这里，我们必须做出区别。如果让人愉快或者不快的那种性质常常存在于个人和其性格中，那么不论有没有意向，那种性质都将引起这些情感。但是在其他情况下，这些情感就必须和认识及预谋相联系才能得以产生。一个人如果因为丑陋或愚蠢使人不愉快，便成为我们厌恶的对象，虽然他绝没有有意识地想通过这些性质而让我们憎恨。但是如果这种不快不是发生于某种性质，而是发于一刹那间产生并随之就消灭的行为，那么为了产生某种联系，并把这种联系和一个人密切联系起来，这种行为就必须产生于一种特殊的预谋和意图。但是这个行为发生于那个人，并以那个人为直接原因和主动者，那还是不够的。单独这种关系还是太微妙太不稳定，不足以成为这些情感的基础。这种关系达不到情感和思想的部分，它既不是发生于那个人的任何持久的性质，而且过后也不留任何痕迹；而是一刹那就过去，好像从来没有发生过一样。另一方面，某种意向表明某种性质，那些性质在行为完成以后仍然存在，因而就把行为和那个人联系起来，促进了由此及彼的观念推移。我们一想到他，就不能不回忆起这些性质；除非悔改和生活上的改变在那方面产生了变化：在那种情况下，别人对他的态度也改变了。因此，这就是需要一种意向来刺激爱恨的理由。

不过我们需要进一步考察，意向除了加强观念间的关系之外，在产生印象间的关系和产生快乐与不快乐方面，也往往是必要的。因为我们可以观察到，构成侵害的主要部分是侵害我们的那个人所表现的对我们的鄙视和憎恨；如果没有这种心理，单纯的伤害给我们的不快就没有那么大。同样，殷勤的服务之所以令人愉快，主要也是因为这种行为正合我们的虚荣心，并且证明，做出这种行为的人对我们有好感，如果除去意向，就把前一方面的耻辱感和后一方面的虚荣感消除了；因此自然一定会让爱恨程度减少。

我承认，由于取消意图而减弱印象和观念之间的效果，并非是全面的，而且也不一定能够消除一切关系。但是我仍然要接着问，消除意图是否就可以消除爱恨？我相信，经验正好相反，人们对于自己所遭受的明知无意的、完全偶然的侵害，也会大发雷霆，这点也十分确实。诚然，这种情绪并不会长时间继续下去，但是足以证明，不快和愤怒有自然的关系，而且印象关系将会对非常轻微的观念关系产生作用。但是当印象的猛烈程度减低之后，我们就会更加明确地感受到那个关系的缺陷；那个人的性格对这个偶然而无意的侵害本来没有任何关系，所以我们很少因为这些侵害而保持一种持久的仇恨。

再用平行的例子来具体说明这个学说：我们可以说，偶然来自于别人的那种不快没有多大的力量来刺激我们的情感，公认的必然和义务所引起的那种不快，也是一样。一个真正怀有伤害我们意图的人，如果他没有恶意，而是公平和公道的，那么虽然他是我们痛苦的根源，且是有意识的原因，但并不会引起我们的愤怒，假如我们有一定程度的理智的话。让我们来考察这个现象。

显而易见，这个情况并不起决定性的作用。它虽然可以减弱情感，却并不能完全消除情感。罪犯虽然明知道自己罪有应得，可是有几个罪犯对于控告他们的人或者判处他们有罪的法官不怀有恶意呢？同样，与我们对抗的人，与我们竞争职位的人，往往也被认为是我们的敌人，虽然我们必须承认（只要我们略为反省），他们动机和我们的动机同样是正当的。

此外，我们可以考虑，当我们受任何人伤害的时候，我们就容易想象他们是罪恶的，很难认为他公正无罪。这就清楚地证明，任何伤害或不快都有刺激起我们憎恨的一种自然倾向，完全与不公正的观念无关，我们只是在事后才找理由来建立那种情感，并为之辩护。在这里，侵害的观念并不产生那种情感，而是由情感引发。

情感之所以产生侵害观念也不足为怪；因为如果不是如此，情感就会大为降低，这是一切情感所要尽量加以避免的。除去了侵害，也可以除去愤怒，但这也不足以证明愤怒只是缘于侵害。伤害和公正是两个相反的对象，一个有产生恨的倾向，另一个有产生爱的倾向；根据它们程度的不同和我们特定的思想倾向，这两种对象的其中之一占据优势，并且刺激产生出与其相应的特有的情感来。

第四节　对于亲友的爱

我们已经举出理由说明，引起真正快乐或者不快的行为为什么不能激起对行为者任何程度的爱恨，或者只能激起一点轻微的爱恨。现在必须指出，我们凭借经验发现产生爱恨的情感的许多对象，它们传来的快乐和不快究竟以什么为依据。

依据前面的体系，要产生爱恨，总是需要原因和结果之间对印象和观念的双重关系。这种说法虽然普遍真实，但是值得注意的是，爱可以单独被另一种关系，即我们自己和对象之间的关系刺激起来；或者更恰当地说，这种关系是永远伴有其余两种关系的。谁要是借任何关系和我们联系起来，谁就总是能依据这个关系得到我们的爱，爱的多少在于关系的远近，而并不考察它的其他性质。例如血缘关系在亲子之间能产生心灵所发生的最强的联系，关系减弱，这种感情的程度也就减弱。不但血缘关系有这样的效果，任何关系都不能例外。我们爱国人，爱我们的邻人，爱同行、同业甚至爱和自己同名的人。这些关系中，每一种都被认为是一种联系，并给予人以爱的权利。

还有与此平行的另外一种现象，就是相识。相识虽然没有任何关系，但也能产生爱和好感。当我们和任何人相处得熟悉而亲密的时候，虽然在经常相处之中，并没有发现出他具有什么很有价值的优点，但与陌生人比较时，虽然我们充分意识到这些陌生人的更大的优点，但我们总不免偏袒他。亲戚的作用和相识的作用可以互相阐明，并且可以用同一原则说明。

喜欢攻击人性的人们曾经说过，人类完全不足以支持自己，当你解除他和外界对象的一切联系的时候，他立即陷入最深的忧郁和绝望之中。他们说，因为这个缘故，人们才不断地游戏、打猎、在做事中寻找消遣，力求借此忘掉自己，而把我们的精神刺激起来，摆脱那种当他们失去活泼生动的情绪的支持时就会陷入的迷失转向。我非常同意这种说法，我承认心灵本身不足以自娱自乐，而自然要寻求产生生动的感觉和刺激起精神的外界对象。这样一个对象出现时，心灵就好像从梦中觉醒：那时血液流入一个新的高潮，心情激发，整个人精神焕发，这是他在孤独和平静的时候无法做到的。因此，同伴自然令人愉快，因为他呈现出一切对象中最生动的对象，即与我们自己相似的有理性、有思想的存在者；他把全部活动传达于我们，使我们知道他内心深处的情感；使我们在任何对象所引起的一切情绪最初产生的那一刹那就看到了。每一个生动的观念都让人愉快，尤其是那些情感的观念，因为观念变成了情感，并且比其他任何意向或者观念更能给心灵以明显的刺激。

这一点一旦承认，其他的问题就迎刃而解了。因为和陌生人相处，尚且可以活跃我们的思想，因而让我们暂时感到愉快，那么和亲友和熟人做伴，必然让人感到特别愉快，因为在这里它有较大程度活跃思想的效果和较为持久的影响。凡是和我们有关系的任何东西，由于我们在自我和对象之间能够顺利推移，所以我们就会以生动的方式想象它们。习惯和相识关系也让任何对象更容易进入内心，并加强关于这个对象的概念。第一种情况和我们从因到果的推理平行，第二种和教育平行。推理和教育的共同点既然只在于产生对象的生动强烈的观念，而这也是亲友和相识的唯一共同点，因此，这一定是两者产生它们共同后果的具有影响的性质。爱或好感既然是这些结果，所以情感必然基于想象的强力和生动。这种想象令人愉快，并且使得我们对于一切产生这种想象的元素都产生了厚爱，如果那元素是善意的对象的话。

虽然，人们依照他们的特殊习性和性情结合，性情快乐的人自然喜欢快乐的人，而性情严肃的人则喜欢严肃的人。这种情况不仅发生在人们看到他们和别人之间存在着相似关系时，而且由于性情的自然发展和类似性格之间的同情，也会发生这种作用。当人们注意到这种类似关系时，这种作用通过产生观念间的联系而按照这种相关的方式运作。当他们看不到这个类似关系的时候它就根据另一个原则发生作用；后面这个原则如果和前面的原则类似，我们必须认为这个原则是前面推理的一个证实。

自我观念永远亲切地呈现于我们面前，并且把明显的活泼程度传输给和我们有关系的其他对象。这个生动的观念渐渐转为实在的印象，因为这两种知觉在很大程度上相同，只在它们的强度和活泼度上有所差异而已。但是，当我们的自然性情让我们倾向于我们在别人身上看到的印象，并一触即发时，则前面的观念和现象的变化就容易产生。在这种情况下，类似关系把观念转为印象，但不仅仅借助于两者间的关系，和通过把原初的活泼性输入给相关观念的手段实现这种从观念到印象的转换，而且通过展现那一点就激活的物质而进行。在这两种情况下，爱既然发生了类似关系，我们就知道别人的同情是愉快的，只是由于它让精神产生了某种情绪，因为，容易产生同情和相应情绪的是亲友、相识和类似三者所共有的。

人类所有的强烈骄傲，都可以看作是另一个类似情况。常有这样的事情，任何城市在最初虽然让人感到不快，但是当我们在城市中住了很久之后，在熟悉了各种现象，甚至只是熟悉了街道和楼房以后，厌恶的情感就会消退，而最终转变为相反的情况。心灵在观察熟悉的对象的时候，会感到愉快舒服，而自然地偏爱那些对象，超过了那些虽然也许本身有价值却不熟悉的对象。心灵的这种性质诱导我们对自己和属于我们的一切现象保持好印象。这些出现在更强烈的观点之下让人愉快，因此比其他对象更骄傲更合适。

在讨论我们对于亲友和相识所产生的爱恨中，我们观察一下伴随着它的奇特现象应该不会有错。在平常生活中我们很容易注意到，当母亲再婚之后，子女们就认为他们与她的关系大为削弱，不再按她寡居时看待她的眼光来看待她。发生这种情况，不仅是因为他们感到由于她的再嫁所引起的不便，或是她的新丈夫地位较低，而（就算没有任何这类原因）仅仅因为她成为了另一个家庭的成员。当父亲再婚时，也有这种情况，但是程度却降低了，而且父亲再娶，也确实不像母亲再嫁那样削弱了血统关系。这两种现象本身已经引人注目，但是一经过比较就更明显了。

为了产生两个对象之间的完善关系，不但需要想象通过类似、接近或因果的关系从一个物体转移到另一个，而且还需要想象同样顺利地原路返回。乍看之下，这是一个不可避免的结果，一个对象和另一个对象类似，那么后一个对象就必然和前者类似。如果一个对象是另一个的原因，那么后者一定是前者的结果。接近关系也是一样。关系既然可循环，那么人们的联想会由后者返回前者，也是自然的。但是经过仔细地检查后我们就会发觉我们的错误。因为假设后者除了和前者的关系循环之外，还和第三个对象有密切关系；在这种情况下，当思想由前者转向后者之后就不能同样顺利地返回，而是因第三者的出现而给予思维新的动力，思维就迅速转到第三者去了。因此，这个新的关系就削弱了前后两者的直接联系。想象的本性是动摇不定的；当推移在两个方向上都顺利的时候，它就认为两个对象的联系比在一个方向上的对象的推移容易，两者之间的联系更为密切。双重运动是双重联系，并且以最密切最亲切的方式实现了对象

母亲的再婚并不打破亲子关系；那种关系已足以让我们的联想方便而顺利地得到传达。但是当想象到达这个观点之后，它就会发现它的对象被那么多其他的联系所围绕。让它无所适从，不知道应该落在哪个点上。利害关系和义务把他拴在另一个家庭，阻止想象从她那里返回到自身，而这种返回对于支持母子的联结关系来说是必需的。思想沉湎于变化之中，不再实现使得循环顺利进行的振动。思想在前进的时候是顺利的，但是返回的时候却很困难；并且由于中断，我们发现那种关系比推移在两方面都顺利时的关系已经大为削弱。

现在再举例说明为什么父亲再娶并不发生这种程度的效果。我们回顾前面所做的证明，想象虽然容易由小到大，但是却不容易由大返小。我的联想由我转移到父亲时，并不那么迅速地再由父亲回到他的续弦，也不认为他进入了一个新的家庭，而是认为他仍然是一家之主，自己也是这个家庭的一员。他的优越性阻止思想由他推移到他的续弦，而我顺着亲子关系返回到我自己的路依然通畅。他并不沉默于他所获得的新关系，所以思想的互动或振动仍然顺利而自然。联想有这种变化，所以亲子关系仍然保留充分的力量和影响。母亲并不认为她与儿子的联系因由她和她丈夫分享就会减弱；儿子也并不认为他和双亲的联系，因为有个兄弟就削弱了。在这里，第三个对象不但和第二个对象有关系，也和第一个对象有关系，所以联想极为顺利地在这些对象中穿梭。

的结合。

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第三章　意志与直接情感

现在我们来说明直接情感或直接来源于苦乐祸福的印象。属于这一类的有欲望、厌恶、悲伤和喜悦、希望、恐惧。

在苦乐的一切直接根源中最显著的是意志；严格地说，意志虽然不包括情感，但是为了说明这些情感，必须对意志的本性和特征有充分的理解，因此我们把意志作为研究的主题。我要说的是，我们所说的意志是把意志作为我们自发自觉的自身的新运动，或是自己心灵的任何新知觉时，所感受到的和意识到的内在印象。这个印象和之前我们所说的骄傲谦卑、爱恨一样是不能下定义的，也用不着进一步描述。因此，我们将省略哲学家们时常使用的会让问题变得更加混乱的那些定义和区别，我们在研究这个题目之初，就考察长期争论的自由和必然。讨论意志，这个问题就会自然出现。

众所周知，外界事务的各种活动是必然的，在它们运动、传达、互相吸引、互相凝聚这些作用中，并没有中立或自由的痕迹。每一个对象都被命运设定了程度和方向，并且不能离开它运动的那条精确线路，正像它不能将自己转变为一个天使、精神或任何较高的实体一样。因此，物质活动应该被认为是必然的生动例子。为了明白心灵究竟是否这样，我们将从考察物质开始，并考察物质活动方面的必然观念是建立在怎样的基础之上的，以及我们何以断言物体或活动是另一个物体或活动的必然原因。

BOOK 3　Of Morals

PART 1　Of Virtue and Vice in General

SECT.1　Moral Distinctions Not Derived from Reason

There is an inconvenience which attends all abstruse reasoning,that it may si-lence,without convincing an antagonist,and requires the same intense study to make us sensible of its force,that was at first requisite for its invention.When we leave our clos-et,and engage in the common affairs of life,its conclusions seem to vanish,like the phantoms of the night on the appearance of the morning；and it is difficult for us to re-tain even that conviction,which we had attained with difficulty.This is still more con-spicuous in a long chain of reasoning,where we must preserve to the end the evidence of the first propositions,and where we often lose sight of all the most received maxims,ei-ther of philosophy or common life.I am not,however,without hopes,that the present system of philosophy will acquire new force as it advances；and that our reasonings con-cerning morals will corroborate whatever has been said concerning the understanding and the passions.Morality is a subject that interests us above all others：We fancy the peace of society to be at stake in every decision concerning it；and it is evident,that this con-cern must make our speculations appear more real and solid,than where the subject is,in a great measure,indifferent to us.What affects us,we conclude can never be a chi-mera；and as our passion is engaged on the one side or the other,we naturally think that the question lies within human comprehension；which,in other cases of this nature,we are apt to entertain some doubt of.Without this advantage I never should have ventured upon a third volume of such abstruse philosophy,in an age,wherein the greatest part of men seem agreed to convert reading into an amusement,and to reject every thing that requires any considerable degree of attention to be comprehended.

It has been observed,that nothing is ever present to the mind but its perceptions；and that all the actions of seeing,hearing,judging,loving,hating,and thinking,fall under this denomination.The mind can never exert itself in any action,which we maynot comprehend under the term of perception；and consequently that term is no less ap-plicable to those judgments,by which we distinguish moral good and evil,than to every other operation of the mind.To approve of one character,to condemn another,are only so many different perceptions.

Now as perceptions resolve themselves into two kinds,viz.impressions and ideas,this distinction gives rise to a question,with which we shall open up our present enquiry concerning morals.Whether it is by meants of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and vertue,and pronounce an action blameable or praiseworth？This will immediately cut off all loose discourses and declamations,and reduce us to something precise and exact on the present subject.

Those who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity to reason；that there are e-ternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things,which are the same to every rational being that considers them；that the immutable measures of right and wrong impose an obligation,not only on human creatures,but also on the Deity himself：All these systems concur in the opinion,that morality,like truth,is discerned merely by ideas,and by their juxta-position and comparison.In order,therefore,to judge of these systems,we need only consider,whether it be possible,from reason alone,to distinguish betwixt moral good and evil,or whether there must concur some other principles to enable us to make that distinction.

If morality had naturally no influence on human passions and actions,it were in vain to take such pains to inculcate it；and nothing would be more fruitless than that multitude of rules and precepts,with which all moralists abound.Philosophy is com-monly divided into speculative and practical；and as morality is always comprehended under the latter division,it is supposed to influence our passions and actions,and to go beyond the calm and indolent judgments of the understanding.And this is confirmed by common experience,which informs us,that men are often governed by their duties,and are detered from some actions by the opinion of injustice,and impelled to others by that of obligation.

Since morals,therefore,have an influence on the actions and affections,it fol-lows,that they cannot be derived from reason；and that because reason alone,as we have already proved,can never have any such influence.Morals excite passions,and produce or prevent actions.Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular.The rules of morality.therefore,are not conclusions of our reason.

No one,I believe,will deny the justness of this inference；nor is there any other means of evading it,than by denying that principle,on which it is founded.As long as it is allowed,that reason has no influence on our passions and action,it is in vain to pretend,that morality is discovered only by a deduction of reason.An active principle can never be founded on an inactive；and if reason be inactive in itself,it must remain so in all its shapes and appearances,whether it exerts itself in natural or moral subjects,whether it considers the powers of external bodies,or the actions of rational beings.

It would be tedious to repeat all the arguments,by which I have proved,that rea-son is perfectly inert,and can never either prevent or produce any action or affection.it will be easy to recollect what has been said upon that subject.I shall only recall on this occasion one of these arguments,which I shall endeavour to render still more conclu-sive,and more applicable to the present subject.

Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood.Truth or falshood consists in an agree-ment or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas,or to real existence and matter of fact.Whatever,therefore,is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement,is in-capable of being true or false,and can never be an object of our reason.Now it is evi-dent our passions,volitions,and actions,are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement；being original facts and realities,compleat in themselves,and implying no reference to other passions,volitions,and actions.It is impossible,therefore,they can be pronounced either true or false,and be either contrary or conformable to reason.

This argument is of double advantage to our present purpose.For it proves directly,that actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason,nor their blame from a contrariety to it；and it proves the same truth more indirectly,by shewing us,that as reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or appro-ving of it,it cannot be the source of moral good and evil,which are found to have that influence.Actions may be laudable or blameable；but they cannot be reasonable：Laud-able or blameable,therefore,are not the same with reasonable or unreasonable.The merit and demerit of actions frequently contradict,and sometimes controul our natural propensities.But reason has no such influence.Moral distinctions,therefore,are not the offspring of reason.Reason is wholly inactive,and can never be the source of so ac-tive a principle as conscience,or a sense of morals.

But perhaps it may be said,that though no will or action can be immediately con-tradictory to reason,yet we may find such a contradiction in some of the attendants of the action,that is,in its causes or effects.The action may cause a judgment,or may be obliquely caused by one,when the judgment concurs with a passion；and by an abusive way of speaking,which philosophy will scarce allow of,the same contrariety may,upon that account,be ascribed to the action.How far this truth or falshood may be the source of morals,it will now be proper

It has been observed,that reason,in a strict and philosophical sense,can have in-fluence on our conduct only after two ways：Either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it；or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects,so as to afford us means of exerting any passion.These are the only kinds of judgment,which can accompany our actions,or can be said to pro-duce them in any manner；and it must be allowed,that these judgments may often be false and erroneous.A person may be affected with passion,by supposing a pain or pleasure to lie in an object,which has no tendency to produce either of these sensa-tions,or which produces the contrary to what is imagined.A person may also take false measures for the attaining his end,and may retard,by his foolish conduct,instead of forwarding the execution of any project.These false judgments may be thought to affect the passions and actions,which are connected with them,and may be said to render them unreasonable,in a figurative and improper way of speaking.But though this be ac-knowledged,it is easy to observe,that these errors are so far from being the source of all immorality,that they are commonly very innocent,and draw no manner of guilt upon the person who is so unfortunate as to fail into them.They extend not beyond a mistake of fact,which moralists have not generally supposed criminal,as being perfectly invol-untary.I am more to be lamented than blamed,if I am mistaken with regard to the in-fluence of objects in producing pain or pleasure,or if I know not the proper means of satisfying my desires.No one can ever regard such errors as a defect in my moral char-acter.A fruit,for instance,that is really disagreeable,appears to me at a distance,and through mistake I fancy it to be pleasant and delicious.Here is one error.I choose cer-tain means of reaching this fruit,which are not proper for my end.Here is a second er-ror；nor is there any third one,which can ever possibly enter into our reasonings con-cerning actions.I ask,therefore,if a man,in this situation,and guilty of these two er-rors,is to be regarded as vicious and criminal,however unavoidable they might have been？Or if it be possible to imagine,that such errors are the sources of all immorality？

And here it may be proper to observe,that if moral distinctions be derived from thetruth or falshood of those judgments,they must take place wherever we form the judg-ments；nor will there be any difference,whether the question be concerning an apple or a kingdom,or whether the error be avoidable or unavoidable.For as the very essence of morality is supposed to consist in an agreement or disagreement to reason,the other cir-cumstances are entirely arbitrary,and can never either bestow on any action the charac-ter of virtuous or vicious,or deprive it of that character.To which we may add,that this agreement or disagreement,not admitting of degrees,all virtues and vices would of course be equal.

Should it be pretended,that though a mistake of fact be not criminal,yet a mistake of right often is；and that this may be the source of immorality：I would answer,that it is impossible such a mistake can ever be the original source of immorality,since it sup-poses a real right and wrong；that is,a real distinction in morals,independent of these judgments.A mistake,therefore,of right may become a species of immorality；but it is only a secondary one,and is founded on some other,antecedent to it.

As to those judgments which are the effects of our actions,and which,when false,give occasion to pronounce the actions contrary to truth and reason；we may observe,that our actions never cause any judgment,either true or false,in ourselves,and that it is only on others they have such an influence.It is certain,that an action,on many oc-casions,may give rise to false conclusions in others；and that a person,who through a window sees any lewd behaviour of mine with my neighbour s wife,may be so simple as to imagine she is certainly my own.In this respect my action resembles somewhat a lye or falshood；only with this difference,which is material,that I perform not the action with any intention of giving rise to a false judgment in another,but merely to satisfy my lust and passion.It causes,however,a mistake and false judgment by accident；and the falshood of its effects may be ascribed,by some odd figurative way of speaking,to the action itself.But still I can see no pretext of reason for asserting,that the tendency to cause such an error is the first spring or original source of all immorality.

Thus upon the whole,it is impossible,that the distinction betwixt moral good and evil,can be made to reason；since that distinction has an influence upon our actions,of which reason alone is incapable.Reason and judgment may,indeed,be the mediate cause of an action,by prompting,or by directing a passion：But it is not pretended,that a judgment of this kind,either in its truth or falshood,is attended with virtue or vice.And as to the judgments,which are caused by our judgments,they can still lessbestow those moral qualities on the actions,which are their causes.

If the thought and understanding were alone capable of fixing the boundaries of right and wrong,the character of virtuous and vicious either must lie in some relations of objects,or must be a matter of fact,which is discovered by our reasoning.This conse-quence is evident.As the operations of human understanding divide themselves into two kinds,the comparing of ideas,and the inferring of matter of fact；were virtue discovered by the understanding；it must be an object of one of these operations,nor is there any third operation of the understanding.which can discover it.There has been an opinion very industriously propagated by certain philosophers,that morality is susceptible of demonstration；and though no one has ever been able to advance a single step in those demonstrations；yet it is taken for granted,that this science may be brought to an equal certainty with geometry or algebra.Upon this supposition.vice and virtue must consist in some relations；since it is allowed on all hands,that no matter of fact is capable of being demonstrated.Let us,therefore,begin with examining this hypothesis,and en-deavour,if possible,to fix those moral qualities,which have been so long the objects of our fruitless researches.Point out distinctly the relations,which constitute morality or obligation,that we may know wherein they consist,and after what manner we must judge of them.

If you assert,that vice and virtue consist in relations susceptible of certainty and demonstration,you must confine yourself to those four relations,which alone admit of that degree of evidence；and in that case you run into absurdities,from which you will never be able to extricate yourself.For as you make the very essence of morality to lie in the relations,and as there is no one of these relations but what is applicable,not only to an irrational,but also to an inanimate object；it follows,that even such objects must be susceptible of merit or demerit.Resemblance,contrariety,degrees in quality,and pro-portions in quantity and number；all these relations belong as properly to matter,as to our actions,passions,and volitions.It is unquestionable,therefore,that morality lies not in any of these relations,nor the sense of it in their discovery.

Should it be asserted,that the sense of morality consists in the discovery of some relation,distinct from these,and that our enumeration was not compleat,when we com-prehended all demonstrable relations under four general heads：To this I know not what to reply,till some one be so good as to point out to me this new relation.It is impossible to refute a system,which has never yet been explained.In such a manner of fighting inthe dark,a man loses his blows in the air,and often places them where the enemy is not present.

I must,therefore,on this occasion,rest contented with requiring the two following conditions of any one that would undertake to clear up this system.First,As moral good and evil belong only to the actions of the mind,and are derived from our situation with regard to external objects,the relations,from which these moral distinctions arise,must lie only betwixt internal actions,and external objects,and must not be applicable either to internal actions,compared among themselves,or to external objects,when placed in opposition to other external objects.For as morality is supposed to attend certain rela-tions,if these relations cou d belong to internal actions considered singly,it would fol-low,that we might be guilty of crimes in ourselves,and independent of our situation,with respect to the universe：And in like manner,if these moral relations cou d be ap-plied to external objects,it would follow,that even inanimate beings would be suscepti-ble of moral beauty and deformity.

But it will be still more difficult to fulfil the second condition,requisite to justify this system.In order,therefore,to prove,that the measures of right and wrong are eter-nal laws,obligatory on every rational mind,it is not sufficient to shew the relations upon which they are founded：We must also point out the connexion betwixt the relation and the will；and must prove that this connexion is so necessary,that in every well-dis-posed mind,it must take place and have its influence；though the difference betwixt these minds be in other respects immense and infinite.Now besides what I have already proved,that even in human nature no relation can ever alone produce any action：be-sides this,I say,it has been shewn,in treating of the understanding,that there is no connexion of cause and effect,such as this is supposed to be,which is discoverable oth-erwise than by experience,and of which we can pretend to have any security by the sim-ple consideration of the objects.All beings in the universe,considered in themselves,appear entirely loose and independent of each other.It is only by experience we learn their influence and connexion；and this influence we ought never to extend beyond expe-rience.

Thus it will be impossible to fulfil the first condition required to the system of eter-nal measures of right and wrong；because it is impossible to shew those relations,upon which such a distinction may be founded：And it is as impossible to fulfil the second condition；because we cannot prove a priori,that these relations,if they really existedand were perceived,would be universally forcible and obligatory.

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PART 2　Of Justice and Injustice

SECT.1　Justice,Whether a Natural or Artificial Virtue

I have already hinted,that our sense of every kind of virtue is not natural；but that there are some virtues,that produce pleasure and approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance,which arises from the circumstances and necessity of mankind.Of this kind I assert justice to be；and shall endeavour to defend this opinion by a short,and,I hope,convincing argument,before I examine the nature of the artifice,from which the sense of that virtue is derived.

It is evident,that when we praise any actions,we regard only the motives that pro-duced them,and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper.The external performance has no merit.We must look within to find the moral quality.This we cannot do directly；and therefore fix our attention on actions,as on external signs.But these actions are still considered as signs；and the ultimate ob-ject of our praise and approbation is the motive,that produced them.

After the same manner,when we require any action,or blame a person for not per-forming it,we always suppose,that one in that situation should be influenced by the proper motive of that action,and we esteem it vicious in him to be regardless of it.If we find,upon enquiry,that the virtuous motive was still powerful over his breast,though checked in its operation by some circumstances unknown to us,we retract our blame,and have the same esteem for him,as if he had actually performed the action,which we require of him.

It appears,therefore,that all virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous motives,and are considered merely as signs of those motives.From this principle I con-clude,that the first virtuous motive,which bestows a merit on any action,can never be a regard to the virtue of that action.but must be some other natural motive or principle.To suppose,that the mere regard to the virtue of the action.may be the first motive,which produced the action,and rendered it virtuous,is to reason in a circle.Before we can have such a regard,the action must be really virtuous；and this virtue must be de-rived from some virtuous motive：And consequently the virtuous motive must be different from the regard to the virtue of the action.A virtuous motive is requisite to render an action virtuous.An action must be virtuous,before we can have a regard to its virtue.Some virtuous motive,therefore,must be antecedent to that regard.

Nor is this merely a metaphysical subtilty；but enters into all our reasonings in common life,though perhaps we may not be able to place it in such distinct philosophi-cal terms.We blame a father for neglecting his child.Why？because it shews a want of natural affection,which is the duty of every parent.Were not natural affection a duty,the care of children could not be a duty；and it were impossible we cou d have the duty in our eye in the attention we give to our offspring.In this case,therefore,all men sup-pose a motive to the action distinct from a sense of duty.

Here is a man,that does many benevolent actions；relieves the distressed,com-forts the afflicted,and extends his bounty even to the greatest strangers.No character can be more amiable and virtuous.We regard these actions as proofs of the greatest hu-manity.This humanity bestows a merit on the actions.A regard to this merit is,there-fore,a secondary consideration,and derived from the antecedent principle of humanity,which is meritorious and laudable.

In short,it may be established as an undoubted maxim,that no action can be vir-tuous,or morally good,unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it,dis-tinct from the sense of its morality.

For it is a plain fallacy to say,that a virtuous motive is requisite to render an action honest,and at the same time that a regard to the honesty is the motive of the action.We can never have a regard to the virtue of an action,unless the action be antecedently vir-tuous.No action can be virtuous,but so far as it proceeds from a virtuous motive.A virtuous motive,therefore,must precede the regard to the virtue,and it is impossible,that the virtuous motive and the regard to the virtue can be the same.

It is requisite,then,to find some motive to acts of justice and honesty,distinct from our regard to the honesty；and in this lies the great difficulty.For should we say,that a concern for our private interest or reputation is the legitimate motive to all honest actions；it would follow,that wherever that concern ceases,honesty can no longer have place.But it is certain,that self-love,when it acts at its liberty,instead of engaging us to honest actions,is the source of all injustice and violence；nor can a man ever cor-rect those vices,without correcting and restraining the natural movements of that appe-tite.

In general,it may be affirmed,that there is no such passion in human minds,asthe love of mankind,merely as such,independent of personal qualities,of services,or of relation to ourself.It is true,there is no human,and indeed no sensible,creature,whose happiness or misery does not,in some measure,affect us when brought near to us,and represented in lively colours：But this proceeds merely from sympathy,and is no proof of such an universal affection to mankind,since this concern extends itself be-yond our own species.An affection betwixt the sexes is a passion evidently implanted in human nature；and this passion not only appears in its peculiar symptoms,but also in inflaming every other principle of affection,and raising a stronger love from beauty,wit,kindness,than what would otherwise flow from them.Were there an universal love a-mong all human creatures,it would appear after the same manner.Any degree of a good quality would cause a stronger affection than the same degree of a bad quality would cause hatred；contrary to what we find by experience.Men s tempers are different,and some have a propensity to the tender,and others to the rougher,affections：But in the main,we may affirm,that man in general,or human nature,is nothing but the object both of love and hatred,and requires some other cause,which by a double relation of impressions and ideas,may excite these passions.In vain would we endeavor to elude this hypothesis.There are no phenomena that point out any such kind affection to men,independent of their merit,and every other circumstance.We love company in general；but it is as we love any other amusement.

A rich man lies under a moral obligation to communicate to those in necessity a share of his superfluities.Were private benevolence the original motive to justice,a man would not be obliged to leave others in the possession of more than he is obliged to give them.At least the difference would be very inconsiderable.Men generally fix their af-fections more on what they are possessed of,than on what they never enjoyed：For this reason,it would be greater cruelty to dispossess a man of any thing,than not to give it him.But who will assert,that this is the only foundation of justice？

From all this it follows,that we have no real or universal motive for observing the laws of equity,but the very equity and merit of that observance；and as no action can be equitable or meritorious,where it cannot arise from some separate motive,there is here an evident sophistry and reasoning in a circle.Unless,therefore,we will allow,that nature has established a sophistry,and rendered it necessary and unavoidable,we must allow,that the sense of justice and injustice is not derived from nature,but arises artifi-cially,though necessarily from education,and human

To avoid giving offence,I must here observe,that when I deny justice to be a natu-ral virtue,I make use of the word,natural,only as opposed to artificial.In another sense of the word；as no principle of the human mind is more natural than a sense of vir-tue；so no virtue is more natural than justice.Mankind is an inventive species；and where an invention is obvious and absolutely necessary,it may as properly be said to be natural as any thing that proceeds immediately from original principles,without the in-tervention of thought or reflection.Though the rules of justice be artificial,they are not arbitrary.Nor is the expression improper to call them Laws of Nature；if by natural we understand what is common to any species,or even if we confine it to mean what is in-separable from the species.

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SECT.2 Of the Origin of Justice and Property

We now proceed to examine two questions,viz.concerning the manner,in which the rules of justice are established by the artifice of men；and concerning the reasons,which determine us to attribute the observance or neglect of these rules a moral beauty and deformity.These questions will appear afterwards to be distinct.We shall begin with the former.

It is by society alone he is able to supply his defects,and raise himself up to an e-quality with his fellow-creatures,and even acquire a superiority above them.By society all his infirmities are compensated；and though in that situation his wants multiply every moment upon him,yet his abilities are still more augmented,and leave him in every re-spect more satisfied and happy,than it is possible for him,in his savage and solitary condition,ever to become.

But in order to form society,it is requisite not only that it be advantageous,but al-so that men be sensible of these advantages；and it is impossible,in their wild unculti-vated state,that by study and reflection alone,they should ever be able to attain this knowledge.Most fortunately,therefore,there is conjoined to those necessities,whose remedies are remote and obscure,another necessity,which having a present and more obvious remedy,may justly be regarded as the first and original principle of human soci-ety.

There are different species of goods,which we are possessed of；the internal satis-faction of our minds,the external advantages of our body,and the enjoyment of such possessions as we have acquired by our industry and good fortune.We are perfectly secure in the enjoyment of the first.The second may be ravished from us,but can be of no advantage to him who deprives us of them.The last only are both exposed to the vio-lence of others,and may be transferred without suffering any loss or alteration；while at the same time,there is not a sufficient quantity of them to supply every one s desires and necessities.As the improvement,therefore,of these goods is the chief advantage of so-ciety,so the instability of their possession,along with their scarcity,is the chief imped-iment.

In vain should we expect to find,in uncultivated nature,a remedy to this incon-venience；or hope for any inartificial principle of the human mind,which might controul those partial affections,and make us overcome the temptations arising from our circum-stances.The idea of justice can never serve to this purpose,or be taken for a natural principle,capable of inspiring men with an equitable conduct towards each other.This we may observe in our common judgments concerning actions,where we blame a per-son,who either centers all his affections in his family,or is so regardless of them,as,in any opposition of interest,to give the preference to a stranger,or mere chance ac-quaintance.From all which it follows,that our natural uncultivated ideas of morality,instead of providing a remedy for the partiality of our affections,do rather conform them-selves to that partiality,and give it an additional force and influence.

The remedy,then,is not derived from nature,but from artifice；or more properly speaking,nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding,for what is ir-regular and incommodious in the affections.For when men,from their early education in society,have become sensible of the infinite advantages that result from it,and have be-sides acquired a new affection to company and conversation；and when they have ob-served,that the principal disturbance in society arises from those goods,which we call external,and from their looseness and easy transition from one person to another；they must seek for a remedy by putting these goods,as far as possible,on the same footing with the fixed and constant advantages of the mind and body.This can be done after no other manner,than by a convention entered into by all the members of the society to be-stow stability on the possession of those external goods,and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry.By this means,every one knows what he may safely possess；and the passions are restrained in their partial and contradictory motions.Nor is such a restraint contrary to these pas-sions；for if so,it coued never be entered into,nor maintained；but it is only contraryto their heedless and impetuous movement.Instead of departing from our own interest,or from that of our nearest friends,by abstaining from the possessions of others,we can-not better consult both these interests,than by such a convention；because it is by that means we maintain society,which is so necessary to their well-being and subsistence,as well as to our own.

After this convention,concerning abstinence from the possessions of others,is en-tered into,and every one has acquired a stability in his possessions,there immediately arise the ideas of justice and injustice；as also those of property,right,and obligation.The latter are altogether unintelligible without first understanding the former.Our prop-erty is nothing but those goods,whose constant possession is established by the laws of society；that is,by the laws of justice.Those,therefore,who make use of the words property,or right,or obligation,before they have explained the origin of justice,or e-ven make use of them in that explication,are guilty of a very gross fallacy,and can nev-er reason upon any solid foundation.A man s property is some object related to him.This relation is not natural,but moral,and founded on justice.It is very preposterous,therefore,to imagine,that we can have any idea of property,without fully comprehen-ding the nature of justice,and shewing its origin in the artifice and contrivance of man.The origin of justice explains that of property.The same artifice gives rise to both.As our first and most natural sentiment of morals is founded on the nature of our passions,and gives the preference to ourselves and friends,above strangers；it is impossible there can be naturally any such thing as a fixed right or property,while the opposite passions of men impel them in contrary directions,and are not restrained by any convention or a-greement.

Here then is a proposition,which,I think,may be regarded as certain,that it is only from the selfishness and confined generosity of men,along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants,that justice derives its origin.If we look backward we shall find,that this proposition bestows an additional force on some of those observa-tions,which we have already made on this subject.

First,we may conclude from it,that a regard to public interest,or a strong exten-sive benevolence,is not our first and original motive for the observation of the rules of justice；since it is allowed,that if men were endowed with such a benevolence,these rules would never have been dreamt of.

Secondly,we may conclude from the same principle,that the sense of justice is notfounded on reason,or on the discovery of certain connexions and relations of ideas,which are eternal,immutable,and universally obligatory.For since it is confest,that such an alteration as that above-mentioned,in the temper and circumstances of man-kind,would entirely alter our duties and obligations,it is necessary upon the common system,that the sense of virtue is derived from reason,to shew the change which this must produce in the relations and ideas.But it is evident,that the only cause,why the extensive generosity of man,and the perfect abundance of every thing,would destroy the very idea of justice,is because they render it useless；and that,on the other hand,his confined benevolence,and his necessitous condition,give rise to that virtue,only by making it requisite to the publick interest,and to that of every individual.It was there-fore a concern for our own,and the publick interest,which made us establish the laws of justice；and nothing can be more certain,than that it is not any relation of ideas,which gives us this concern,but our impressions and sentiments,without which every thing in nature is perfectly indifferent to us,and can never in the least affect us.The sense of justice,therefore,is not founded on our ideas,but on our

Thirdly,we may farther confirm the foregoing proposition,that those impressions,which give rise to this sense of justice,are not natural to the mind of man,but arise from artifice and human conventions.For since any considerable alteration of temper and circumstances destroys equally justice and injustice；and since such an alteration has an effect only by changing our own and the publick interest；it follows,that the first estab-lishment of the rules of justice depends on these different interests.But if men pursued the publick interest naturally,and with a hearty affection,they would never have dreamed of restraining each other by these rules；and if they pursued their own interest,without any precaution,they would run head-long into every kind of injustice and vio-lence.These rules,therefore,are artificial,and seek their end in an oblique and indi-rect manner；nor is the interest,which gives rise to them,of a kind that could be pur-sued by the natural and inartificial passions of men.

We come now to the second question we proposed,viz.Why we annex the idea of virtue to justice,and of vice to injustice.

After men have found by experience,that their selfishness and confined generosity,acting at their liberty,totally incapacitate them for society；and at the same time have observed,that society is necessary to the satisfaction of those very passions,they are naturally induced to lay themselves under the restraint of such rules,as may render theircommerce more safe and commodious.To the imposition then,and observance of these rules,both in general,and in every particular instance,they are at first induced only by a regard to interest；and this motive,on the first formation of society,is sufficiently strong and forcible.But when society has become numerous,and has encreased to a tribe or nation,this interest is more remote；nor do men so readily perceive,that disor-der and confusion follow upon every breach of these rules,as in a more narrow and con-tracted society.But though in our own actions we may frequently lose sight of that inter-est,which we have in maintaining order,and may follow a lesser and more present in-terest,we never fail to observe the prejudice we receive,either mediately or immediate-ly,from the injustice of others；as not being in that case either blinded by passion,or byass'd by any contrary temptation.Nay when the injustice is so distant from us,as no way to affect our interest,it still displeases us；because we consider it as prejudicial to human society,and pernicious to every one that approaches the person guilty of it.We partake of their uneasiness by sympathy；and as every thing,which gives uneasiness in human actions,upon the general survey,is called Vice,and whatever produces satis-faction,in the same manner,is denominated Virtue；this is the reason why the sense of moral good and evil follows upon justice and injustice.And though this sense,in the present case,be derived only from contemplating the actions of others,yet we fail not to extend it even to our own actions.The general rule reaches beyond those instances,from which it arose；while at the same time we naturally sympathize with others in the sentiments they entertain of us.Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establish-ment of justice：but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approba-tion,which attends that virtue.

What farther contributes to encrease their solidity,is the interest of our reputation,after the opinion,that a merit or demerit attends justice or injustice,is once firmly es-tablished among mankind.There is nothing,which touches us more nearly than our rep-utation,and nothing on which our reputation more depends than our conduct,with rela-tion to the property of others.For this reason,every one,who has any regard to his character,or who intends to live on good terms with mankind,must fix an inviolable law to himself,never,by any temptation,to be induced to violate those principles,which are essential to a man of probity and honour.

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SECT.3　Of the Rules Which Determine Property

Though the establishment of the rule,concerning the stability of possession,be notonly useful,but even absolutely necessary to human society,it can never serve to any purpose,while it remains in such general terms.Some method must be shewn,by which we may distinguish what particular goods are to be assigned to each particular per-son,while the rest of mankind are excluded from their possession and enjoyment.Our next business,then,must be to discover the reasons which modify this general rule,and fit it to the common use and practice of the world.

What has long lain under our eye,and has often been employed to our advantage,that we are always the most unwilling to part with；but can easily live without posses-sions,which we never have enjoyed,and are not accustomed to.It is evident,there-fore,that men would easily acquiesce in this expedient,that every one continue to enjoy what he is at present possessed of；and this is the reason,why they would so naturally agree in preferring it.

But we may observe,that though the rule of the assignment of property to the pres-ent possessor be natural,and by that means useful,yet its utility extends not beyond the first formation of society；nor would any thing be more pernicious,than the constant ob-servance of it；by which restitution would be excluded,and every injustice would be au-thorized and rewarded.We must,therefore,seek for some other circumstance,that may give rise to property after society is once established；and of this kind,I find four most considerable,viz.Occupation,Prescription,Accession,and Succession.We shall briefly examine each of these,beginning with Occupation.

There remains nothing,but to determine exactly,what is meant by possession；and this is not so easy as may at first sight be imagined.We are said to be in possession of any thing,not only when we immediately touch it,but also when we are so situated with respect to it,as to have it in our power to use it；and may move,alter,or destroy it,according to our present pleasure or advantage.This relation,then,is a species of cause and effect；and as property is nothing but a stable possession,derived from the rules of justice,or the conventions of men,it is to be considered as the same species of relation.But here we may observe,that as the power of using any object becomes more or less certain,according as the interruptions we may meet with are more or less proba-ble；and as this probability may increase by insensible degrees；it is in many cases im-possible to determine when possession begins or ends；nor is there any certain standard,by which we can decide such controversies.

But such disputes may not only arise concerning the real existence of property and possession,but also concerning their extent；and these disputes are often susceptible of no decision,or can be decided by no other faculty than the imagination.A person who lands on the shore of a small island,that is desert and uncultivated,is deemed its pos-sessor from the very first moment,and acquires the property of the whole；because the object is there bounded and circumscribed in the fancy,and at the same time is propor-tioned to the new possessor.The same person landing on a desart island,as large as Great Britain,extends his property no farther than his immediate possession；though a numerous colony are esteemed the proprietors of the whole from the instant of their de-barkment.

But it often happens,that the title of first possession becomes obscure through time；and that it is impossible to determine many controversies,which may arise con-cerning it.In that case long possession or prescription naturally takes place,and gives a person a sufficient property in any thing he enjoys.The nature of human society admits not of any great accuracy；nor can we always remount to the first origin of things,in or-der to determine their present condition.Any considerable space of time sets objects at such a distance,that they seem,in a manner,to lose their reality,and have as little in-fluence on the mind,as if they never had been in being.A man s title,that is clear and certain at present,will seem obscure and doubtful fifty years hence,even though the facts,on which it is founded,should be proved with the greatest evidence and certainty.The same facts have not the same influence after so long an interval of time.And this may be received as a convincing argument for our preceding doctrine with regard to property and justice.Possession during a long tract of time conveys a title to any object.But as it is certain,that,however every thing be produced in time,there is nothing real that is produced by time；it follows,that property being produced by time,is not any thing real in the objects,but is the off-spring of the sentiments,on which alone time is found to have any influence.

We acquire the property of objects by accession,when they are connected in an in-timate manner with objects that are already our property,and at the same time are infe-rior to them.Thus the fruits of our garden,the offspring of our cattle,and the work of our slaves,are all of them esteemed our property,even before possession.Where ob-jects are connected together in the imagination,they are apt to be put on the same foot-ing,and are commonly supposed to be endowed with the same qualities.We readily pass from one to the other,and make no difference in our judgments concerning them；especially if the latter be inferior to the former.

The right of succession is a very natural one,from the presumed consent of the par-ent or near relation,and from the general interest of mankind,which requires,that men s possessions should pass to those,who are dearest to them,in order to render them more industrious and frugal.Perhaps these causes are seconded by the influence of rela-tion,or the association of ideas,by which we are naturally directed to consider the son after the parents decease,and ascribe to him a title to his father s possessions.Those goods must become the property of some body：But of whom is the question.Here it is evident the persons children naturally present themselves to the mind；and being alread-y.connected to those possessions by means of their deceased parent,we are apt to con-nect them still farther by the relation of property.Of this there are many parallel in-stances.

SECT.4　Of the Transference of Property by Consent

However useful,or even necessary,the stability of possession may be to human so-ciety,it is attended with very considerable inconveniences.The relation of fitness or suitableness ought never to enter into consideration,in distributing the properties of mankind；but we must govern ourselves by rules,which are more general in their appli-cation,and more free from doubt and uncertainty.Of this kind is present possession up-on the first establishment of society；and afterwards occupation,prescription,acces-sion,and succession.As these depend very much on chance,they must frequently prove contradictory both to men s wants and desires；and persons and possessions must often be very ill adjusted.This is a grand inconvenience,which calls for a remedy.To apply one directly,and allow every man to seize by violence what he judges to be fit for him,would destroy society；and therefore the rules of justice seek some medium betwixt a rigid stability,and this changeable and uncertain adjustment.But there is no medium better than that obvious one,that possession and property should always be stable,ex-cept when the proprietor consents to bestow them on some other person.This rule can have no ill consequence,in occasioning wars and dissentions；since the proprietor s con-sent,who alone is concerned,is taken along in the alienation：And it may serve to many good purposes in adjusting property to persons.Different parts of the earth produce different commodities；and not only so,but different men both are by nature fitted for different employments,and attain to greater perfection in any one,when they confine the mselves to it alone.All this requires a mutual exchange and commerce；for which reason the translation of property by consent is founded on a law of nature,as well as its stability without such a consent.

So far is determined by a plain utility and interest.But perhaps it is from more triv-ial reasons,that delivery,or a sensible transference of the object is commonly required by civil laws,and also by the laws of nature,according to most authors,as a requisite circumstance in the translation of property.The property of an object,when taken for something real,without any reference to morality,or the sentiments of the mind,is a quality perfectly insensible,and even inconceivable；nor can we form any distinct no-tion,either of its stability or translation.This imperfection of our ideas is less sensibly felt with regard to its stability,as it engages less our attention,and is easily past over by the mind,without any scrupulous examination.But as the translation of property from one person to another is a more remarkable event,the defect of our ideas becomes more sensible on that occasion,and obliges us to turn ourselves on every side in search of some remedy.Now as nothing more enlivens any idea than a present impression,and a relation betwixt that impression and the idea；it is natural for us to seek some false light from this quarter.In order to aid the imagination in conceiving the transference of prop-erty,we take the sensible object,and actually transfer its possession to the person,on whom we would bestow the property.The supposed resemblance of the actions,and the presence of this sensible delivery,deceive the mind,and make it fancy,that it con-ceives the mysterious transition of the property.And that this explication of the matter is just,appears hence,that men have invented a symbolical delivery,to satisfy the fancy,where the real one is impracticable.Thus the giving the keys of a granary is understood to be the delivery of the corn contained in it：The giving of stone and earth represents the delivery of a mannor.This is a kind of superstitious practice in civil laws,and in the laws of nature,resembling the Roman catholic superstitions in religion.As the Roman catholics represent the inconceivable mysteries of the Christian religion,and render them more present to the mind,by a taper,or habit,or grimace,which is supposed to resem-ble them；so lawyers and moralists have run into like inventions for the same reason,and have endeavoured by those means to satisfy themselves concerning the transference of property by consent.

SECT.5　Of the Obligation of Promises

That the rule of morality,which enjoins the performance of promises,is not na-tural,will sufficiently appear from these two propositions,which I proceed to prove,viz.that a promise would not be intelligible,before human conventions had established it；and that even if it were intelligible,it would not be attended with any moral obliga-tion.

I say,first,that a promise is not intelligible naturally,nor antecedent to human conventions；and that a man,unacquainted with society,could never enter into any en-gagements with another,even though they could perceive each other s thoughts by intui-tion.If promises be natural and intelligible,there must be some act of the mind atten-ding these words,I promise；and on this act of the mind must the obligation depend.Let us,therefore,run over all the faculties of the soul,and see which of them is exerted in our promises.

The act of the mind,exprest by a promise,is not a resolution to perform any thing：For that alone never imposes any obligation.Nor is it a desire of such a performance：For we may bind ourselves without such a desire,or even with an aversion,declared and avowed.Neither is it the willing of that action,which we promise to perform：For a promise always regards some future time,and the will has an influence only on present actions.It follows,therefore,that since the act of the mind,which enters into a prom-ise,and produces its obligation,is neither the resolving,desiring,nor willing any parti-cular performance,it must necessarily be the willing of that obligation,which arises from the promise.Nor is this only a conclusion of philosophy；but is entirely conform-able to our common ways of thinking and of expressing ourselves,when we say that we are bound by our own consent,and that the obligation arises from our mere will and pleasure.The only question then is,whether there be not a manifest absurdity in suppo-sing this act of the mind,and such an absurdity as no man could fall into,whose ideas are not confounded with prejudice and the fallacious use of language.

All morality depends upon our sentiments；and when any action,or quality of the mind,pleases us after a certain manner,we say it is virtuous；and when the neglect,or nonperformance of it,displeases us after a like manner,we say that we lie under an ob-ligation to perform it.A change of the obligation supposes a change of the sentiment；and a creation of a new obligation supposes some new sentiment to arise.But it is cer-tain we can naturally no more change our own sentiments,than the motions of the heav-ens；nor by a single act of our will,that is,by a promise,render any action agreeable or disagreeable,moral or immoral；which,without that act,would have produced co-ntrary impressions,or have been endowed with different qualities.It would be absurd,therefore,to will any new obligation,that is,any new sentiment of pain or pleasure；nor is it possible,that men could naturally fall into so gross an absurdity.A promise,therefore,is naturally something altogether unintelligible,nor is there any act of the mind belonging to it.

But,secondly,if there was any act of the mind belonging to it,it could not natu-rally produce any obligation.This appears evidently from the foregoing reasoning.A promise creates a new obligation.A new obligation supposes new sentiments to arise.The will never creates new sentiments.There could not naturally,therefore,arise any obligation from a promise,even supposing the mind could fall into the absurdity of will-ing that obligation.

The same truth may be proved still more evidently by that reasoning,which proved justice in general to be an artificial virtue.No action can be required of us as our duty,unless there be implanted in human nature some actuating passion or motive,capable of producing the action.This motive cannot be the sense of duty.A sense of duty supposes an antecedent obligation：And where an action is not required by any natural passion,it cannot be required by any natural obligation；since it may be omitted without proving any defect or imperfection in the mind and temper,and consequently without any vice.Now it is evident we have no motive leading us to the performance of promises,distinct from a sense of duty.If we thought,that promises had no moral obligation,we never should feel any inclination to observe them.This is not the case with the natural virtues.

Men being naturally selfish,or endowed only with a confined generosity,they are not easily induced to perform any action for the interest of strangers,except with a view to some reciprocal advantage,which they had no hope of obtaining but by such a per-formance.Now as it frequently happens,that these mutual performances cannot be fin-ished at the same instant,it is necessary,that one party be contented to remain in un-certainty,and depend upon the gratitude of the other for a return of kindness.But so much corruption is there among men,that,generally speaking,this becomes but a slen-der security；and as the benefactor is here supposed to bestow his favours with a view to self-interest,this both takes off from the obligation,and sets an example to selfish-ness,which is the true mother of ingratitude.Were we,therefore,to follow the natural course of our passions and inclinations,we should perform but few actions for the advan-tage of others,from distinterested views；because we are naturally very limited in our kindness and affection：And we should perform as few of that kind,out of a regard to in-terest；because we cannot depend upon their gratitude.Here then is the mutual com-merce of good offices in a manner lost among mankind,and every one reduced to his own skill and industry for his well-being and subsistence.The invention of the law of na-ture,concerning the stability of possession,has already rendered men tolerable to each other；that of the transference of property and possession by consent has begun to render them mutually advantageous：But still these laws of nature,however strictly observed,are not sufficient to render them so serviceable to each other,as by nature they are fitted to become.Though possession be stable,men may often reap but small advantage from it,while they are possessed of a greater quantity of any species of goods than they have occasion for,and at the same time suffer by the want of others.The transference of property,which is the proper remedy for this inconvenience,cannot remedy it entirely；because it can only take place with regard to such objects as are present and individual,but not to such as are absent or general.One cannot transfer the property of a particular house,twenty leagues distant；because the consent cannot be attended with delivery,which is a requisite circumstance.Neither can one transfer the property of ten bushels of corn,or five hogsheads of wine,by the mere expression and consent；because these are only general terms,and have no direct relation to any particular heap of corn,or barrels of wine.Besides,the commerce of mankind is not confined to the barter of commodi-ties,but may extend to services and actions,which we may exchange to our mutual in-terest and advantage.

All this is the effect of the natural and inherent principles and passions of human nature；and as these passions and principles are inalterable,it may be thought,that our conduct,which depends on them,must be so too,and that it would be in vain,either for moralists or politicians,to tamper with us,or attempt to change the usual course of our actions,with a view to public interest.

I may still do services to such persons as I love,and am more particularly acquain-ted with,without any prospect of advantage；and they may make me a return in the same manner,without any view but that of recompensing my past services.In order,therefore,to distinguish those two different sorts of commerce,the interested and the disinterested,there is a certain form of words invented for the former,by which we bind ourselves to the performance of any action.This form of words constitutes what we call a promise,which is the sanction of the interested commerce of mankind.When a mansays he promises any thing,he in effect expresses a resolution of performing it；and a-long with that,by making use of this form of words,subjects himself to the penalty of never being trusted again in case of failure.A resolution is the natural act of the mind,which promises express：But were there no more than a resolution in the case,promises would only declare our former motives,and would not create any new motive or obliga-tion.They are the conventions of men,which create a new motive,when experience has taught us,that human affairs would be conducted much more for mutual advantage,were there certain symbols or signs instituted,by which we might give each,other secu-rity of our conduct in any particular incident,After these signs are instituted,whoever uses them is immediately bound by his interest to execute his engagements,and must never expect to be trusted any more,if he refuse to perform what

It is evident,that the will alone is never supposed to cause the obligation,but must be expressed by words or signs,in order to impose a tye upon any man.The expression being once brought in as subservient to the will,soon becomes the principal part of the promise；nor will a man be less bound by his word,though he secretly give a different direction to his intention,and with-hold himself both from a resolution,and from willing an obligation.

We may draw the same conclusion,concerning the origin of promises,from the force,which is supposed to invalidate all contracts,and to free us from their obligation.Such a principle is a proof,that promises have no natural obligation,and are mere arti-ficial contrivances for the convenience and advantage of society.

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SECT.6　Some Farther Reflections Concerning Justice and Injustice

We have now run over the three fundamental laws of nature,that of the stability of possession,of its transference by consent,and of the performance of promises.It is on the strict observance of those three laws,that the peace and security of human society entirely depend；nor is there any possibility of establishing a good correspondence among men,where these are neglected.we may here stop a moment,and from a review of the preceding reasonings may draw some new arguments,to prove that those laws,however necessary,are entirely artificial,and of human invention；and consequently that justice is an artificial,and not a natural virtue.

Ⅰ.The first argument I shall make use of is derived from the vulgar definition of justice.Justice is commonly defined to be a constant and perpetual will of giving every one his due.In this definition it is supposed,that there are such things as right and property,independent of justice,and antecedent to it；and that they would have subsis-ted,though men had never dreamt of practising such a virtue.I have already observed,in a cursory manner,the fallacy of this opinion,and shall here continue to open up a little more distinctly my sentiments on that subject.

It is evident property does not consist in any of the sensible qualities of the object.For these may continue invariably the same,while the property changes.Property,therefore,must consist in some relation of the object.But it is not in its relation with re-gard to other external and inanimate objects.For these may also continue invariably the same,while the property changes.This quality,therefore,consists in the relations of objects to intelligent and rational beings.But it is not the external and corporeal rela-tion,which forms the essence of property.For that relation may be the same betwixt in-animate objects,or with regard to brute creatures；though in those cases it forms no property.It is,therefore,in some internal relation,that the property consists；that is,in some influence,which the external relations of the object have on the mind and ac-tions.Thus the external relation,which we call occupation or first possession,is not of itself imagined to be the property of the object,but only to cause its property.Now it is evident,this external relation causes nothing in external objects,and has only an influ-ence on the mind,by giving us a sense of duty in abstaining from that object,and in re-storing it to the first possessor.These actions are properly what we call justice；and con-sequently it is on that virtue that the nature of property depends,and not the virtue on the property.

Ⅱ.In the second place we may observe,that all kinds of vice and virtue run insen-sibly into each other,and may approach by such imperceptible degrees as will make it very difficult,if not absolutely impossible,to determine when the one ends,and the other begins；and from this observation we may derive a new argument for the foregoing principle.

For whatever may be the case,with regard to all kinds of vice and virtue,it is cer-tain,that rights,and obligations,and property,admit of no such insensible gradation,but that a man either has a full and perfect property,or none at all；and is either entire-ly obliged to perform any action,or lies under no manner of obligation.These dependentirely upon justice and injustice,and follow them in all their variations.Where the justice is entire,the property is also entire：Where the justice is imperfect,the property must also be imperfect And vice versa,if the property admit of no such variations,they must also be incompatible with justice.If you assent,therefore,to this last proposition,and assert,that justice and injustice are not susceptible of degrees,you in effect assert,that they are not naturally either vicious or virtuous；since vice and virtue,moral good and evil,and indeed all natural qualities,run insensibly into each other,and are,on many occasions,undistinguishable.

Ⅲ.If we consider the ordinary course of human actions,we shall find,that the mind restrains not itself by any general and universal rules；but acts on most occasions as it is determined by its present motives and inclination.As each action is a particular individual event,it must proceed from particular principles,and from our immediate sit-uation within ourselves,and with respect to the rest of the universe.If on some occa-sions we extend our motives beyond those very circumstances,which gave rise to them,and form something like general rules for our conduct,it is easy to observe,that these rules are not perfectly inflexible,but allow of many exceptions.Since,therefore,this is the ordinary course of human actions,we may conclude,that the laws of justice,being universal and perfectly inflexible,can never be derived from nature,nor be the immedi-ate offspring of any natural motive or inclination.

Upon the whole,then,we are to consider this distinction betwixt justice and injus-tice,as having two different foundations,viz.that of interest,when men observe,that it is impossible to live in society without restraining themselves by certain rules；and that of morality,when this interest is once observed and men receive a pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to the peace of society,and an uneasiness from such as are contrary to it.It is the voluntary convention and artifice of men,which makes the first interest take place；and therefore those laws of justice are so far to be considered as arti-ficial.After that interest is once established and acknowledged,the sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows naturally,and of itself；though it is certain,that it is also augmented by a new artifice,and that the public instructions of politicians,and the private education of parents,contribute to the giving us a sense of honour and duty in the strict regulation of our actions with regard to the properties of others.

SECT.7　Of the Origin of Government

Since,therefore,men are so sincerely attached to their interest,and their interestis so much concerned in the observance of justice,and this interest is so certain and a-vowed；it may be asked,how any disorder can ever arise in society,and what principle there is in human nature so powerful as to overcome so strong a passion,or so violent as to obscure so clear a knowledge？

It has been observed,in treating of the passions,that men are mightily governed by the imagination,and proportion their affections more to the light,under which any ob-ject appears to them,than to its real and intrinsic value.Now as every thing,that is contiguous to us,either in space or time,strikes upon us with such an idea,it has a proportional effect on the will and passions,and commonly operates with more force than any object,that lies in a more distant and obscure light.Though we may be fully con-vinced,that the latter object excels the former,we are not able to regulate our actions by this judgment；but yield to the sollicitations of our passions,which always plead in favour of whatever is near and contiguous.

This is the reason why men so often act in contradiction to their known interest；and in particular why they prefer any trivial advantage,that is present,to the mainte-nance of order in society,which so much depends on the observance of justice.

This quality,therefore,of human nature,not only is very dangerous to society,but also seems,on a cursory view,to be incapable of any remedy.The remedy can only come from the consent of men；and if men be incapable of themselves to prefer remote to contiguous,they will never consent to any thing,which would oblige them to such a choice,and contradict,in so sensible a manner,their natural principles and propensi-ties.

The only difficulty,therefore,is to find out this expedient,by which men cure their natural weakness,and lay themselves under the necessity of observing the laws of justice and equity,notwithstanding their violent propensity to prefer contiguous to re-mote.It is evident such a remedy can never be effectual without correcting this propen-sity；and as it is impossible to change or correct any thing material in our nature,the ut-most we can do is to change our circumstances and situation,and render the observance of the laws of justice our nearest interest,and their violation our most remote.But this being impracticable with respect to all mankind,it can only take place with respect to a few,whom we thus immediately interest in the execution of justice.There are the per-sons,whom we call civil magistrates,kings and their ministers,our governors and rul-ers,who being indifferent persons to the greatest part of the state,have no interest,orbut a remote one,in any act of injustice；and being satisfied with their present condi-tion,and with their part in society,have an immediate interest in every execution of jus-tice,which is so necessary to the upholding of society.Here then is the origin of civil government and society.Men are not able radically to cure,either in themselves or oth-ers,that narrowness of soul,which makes them prefer the present to the remote.They cannot change their natures.All they can do is to change their situation,and render the observance of justice the immediate interest of some particular persons,and its violation their more remote.These persons,then,are not only induced to observe those rules in their own conduct,but also to constrain others to a like regularity,and inforce the dic-tates of equity through the whole society.And if it be necessary,they may also interest others more immediately in the execution of justice,and create a number of officers,civil and military,to assist them in their government,which,though composed of men subject to all human infirmities,becomes,by one of the finest and most subtle inven-tions imaginable,a composition,which is,in some measure,exempted from all these infirmities.

SECT.8　Of the Source of Allegiance

I shall go farther,and assert,that government,upon its first establishment,would naturally be supposed to derive its obligation from those laws of nature,and,in particu-lar,from that concerning the performance of promises.When men have once perceived the necessity of government to maintain peace,and execute justice,they would naturally assemble together,would chuse magistrates,determine power,and promise them obedi-ence.As a promise is supposed to be a bond or security already in use,and attended with a moral obligation,it is to be considered as the original sanction of government,and as the source of the first obligation to obedience.This reasoning appears so natural,that it has become the foundation of our fashionable system of politics,and is in a man-ner the creed of a party amongst us,who pride themselves,with reason,on the sound-ness of their philosophy,and their liberty of thought.All men,say they,are born free and equal：Government and superiority can only be established by consent：The consent of men,in establishing government,imposes on them a new obligation,unknown to the laws of nature.Men,therefore,are bound to obey their magistrates,only because they promise it；and if they had not given their word,either expressly or tacitly,to preserve allegiance,it would never have become a part of their moral duty.This conclusion,however,when carried so far as to comprehend government in all its ages and situations,is entirely erroneous；and I maintain,that though the duty of allegiance be at first graf-ted on the obligation of promises,and be for some time supported by that obligation,yet it quickly takes root of itself,and has an original obligation and authority,independent of all contracts.This is a principle of moment,which we must examine with care and at-tention,before we proceed any farther.

Though the rules of justice be sufficient to maintain any society,yet it is impossible for them,of themselves,to observe those rules,in large and polished societies；they es-tablish government,as a new invention to attain their ends,and preserve the old,or procure new advantages,by a more strict execution of justice.So far,therefore,our civil duties are connected with our natural,that the former are invented chiefly for the sake of the latter；and that the principal object of government is to constrain men to ob-serve the laws of nature.In this respect,however,that law of nature,concerning the performance of promises,is only compriz'd along with the rest；and its exact observance is to be considered as an effect of the institution of government,and not the obedience to government as an effect of the obligation of a promise.Though the object of our civil du-ties be the enforcing of our natural,yet the first（First in time,not in dignity or force.）motive of the invention,as well as performance of both,is nothing but self-interest：and since there is a separate interest in the obedience to government,from that in the performance of promises,we must also allow of a separate obligation.To obey the civil magistrate is requisite to preserve order and concord in society.To perform promises is requisite to beget mutual trust and confidence in the common offices of life.The ends,as well as the means,are perfectly distinct；nor is the one subordinate to the other.

In short,if the performance of promises be advantageous,so is obedience to gov-ernment：If the former interest be general,so is the latter：If the one interest be obvious and avowed,so is the other.And as these two rules are founded on like obligations of interest,each of them must have a peculiar authority,independent of the other.

But it is not only the natural obligations of interest,which are distinct in promises and allegiance；but also the moral obligations of honour and conscience：Nor does the merit or demerit of the one depend in the least upon that of the other.

We find,that magistrates are so far from deriving their authority,and the obligation to obedience in their subjects,from the foundation of a promise or original contract,that they conceal,as far as possible,from their people,especially from the vulgar,that theyhave their origin from thence.Were this the sanction of government,our rulers would never receive it tacitly,which is the utmost that can be pretended；since what is given tacitly and insensibly can never have such influence on mankind,as what is performed expressly and openly.A tacit promise is,where the will is signified by other more dif-fuse signs than those of speech；but a will there must certainly be in the case,and that can never escape the person s notice,who exerted it,however silent or tacit.But were you to ask the far greatest part of the nation,whether they had ever consented to the au-thority of their rulers,or promised to obey them,they would be inclined to think very strangely of you；and would certainly reply,that the affair depended not on their con-sent,but that they were born to such an obedience.

To which we may add,that a man living under an absolute government,would owe it no allegiance；since,by its very nature,it depends not on consent.But as that is as natural and common a government as any,it must certainly occasion some obligation；and it is plain from experience,that men,who are subjected to it,do always think so.This is a clear proof,that we do not commonly esteem our allegiance to be derived from our consent or promise.

SECT.9　Of the Measures of Allegiance

Those political writers,who have had recourse to a promise,or original contract,as the source of our allegiance to government,intended to establish a principle,which is perfectly just and reasonable；though the reasoning,upon which they endeavoured to es-tablish it,was fallacious and sophistical.They would prove,that our submission to gov-ernment admits of exceptions,and that an egregious tyranny in the rulers is sufficient to free the subjects from all ties of allegiance.Since men enter into society,say they,and submit themselves to government,by their free and voluntary consent,they must have in view certain advantages,which they propose to reap from it,and for which they are con-tented to resign their native liberty.There is,therefore,something mutual engaged on the part of the magistrate,viz.protection and security；and it is only by the hopes he affords of these advantages,that he can ever persuade men to submit to him.But when instead of protection and security,they meet with tyranny and oppression,they are free d from their promises，（as happens in all conditional contracts）and return to that state of liberty,which preceded the institution of government.Men would never be so foolish as to enter into such engagements as should turn entirely to the advantage of o-thers,without any view of bettering their own condition.Whoever proposes to draw any profit from our submission,must engage himself,either expressly or tacitly,to make us reap some advantage from his authority；nor ought he to expect,that without the per-formance of his part we will ever continue in obedience.

If interest first produces obedience to government,the obligation to obedience must cease,whenever the interest ceases,in any great degree,and in a considerable number of instances.

SECT.10　Of the Objects of Allegiance

The common rule requires submission；and it is only in cases of grievous tyranny and oppression,that the exception can take place.Since then such a blind submission is commonly due to magistracy,the next question is,to whom it is due,and whom we are to regard as our lawful magistrates？……Government,therefore,arises from the same voluntary conversation of men；and it is evident,that the same convention,which establishes government,will also determine the persons who are to govern,and will re-move all doubt and ambiguity in this particular.And the voluntary consent of men must here have the greater efficacy,that the authority of the magistrate does at first stand up-on the foundation of a promise of the subjects,by which they bind themselves to obedi-ence；as in every other contract or engagement.The same promise,then,which binds them to obedience,ties them down to a particular person,and makes him the object of their allegiance.

The first of those principles I shall take notice of,as a foundation of the right of magistracy,is that which gives authority to all the most established governments of the world without exception：I mean,long possession in any one form of government,or succession of princes.When there is no form of government established by long posses-sion,the present possession is sufficient to supply its place,and may be regarded as the second source of all public authority.The right of conquest may be considered as a third source of the title of sovereigns.This right resembles very much that of present posses-sion；but has rather a superior force,being seconded by the notions of glory and hono-ur,which we ascribe to conquerors,instead of the sentiments of hatred and detestation,which attend usurpers.When neither long possession,nor present possession,nor con-quest take place,as when the first sovereign,who founded any monarchy,dies；in that case,the right of succession naturally prevails in their stead,and men are commonly induced to place the son of their late monarch on the throne,and suppose him to inherit his father s authority.

This leads us to consider the fifth source of authority,viz.positive laws；when the legislature establishes a certain form of government and succession of princes.At first sight it may be thought,that this must resolve into some of the preceding titles of author-ity.The legislative power,whence the positive law is derived,must either be estab-lished by original contract,long possession,present possession,conquest,or succes-sion；and consequently the positive law must derive its force from some of those princi-ples.But here it is remarkable,that though a positive law can only derive its force from these principles,yet it acquires not all the force of the principle from whence it is de-rived,but loses considerably in the transition；as it is natural to imagine.

PART 3　Of the Other Virtues and Vices

SECT.1　Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues and Vices

We come now to the examination of such virtues and vices as are entirely natural,and have no dependance on the artifice and contrivance of men.The examination of these will conclude this system of morals.

Sympathy is the source of the esteem,which we pay to all the artificial virtues.

Thus it appears,that sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature,that it has a great influence on our taste of beauty,and that it produces our sentiment of morals in all the artificial virtues.From thence we may presume,that it also gives rise to many of the other virtues；and that qualities acquire our approbation,because of their tenden-cy to the good of mankind.This presumption must become a certainty,when we find that most of those qualities,which we naturally approve of,have actually that tendency,and render a man a proper member of society：While the qualities,which we naturally disapprove of,have a contrary tendency,and render any intercourse with the person dangerous or disagreeable.

But however directly the distinction of vice and virtue may seem to flow from the immediate pleasure or uneasiness,which particular qualities cause to ourselves or oth-ers；it is easy to observe,that it has also a considerable dependence on the principle of sympathy so often insisted on.We approve of a person,who is possessed of qualities im-mediately agreeable to those,with whom he has any commerce；though perhaps we o-urselves never reaped any pleasure from them.We also approve of one,who is pos-sessed of qualities,that are immediately agreeable to himself；though they be of no serv-ice to any mortal.

Thus,to take a general review of the present hypothesis：Every quality of the mind is denominated virtuous,which gives pleasure by the mere survey；as every quality,which produces pain,is called vicious.This pleasure and this pain may arise from four different sources.For we reap a pleasure from the view of a character,which is naturally fitted to be useful to others,or to the person himself,or which is agreeable to others,or to the person himself.One may,perhaps,be surprized that amidst all these interests and pleasures,we should forget our own,which touch us so nearly on every other occa-sion.But we shall easily satisfy ourselves on this head,when we consider,that every particular person s pleasure and interest being different,it is impossible men could ever agree in their sentiments and judgments,unless they chose some common point of view,from which they might survey their object,and which might cause it to appear the same to all of them.Now in judging of characters,the only interest or pleasure,which ap-pears the same to every spectator,is that of the person himself,whose character is ex-amined；or that of persons,who have a connexion with him.And though such interests and pleasures touch us more faintly than our own,yet being more constant and univer-sal,they counter-ballance the latter even in practice,and are alone admitted in specula-tion as the standard of virtue and morality.They alone produce that particular feeling or sentiment,on which moral distinctions depend.

SECT.2　Of Greatness of Mind

If we pass from common life and conversation to history,we observe,that all those great actions and sentiments,which have become the admiration of mankind,are foun-ded on nothing but pride and self-esteem.

In general we may observe,that whatever we call heroic virtue,and admire under the character of greatness and elevation of mind,is either nothing but a steady and well-established pride and self-esteem,or partakes largely of that passion.Courage,intrep-idity,ambition,love of glory,magnanimity,and all the other shining virtues of that kind,have plainly a strong mixture of self-esteem in them,and derive a great part of their merit from that origin.I am content with the concession,that the world naturally esteems a well-regulated pride,which secretly animates our conduct,without breakingout into such indecent expressions of vanity,as many offend the vanity of others.

The merit of pride or self-esteem is derived from two circumstances,viz.its utility and its agreeableness to ourselves；by which it capacitates us for business,and,at the same time,gives us an immediate satisfaction.When it goes beyond its just bounds,it loses the first advantage,and even becomes prejudicial；which is the reason why we condemn an extravagant pride and ambition,however regulated by the decorums of good-breeding and politeness.But as such a passion is still agreeable,and conveys an elevated and sublime sensation to the person,who is actuated by it,the sympathy with that satisfaction diminishes considerably the blame,which naturally attends its danger-ous influence on his conduct and behaviour.Accordingly we may observe,that an ex-cessive courage and magnanimity,especially when it displays itself under the frowns of fortune,contributes in a great measure,to the character of a hero,and will render a person the admiration of posterity；at the same time,that it ruins his affairs,and leads him into dangers and difficulties,with which otherwise he would never have been ac-quainted.

Heroism,or military glory,is much admired by the generality of mankind.They consider it as the most sublime kind of merit.Men of cool reflection are not so sanguine in their praises of it.The infinite confusions and disorder,which it has caused in the world,diminish much of its merit in their eyes.When they would oppose the popular notions on this head,they always paint out the evils,which this supposed virtue has produced in human society；the subversion of empires,the devastation of provinces,the sack of cities.As long as these are present to us,we are more inclined to hate than ad-mire the ambition of heroes.But when we fix our view on the person himself,who is the author of all this mischief,there is something so dazzling in his character,the mere con-templation of it so elevates the mind,that we cannot refuse it our admiration.The pain,which we receive from its tendency to the prejudice of society,is over-powered by a stronger and more immediate sympathy.

SECT.3　Of Goodness and Benevolence

Having thus explained the origin of that praise and approbation,which attends ev-ery thing we call great in human affections；we now proceed to give an account of their goodness,and shew whence its merit is derived.

When experience has once given us a competent know ledge of human affairs,andhas taught us the proportion they bear to human passion,we perceive,that the gener-os-ity of men is very limited,and that it seldom extends beyond their friends and family,or,at most,beyond their native country.Being thus acquainted with the nature of man,we expect not any impossibilities from him；but confine our view to that narrow circle,in which any person moves,in order to form a judgment of his moral character.When the natural tendency of his passions leads him to be serviceable and useful within his sphere,we approve of his character,and love his person,by a sympathy with the senti-ments of those,who have a more particular connexion with him.We are quickly obliged to forget our own interest in our judgments of this kind,by reason of the perpetual con-tradictions,we meet with in society and conversation,from persons that are not placed in the same situation,and have not the same interest with ourselves.The only point of view,in which our sentiments concur with those of others,is,when we consider the tendency of any passion to the advantage or harm of those,who have any immediate con-nexion or intercourse with the person possessed of it.And though this advantage or harm be often very remote from ourselves,yet sometimes it is very near us,and interests us strongly by sympathy.This concern we readily extend to other cases,that are resemb-ling；and when these are very remote,our sympathy is proportionably weaker,and our praise or blame fainter and more doubtful.The case is here the same as in our judg-ments concerning external bodies.All objects seem to diminish by their distance：But though the appearance of objects to our senses be the original standard,by which we judge of them,yet we do not say,that they actually diminish by the distance；but cor-recting the appearance by reflection,arrive at a more constant and established judgment concerning them.In like manner,though sympathy be much fainter than our concern for ourselves,and a sympathy with persons remote from us much fainter than that with per-sons near and contiguous；yet we neglect all these differences in our calm judgments concerning the characters of men.Besides,that we ourselves often change our situation in this particular,we every day meet with persons,who are in a different situation from ourselves,and who could never converse with us on any reasonable terms,were we to remain constantly in that situation and point of view,which is peculiar to us.The inter-course of sentiments,therefore,in society and conversation,makes us form some gener-al inalterable standard,by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and man-ners.And though the heart does not always take part with those general notions,or reg-ulate its love and hatred by them,yet are they sufficient for discourse,and serve all ourpurposes in company,in the pulpit,on the theatre,and in the schools.

From these principles we may easily account for that merit,which is commonly as-cribed to generosity,humanity,compassion,gratitude,friendship,fidelity,zeal,disin-terestedness,liberality,and all those other qualities,which form the character of good and benevolent.A propensity to the tender passions makes a man agreeable and useful in all the parts of life；and gives a just direction to all his other qualities,which other-wise may become prejudicial to society.

As Love is immediately agreeable to the person,who is actuated by it,and hatred immediately disagreeable；this may also be a considerable reason,why we praise all the passions that partake of the former,and blame all those that have any considerable share of the latter.

SECT.4　Of Natural Abilities

The principal reason why natural abilities are esteemed,is because of their tenden-cy to be useful to the person,who is possessed of them.It is impossible to execute any design with success,where it is not conducted with prudence and discretion；nor will the goodness of our intentions alone suffice to procure us a happy issue to our enterpri-zes.Men are superior to beasts principally by the superiority of their reason；and they are the degrees of the same faculty,which set such an infinite difference betwixt one man and another.All the advantages of art are owing to human reason；and where for-tune is not very capricious,the most considerable part of these advantages must fall to the share of the prudent and sagacious.

There are many other qualities of the mind,whose merit is derived from the same origin,industry,perseverance,patience,activity,vigilance,application,constancy,with other virtues of that kind,which it will be easy to recollect,are esteemed valuable upon no other account,than their advantage in the conduct of life.It is the same case with temperance,frugality,economy,resolution：As on the other hand,prodigality,luxury,irresolution,uncertainty,are vicious,merely because they draw ruin upon us,and incapacitate us for business and action.

As wisdom and goodvsense are valued,because they are useful to the person pos-sessed of them；so wit and eloquence are valued,because they are immediately agreea-ble to others.

In this view,cleanliness is also to be regarded as a virtue；since it naturally ren-ders us agreeable to others,and is a very considerable source of love and affection.

The decorum or indecorum of a quality,with regard to the age,or character,or station,contributes also to its praise or blame.This decorum depends,in a great meas-ure,upon experience.

That faculty of the soul,which,of all others,is of the least consequence to the character,and has the least virtue or vice in its several degrees,at the same time,that it admits of a great variety of degrees,is the memory.

Before I leave this subject of natural abilities,I must observe,that,perhaps,one source of the esteem and affection,which attends them,is derived from the importance and weight,which they bestow on the person possessed of them.He becomes of greater consequence in life.His resolutions and actions affect a greater number of his fellow-creatures.Both his friendship and enmity are of moment.And it is easy to observe,that whoever is elevated,after this manner,above the rest of mankind,must excite in us the sentiments of esteem and approbation.Whatever is important engages our attention,fi-xes our thought,and is contemplated with satisfaction.The same theory accounts for the esteem and regard we pay to men of extraordinary parts and abilities.

SECT.5　Some Farther Reflections Concerning the Natural Virtues

It has been observed,in treating of the passions,that pride and humility,love and hatred,are excited by any advantages or disadvantages of the mind,body,or fortune；and that these advantages or disadvantages have that effect by producing a separate im-pression of pain or pleasure.The pain or pleasure,which arises from the general survey or view of any action or quality of the mind,constitutes its vice or virtue,and gives rise to our approbation or blame,which is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred.We have assigned four different sources of this pain and pleasure；and in or-der to justify more fully that hypothesis,it may here be proper to observe,that the ad-vantages or disadvantages of the body and of fortune,produce a pain or pleasure from the very same principles.The tendency of any object to be useful to the person posse ssed of it,or to others；to convey pleasure to him or to others；all these circumstances convey an immediate pleasure to the person,who considers the object,and command his love and approbation.

To begin with the advantages of the body；It is a general remark,that those we call good women's men,who have either signalized themselves by their amorous exploits,or whose make of body promises any extraordinary vigour of that kind,are well received by the fair sex,and naturally engage the affections even of those,whose virtue prevents any design of ever giving employment to those talents.Here it is evident,that the ability of such a person to give enjoyment,is the real source of that love and esteem he meets with among the females.

Another source of the pleasure we receive from considering bodily advantages,is their utility to the person himself,who is possessed of them.It is certain,that a consid-erable part of the beauty of men,as well as of other animals,consists in such a confor-mation of members,as we find by experience to be attended with strength and agility,and to capacitate the creature for any action or exercise.Broad shoulders,a lank belly,firm joints,taper legs；all these are beautiful in our species.because they are signs of force and vigour,which being advantages we naturally sympathize with,they convey to the beholder a share of that satisfaction they produce in the possessor.

So far as to the utility,which may attend any quality of the body.As to the imme-diate pleasure,it is certain,that an air of health,as well as of strength and agility,makes a considerable part of beauty；and that a sickly air in another is always disagreea-ble,upon account of that idea of pain and uneasiness,which it conveys to us.

How far the advantages of fortune produce esteem and approbation from the same principles,we may satisfy ourselves by reflecting on our precedent reasoning on that subject.We have observed,that our approbation of those,who are possess d of the ad-vantages of fortune,may be ascribed to three different causes.First,To that immediate pleasure,which a rich man gives us,by the view of the beautiful cloaths,equipage,gardens,or houses,which he possesses.Secondly,To the advantage,which we hope to reap from him by his generosity and liberality.Thirdly,To the pleasure and advantage,which he himself reaps from his possessions,and which produce an agreeable sympathy in us.my hypothesis prefers the third principle to the other two,and ascribing our es-teem of the rich to a sympathy with the pleasure and advantage,which they themselves receive from their possessions.For as even the other two principles cannot operate to a due extent,or account for all the phenomena,without having recourse to a sympathy of one kind or other；it is much more natural to chuse that sympathy,which is immediate and direct,than that which is remote and indirect.To which we may add,that where the riches or power are very great,and render the person considerable and important in the world,the esteem attending them,may,in part,be ascribed to another source,dis-tinct from these three,viz.their interesting the mind by a prospect of the multitude,and importance of their consequences：Though,in order to account for the operation of this principle,we must also have recourse to sympathy；as we have observed in the pre-ceding section.

SECT.6　Conclusion of this Book

Thus upon the whole I am hopeful,that nothing is wanting to an accurate proof of this system of ethics.We are certain,that sympathy is a very powerful principle in hu-man nature.We are also certain,that it has a great influence on our sense of beauty,when we regard external objects,as well as when we judge of morals.We find,that it has force sufficient to give us the strongest sentiments of approbation,when it operates alone,without the concurrence of any other principle；as in the cases of justice,alle-giance,chastity,and good-manners.We may observe,that all the circumstances requi-site for its operation are found in most of the virtues；which have,for the most part,a tendency to the good of society,or to that of the person possessed of them.If we com-pare all these circumstances,we shall not doubt,that sympathy is the chief source of moral distinctions；especially when we reflect,that no objection can be raised against this hypothesis in one case,which will not extend to all cases.Justice is certainly ap-proved of for no other reason,than because it has a tendency to the public good：And the public good is indifferent to us,except so far as sympathy interests us in it.We may presume the like with regard to all the other virtues,which have a like tendency to the public good.They must derive all their merit from our sympathy with those,who reap any advantage from them：As the virtues,which have a tendency to the good of the per-son possessed of them,derive their merit from our sympathy with him.

All lovers of virtue（and such we all are in speculation,however we may degener-ate in practice）must certainly be pleased to see moral distinctions derived from so noble a source,which gives us a just notion both of the generosity and capacity of human na-ture.It requires but very little knowledge of human affairs to perceive,that a sense of morals is a principle inherent in the soul,and one of the most powerful that enters into the composition.

第三卷　论道德

第一章　善与恶总论

第一节　道德的区别不是从理性得来的

一切深奥的推理都有困境，那就是：可以让论敌无法辩驳，却不能让论敌信服，而且它需要我们像最初发明它时那样再钻研一遍，才能让我们感到它的用处。当我们离开小房间，投入到日常生活中的时候，我们推理的结论就会消失，就像黑夜幽灵在黎明中散去一样；并且我们甚至很难留住我们费了很大的辛苦才获得的那种信念。在我们的一长串推理中这点很重要，因为，我们必须把最初的生命体验的证据保持到最后，可是我们却往往就此忘却哲学或日常生活的公理。但是我们仍然保持着这样的希望：现在这个哲学体系在向前的过程中，会获得新发展，而关于道德的推理也会证实我们之前关于知性和情感的论述。道德较其他一切论题更让我们关心：我们认为，关于道德的每一个判断都和社会的安定息息相关；并且显而易见的是，这种关联和其他与我们完全不相关的问题相比起来会让我们的思辨更加切合实际。我们断言，一切影响我们的事情都不是一个幻象；我们的情感既然总要诉诸这里或那里，我们就会自然而然地认为，这个问题是人类都能理解的；而在其他同质情形下，我们对同样的问题就容易产生怀疑。如果没有这个有利条件，我们在这个时代就绝不敢给那些深奥的哲学写第三卷，因为在这个时代里，大多数人把阅读当消遣，而摒弃一切需要很大注意力才能做到的事情。

前面已经说到，心灵除了它的知觉之外，永远不存在任何东西；看、听、判断、爱、恨、思想等所有活动都归结于知觉。心灵的所有活动没有不能归结于知觉的；因此，知觉这个词就可以同样运用到我们对善恶的区别上，就像它能运用到心灵其他的活动一样。赞美某人，批评某人，都只是不同的知觉而已。

但是知觉既然分为两类，印象和观念，就又产生了一个问题，即：我们是借我们的观念还是我们的印象来区别善恶，并断言某种行为可供赞美还是应当批判的呢？我们从这个问题开始我们的道德学研究。这个问题将立刻除掉所有不着边际的议论或辩论，使我们把现在这个题目归结到准确切实的论点上。

有人认为，善就是符合理性；事物有永久的合适和不合适之分，这对思考它们的每个理性存在者都是一样的；永恒不变的标准不但针对人类，也是“神”的义务：所有体系都有共同的意见，就像道德和真理一样，只是借助一些观念和一些观念的并列和比较被认识。所以，要评价这些体系，就只需考查我们是不是能够单纯地根据理性来区分善恶，还是必须有其他原则的协助，才能做出区别。

如果道德对于人类的情感和行为没有一种纯自然的影响，那么我们耗费辛苦所进行的引导只是枉然，也没有什么比道德家的大量规定和教条更没有意义了。哲学通常分为思辨和实践，道德既然归属于实践，那么就被假设为影响我们情感和行为、超出知性和平静懒散的判断之外的东西。这一点已经为经验所证实，日常经验告诉我们，人们受到责任的支配，认识到不公正的观点时会避免一些行为，认识到义务的观点时，又推动他去做另一些事情。

道德准则既然对行为和感情有影响，那么理所当然的结果是这些准则不可能由理性得来，因为，仅有理性是不能承担这种影响的，这一点我们已经证明过了。道德准则刺激情感，由此而刺激行为或阻止行为。理性本身在这里是苍白无力的，所以道德并不是理性的结论。

我相信，没有人会否定这个推论的正确性，除非首先否定推论的基础原则，不然就没有办法不承认这个推论。我们只要承认理性对我们的情感和行为没有任何影响，那么我们如果假定道德被理性推论所发现就是徒劳的。一个主动性原则永远不能建立在非主动性原则上，如果理性本身不是主动的，那么它在它的一切形象和想象中就必然一直如此，不论它是从事自然研究还是道德研究，也不论它是考察外界事物的能力还是理性存在者的行为。

前面我们已经论证了，理性是完全没有主动性的，不能产生任何情感和行为，也不能阻止任何情感和行为的产生；我在证明这点时所用的种种论证，如果在这里一一重复，就未免繁琐了。我们很容易回忆起我们论题中的话。我在这里仅仅回忆一下这些论证，力求让它更具确定性，并更适用于应用在论题中。

理性的作用是发现真伪。真伪是存在于观念的实在联系或实际存在和事实是否符合之中。所以，凡是没有这种关联的东西就不能成为真的或假的，也不能成为我们理智存在的对象。但是，显然我们的情感、意志和行为是不可能存在这种符合不符合的。它们是原始事实或存在，本身自存，不用参照其他的感情、意志和行为。因此，就不可能被认定真伪、符合理性还是不符合。

这个论证对我们的目的具有双重优越性。因为这个论证直接证明了行为正确不在于它符合理性，行为错误也不在于其违反了理性，同时，它还间接证明了同一个真理，那就是向我们指出了理性不可能永远赞成或反对任何行为，直接激发或阻止行为，所以它不是道德善恶的原因，因为道德善恶是具有这样的影响力的。行为可以褒奖或谴责，但是不存在合理或不合理。因此，值得褒奖或应当责备与合不合理没有关系。行为的对错往往和我们的自然倾向矛盾，甚至有时还可以操纵自然倾向。但是理性并没有这种影响。因此道德上的善恶之别并非理性的产物。理性完全不活动，也永远不能成为和道德良心一样的活动规则的来源。

但是也许有人会说，虽然任何意志行为都不能和理性直接矛盾，但是却可以在伴随行为而来的一些条件上，也就是在行动的原因和结果方面，发现矛盾。行为可以引出判断，而且当这种判断和情感结合的时候，也可以间接由判断引起，所以可以滥用一种说法（哲学是不允许这样的滥用的），也可以把矛盾归结于那种行为。我们现在应该考察这种真伪在多大程度上能成为道德判断的源泉。

我们已经说过，在严格的哲学意义上，理性只有两种方式能影响我们的行为。一种方式是它把某种感情的确定对象告诉我们，从而刺激出这种情感。另一种方式是：它发现因果关系，从而给我们发挥情感的手段。只有这两种判断伴随我们的行为并能在某种情况下产生行为；同时，我们要承认，这些判断通常是虚伪错误的。一个人可以因为误会一个对象存在痛苦或者快乐而产生感情，而事实上那个对象并不痛苦或快乐，或者其实产生的结果恰好和误会的情况正相反。一个人也会为了达到目的采取错误的方式，而因为他的愚蠢行为没有促进计划反而阻碍了行为。我们可以用一种不适当的比喻说它们让行为变得不合理。不过虽然可以承认这一点，我们依然容易看到，这些错误远不是不道德的源泉，它们是清白的，这些受到错误困扰的人们没有任何罪过。这些错误只是事实错误，道德学者一般都不认为这种错误是罪过，因为它完全是无意的。这样错误认识了对象产生痛苦快乐的影响，或者不知道怎样恰当满足欲望，那么人们应该怜惜我，而不是指责我。任何人都不会认为那些错误是我道德品质的缺陷。例如一个其实不好吃的果子放在我面前，而我误以为是好吃的果子。这是个错误。我又选择了不能拿到果子的手段。这是第二个错误。除此之外，我们关于行为的推理再也没有第三种错误的可能性。因此，我就问，一个人如果在这种情况下，犯了这两种错误，那么是不是无论这些错误多糟糕，我们都应该认为它是恶的罪行呢？我们就不能想到，这些错误本身才是一切不道德行为的

这里我们应该指出，如果道德上的善恶之别来自于真伪的判断，那么不论在什么地方，我们只要形成了那些判断就必然有善恶的区别发生；而且不论问题是关于苹果还是一个王国，也不论错误可以避免还是在所难免，都不再有任何差异了。因为道德的本质既然已经被假设为对理性的符合或者不符合上，那么其他的条件就无足轻重，不能给行为的善恶定性也不能剥夺它自身的性质了。另外，符合或者不符合既然不能有程度上的区别，自然就是说善和恶是相等的了。

有人或者会这么说：事实错误虽然不是种罪恶，但是在是非问题上犯错就往往是错误的，而这就是不道德的根源。我的回答是：这种错误不可能是不道德的根源，因为这种错误是以实在的是非为前提的。因此，是非错误可以成为不道德的一种，但是它是源于它以前就存在的另一种不道德上的。

至于说有些判断是我们行为的结果，而这些判断如果是错的，那么我们就断言那些行为反真理、反理性：关于这一点，我们说，我们的行为永远不能引起我们自己的任何真伪判断，而只有在他人身上才可以。的确，一种行为在许多场合下可以使他人发生错误的结论；一个人如果从窗口看到我和邻居的妻子偷情，他也许会天真地以为这是我的妻子。在这点上我的行为类似谎言；唯一的不同（这很重要）在于，我的偷情行为并不是要让别人产生错误判断，而只是为了满足我自己的性欲。不过我的行为却由于偶然而引起错误的虚妄的判断；行为结果（即他人的判断）的虚妄可以用奇特比喻最后归结到行为本身。但是我仍然看不到任何理性的借口并可以据此认为，引起那样一个错误的倾向就是一切不道德的本源和最初的源泉。

因此，总体来说，道德上的善恶之分不会由理性造成，因为那种区分对我们的行为有一种影响，而单独的理性不能产生这种影响。理性和判断推动、知道一种情感，的确会成为行为的间接原因；不过我们不能断言这类判断的真伪会有善恶相伴。至于由我们的行为引起他认定评判，就更不能对构成那些行为的原因给予道德性质。

如果思想和知性单独就能分清是非，那么善恶这两种性质必然在对象的关系上，或者在可以由我们推理发现的事实上。这个结论是显然的。人类知性的作用有两类，即观念的比较和事实的判断，所以如果善是由知性发现，那么善一定是这些作用的对象，除此之外，知性再也没有第三种作用可以发现它们了。某些哲学家勤勤恳恳地传播说，道德是可以论证的；虽然不曾有人在这论证上有进一步发展，但是他们假设这门学科和几何学代数学一样有确定性。根据这个假设，善恶必然成立在某些关系上，因为大家都承认，事实是不能论证的。因此，我们从考察这个假设开始，并且如果有可能，我们也力求确定长期以来成为没有结果的研究对象的道德。请明确指出构成道德、义务的关系，以便让我们知道关系如何建立，以及我们必须用什么方式判断。

如果你主张，善恶的成立有确定性而可以论证的话，那么你必然只限于四种关系，只承认证据的程度，在那种情况下，你就陷入重重矛盾中，永远无法脱出。因为你既然认为道德的本质就体现在这些关系中，而这些关系又没有哪种不可以应用在无理性的对象上，而且也可以用于没有生命的对象上，所以当然的结果是，甚至这些对象也必然能有功有过了。类似关系、相反关系、性质程度和数量数目的比例，这些关系不但属于我们的道德、情感、意志，也属于物质。因此，毫无疑问，道德并不存在于任何这些关系中，道德感也不是由这些关系发现的。

如果有人说，道德感在于发现和这些关系不同的关系，而当我们把一切能论证的关系归结在四个框架之下，我们所列举的关系是不完全的：对于这个说法，我不知道如何回答才好，除非有人肯指出这种新关系来。对于一个从来没有说明过的体系，我们无法驳斥。这样就在黑暗中混战，人会打空，打到敌人并不在的地方。

所以在这种情形下，我只好满足于向愿意澄清这个体系的人提下面两个条件。第一，道德的善恶既然只存于心中，从我们对待外界的立场来看，这些道德区别引发的关系，就必然只能存在于内心的活动和外在的对象之间，而必然不会存在于自相比较的内心活动之间，也不存在于外界事物的互相比较之中。因为道德既然假设是伴随某种关系的，那么这些关系如果仅仅是内心的活动，结论就是我们自己会犯罪，不管我们对外部世界的立场如何。同样，这些道德关系若能运用于外界事物间，那么结果就是，没有生命的物体也有道德上的善恶之分了。

但是证明这个体系所需要的第二个条件更难满足。因此，为了证明是非标准是约束每个有理性的心的永久法则，单单指出善恶还不够，还要指出这种关系和意志的联系，并且证明这种联系的必然性在每个有良知的心灵必然存在，必有影响，虽然这些心灵在其他方面有巨大的甚至是无限大的差异。但是我已经证明在人性中，任何一个关系绝不能单独产生行为；除此之外，在研究知性时我也曾提出，任何因果关系（道德关系也算因果关系）都只能通过经验来发现，而且我们也不能认为，仅考虑对象就能对这种因果关系有什么切实把握。宇宙间的一切，就其本身而言显得散漫而相互独立。我们只是借助经验才知道它们的影响和相互之间的联系，而这种影响，我们永远不可能推到经验以外去。

由此可见，永恒的是非标准的体系所需要的第一个条件就不能满足，因为我们不能指出那种是非区别的依据关系，第二个条件也不能满足，因为我们不能先验地去论证这些关系若存在并被感知，那么它们就会产生普遍的强制和约束力来。

根源吗？

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第二章　论正义与非正义

第一节　正义是自然之德还是人为之德

我已经提及，我们对于任何一种美德的感觉都是非自然的，但是有些德行能够产生愉悦和称赞，是通过一种产生于人类的环境和需求之中的人为的措施或者设计。我确定正义就属于这一种；并且我将努力用一种简短但是令人信服的论证来捍卫这一观点，接着再考察这种人为举动，也就是美德感所起源处的本质。

很明显，当我们表扬任何行为时，我们考虑的只是产生这些行为的动机，并且将那些行为视为心灵和性情中某些原则的标记或者迹象。外在的行为没有任何价值。我们必须在内心中去寻找这种道德品质。我们并不能直接这么做，所以我们要把注意力集中在那些作为外在信号的行为上。但是，这些行为仍然仅被视作一些标记，而我们要赞美和称赞的最终目标是产生那些行为的动机。

同样，当我们要求任何行为，或者为一个人没有这么做而责备他时，我们总是在设想，一个人处于那种情况之下应该被一种恰当的行为动机所影响，他没有顾及到这点，我们认为这是恶劣的。如果经过质询后我们发现，尽管某些我们所不知的情况阻碍了它的执行，善良的动机在他内心中却仍然很强烈，我们便收回我们的责备，并且给予同样的尊重，就好像他事实上已经照我们要求他所作的那样做了一样。

因此，一切德行看来都只能从高尚的动机中追溯它们的价值，并且它们也仅仅被当作那些动机的标记而已。根据这一条原则我判断，那种赋予任何行为以价值的最初的高尚动机绝不可能是出于对那种德行的尊重，而肯定是出于其他的自然动机或者原则。如果对德行的尊重可能是第一动机的话，那么它引起了行为，并且又使其高尚，这样的假设是一种循环推理。在我们存有这般敬意之前，行为必须真的是德行，而这一德行必须源自于某些高尚的动机：因此，高尚的动机必然要不同于那种对于德行的尊重。一种高尚的动机是产生一种高尚行为所必需的。一种行为则必须是高尚的，然后我们才会对它的品德怀有敬意。所以，高尚的动机必然先于那种对德行的尊重而存在。

这种说法并不只是一种哲学上的故弄玄虚，我们所有的推理都是在日常生活中着手进行的，尽管我们可能无法用清晰的哲学术语将其表达。我们因为一位父亲忽略了他的孩子而责怪他，为什么？因为这显示出他缺乏一种自然的爱，而这是每一个父亲的义务。假如自然的爱不是义务的话，对孩子的照顾也就不能成为一种义务，而且我们给予后代的关爱也不可能被视作是一种义务了。因此，在这种情况下，所有人都假设行为动机是有别于责任感的。

此处有一个人，他有诸多慈善之举：救济贫困之人，安慰痛苦之人，甚至慷慨援助那些素不相识之人。没有人能比他更和善和高尚了。我们将这些举动视作是最伟大的人性的证明。这一人性赋予这些行为以价值。因此，我们对这一价值的尊重是第二位的，而且是来自于先在的、值得称赞的人性原则。

简而言之，这可以作为一条无疑的定理被确立下来，即没有行为是高尚的或者道德良好的，除非在人性中有某些有别于自身道德感的能引起善行的动机存在。

如果说高尚的动机产生了诚实行为，而同时这种动机又是出于对诚实的尊重，这显然是一种谬论。倘若行为并非首先是德行，我们是不会对行为的品质存有敬意的。倘若不是出自于一个高尚的动机，是不会产生高尚的行为的。因此，一个高尚的动机必然先于对德行的尊重而存在，而且高尚的动机和对德行的尊重不可能是同一回事。

因此，必须找到引起正义与诚实行为，却又不同于我们对诚实本身的敬意的那些动机。在此过程中存在着巨大的困难。因为按理说我们对于个人私利或者名誉的关心应当是所有诚实行为的合理动机，而任何时候一旦这种关心停止，诚实之举也就不再发生。但是可以肯定的是，倘若让利己之心自由发挥作用的话，它定是所有非正义和暴力行为的源泉，而不会促使我们作出诚实之举。同样，一个人如果不限制和纠正那种欲望的自然作用，也就不会改正那些邪恶的行为。

基本上可以断言，撇开个人品质、服务性的关系以及与自身的关联，人类的头脑中并不存在比如像对人类的爱那样单纯的情感。确实，当任何一个人或者哪怕是动物与我们靠近并呈现出活生生的色彩时，他们的幸福或者苦难无不在一定程度上影响着我们。但是，这仅仅是出于同情，而且并没有证据证明存在一种对人类的博爱，因为这种关心甚至蔓延到了我们人类这一物种以外。两性间的爱很明显是根植于人类本性中的一种情感，这一情感不只体现在一些特别的迹象上，还体现在它所激起的其他各种爱的原则上，以及引发一种从美丽、智慧、仁慈而来的更为强烈的爱。假如整个人类之间存在一种普遍的爱，它便应该以同一种方式表现出来。任何程度的好的品质所能引起的爱本应该比同等程度所能引起的恨更强烈些，而我们的经验告诉我们的情形却恰恰相反。人的性情各不相同，有人倾向于比较温柔，而有人倾向于比较暴躁，但是基本上我们可以断言，一般人或者说人类本质上就是既爱又恨的对象，除此之外，还需要一些其他的诱因，通过印象和观点的双重关系就能够激发这些情感。试图逃避这一假设的努力是徒劳的，没有任何迹象能显示出存在于任何情况下，并且与人们自身利益无关的对人类的爱。我们一般都热爱同伴，但这与我们热爱其他各种娱乐消遣并无二致。

一个富人在道义上有责任与那些有需要的人分享他过剩的财富。如果个人的仁慈是正义的原始动机的话，那么一个人就没有义务要给其他人超过他责任上所应给的更多的财物。至少财产的差异微不足道。一般而言，人们在他们拥有的东西上投入的爱超过那些他们不曾享用过的东西。因为这个原因，夺走一个人所拥有的比从来没有给予他这些要更残忍。但是谁会宣称，这就是正义的唯一基础呢？

由这一切可得出，除了遵守之举本身的公正和价值之外，一种行为如果无法源自于某些个别的动机，就不可能是公正的或者值得称赞的，此处便显然存在着一种诡辩和循环推理。因此，除非我们认同，自然建立了一种诡辩，并使其成为必然的和不可避免的。我们必须承认，正义感与非正义感并非来于自然，而是人为地（尽管是必然地）产生于教育以及人类契约之中。

为了避免冒犯，我在此必须注明，当我否定正义是一种自然的品德的时候，我所用的词，“自然的”只是相对于“人为的”而言。从该词的另一种意思来看，既然在人类内心中没有哪种原则比道德感更自然，那么也没有哪种品德比正义更为自然的了。人类是有创造力的物种，当一项发明很显著而且绝对是必要时，就可以被恰当地说成是自然的，就像从最初的原则而来，未经反省和未受思想干扰的任何事情一样。尽管正义的规则是人为的，但却不是随意的。称这些词为自然法则也并无不当，也许我们所理解的“自然”是指任何物种的相同之处，甚至我们将其意思局限于那些无法从物种中区别开来的东西。

第二节　论正义与财产的起源

我们现在要考察两个问题：一、正义的原则是以什么方式被人为措施确立下来的；二、是什么因素决定了我们将遵守和忽视这些规则将它们分别看作是美德和道德缺陷。这些问题接下来将会明晰。我们首先从前一个问题入手。

一个人只有依靠社会才能弥补他的不足之处，才能把自己提升到与其他人势均力敌的位置，甚至于获得优势。依靠社会，他所有的弱点都得到了弥补，尽管在这种情况下他的欲望无时无刻不在增加，但是他的能力在提高，从各方面来讲都比他在野蛮和孤独条件中过得更舒适和幸福。

但是要形成社会，不仅社会对人必须是有利的，而且人也必须意识到这些利益。人类不可能在野蛮和不文明的状态下，仅仅通过学习和反思而获得这一认识。因此，最幸运的事莫过于那些补救措施显得遥远和模糊的需要，与补救措施就在眼前而且比较清晰的需要恰好能够结合在一起，这或许可以被合理地认为是人类社会的首要原则或者说是原始原则。

我们所拥有的财富有不同的几种：我们内心的满足，我们外部身体的优势，以及对我们拥有的通过勤劳和好运所得的财富的享用。我们可以绝对安全地享用第一类财富。我们有可能无法享受第二类财富，但将它从我们身上夺走的人也得不到丝毫好处。只有最后一类，既可能引起他人的暴行，也有可能不会有任何损失或者改变。然而，同时，这一财富没有足够的数量去满足每个人的欲望和需要。因此，财富的增加是社会的主要优势，而财富的不稳定性以及短缺则是主要障碍。

试图从未开化的自然状态中去寻找对这种不便的补救是徒劳的，而想要能控制那些褊狭的情感并且能使我们克服来自外界环境的诱惑的非人为的原则也是徒劳的。正义的观念从来不能为这一目的效力，也不能作为一种自然的原则激励人们以一种公正的行为彼此对待。在我们对行为的通常判断中可以看到这样的情形，假如一个人要么把全部的爱集中在他的家庭上，要么不管家人，在有任何利益冲突时，都偏向于陌生人或者偶然相褒的人，我们便要责备他。由此可得，我们自然的未开化的道德观念并不能补救我们感情中的偏私之处，反而是迎合它，并且增添它的力量和影响。

所以，补救的办法不是从自然而来，而是人为的，或者更恰当地说，自然为不合常规的和令人不适的情感在判断和理解上提供了一种纠正。人类从他们早期的社会教育中感受到社会带给他们的无穷好处，除此之外还获得了一种新的对结伴和交流的爱好。当他们观察到，社会的主要动乱来自我们称之为身外之物的财物，来自它们的不稳定和从一个人手中转移到另一个人手中的自由性；他们就必然要寻找一种补救的办法，尽可能使得这些财物处在和我们身心所固有的稳定的优势同等重要的位置上。没有其他方式能够做到这点，只有全体社会成员参与协定让那些财物的占有具有稳定性，让每个人都能太太平平地享受他们凭勤劳和运气所得来的东西。通过这一方式，每个人都明白什么是他们能安全拥有的，而情感的偏私和矛盾变动之处也能被约束。这一约束与那些情感并不矛盾，如果矛盾的话，协定就不会缔结，也无法维持。约束只是与轻率和鲁莽之举相冲突。禁止占有他人财物既不违背自己的利益也不违背最亲近的朋友的利益，没有比这样的协定更能顾及到这些利益了。因为只有这样才能维持社会，社会对于他们的幸福和生存是必需的，对我们来说也一样。

在关于禁止夺取他人财物的协定缔结之后，每个人的财产拥有权便获得了稳定性，因此很快就引发了正义与非正义的观念，还有所有权、权利和义务等观念。不理解前一个观念就无法理解后面所有的观念。我们的所有权就是指那些财物，对它们的固定拥有是被社会法律也就是正义法则所确定下来的。因此，那些人使用财产权、权利、义务等词语，却没有事先说明它们来源于正义，或者甚至在说明过程中使用，这就犯了巨大的错误，而且也无法使推理有坚实的基础。一个人的财产便是与之相关的某种物品。这种关联不是自然的，而是道德的，且建立在正义的基础上。因此，在事先没有对正义本质进行全面理解，也不曾指出正义起源于人为设计的情况下，就想象我们会有关于财产的观念，这是极其荒谬的。正义的起源解释了财产的起源。同一的人为之举产生这两者。因为我们最初和最自然的道德感立足于我们情感的本质上，并且相比于陌生人，我们更热爱自己和朋友们，所以类似于固定的权利和财产权这样的概念是不可能天然存在的，因为人类的各种对立情感会促使他们朝向相反方向，并且不为任何条约或协议所限制。

此处便存在一个我想可以被认为是正确的命题，即人类的自私和有限度的慷慨，以及自然给予人类的过少的供应，才是正义的起源。我们回顾一下便会发现，这个命题赋予其他有关这个话题以一种额外的力量。

第一，我们可以从中得出结论，对公共利益的尊重，或强烈而广泛的慈善并不是我们遵守正义原则的最初最原始的动机。因为我们必须得承认，如果我们天生具有这样的慈善心，那些原则反而是实现不了的。

第二，我们还可以由同一原则得出，正义感不是建立在理性，也不是建立在对那些外在的、永恒的和普遍强制性的一些确定的关系的发现上。因为既然已经承认，上面提到的人类性情和环境的改变，会完全改变我们的职责和义务，所以有必要在一种认为道德感来源于理性的常见的体系之上显示出在各种关系与观念中所产生的变化。但很显然，人类的慷慨大方以及每样东西的过量之所以会破坏正义的观念，是因为它们使正义的概念变得无用，而在另一方面，人的有限的慈善心以及贫困条件却能产生道德，只要使其成为公共利益和每个人的个体利益所必需的。因此，是对我们自己以及公共利益的关心促使我们制定了公正的法律，并且，非常确定的是，除了我们的印象和情感之外，没有其他任何观念间的联系能给我们这一关心，而且如果没有这两者，任何东西对我们来说在本质上都是完全冷漠的，丝毫不会影响我们。因此，这种正义感不是建立在我们的观念之上，而是建立在我们的直观印象之上。

第三，我们还能进一步证明上述命题，即那些导致正义感产生的印象，对人类心灵来说并不是天然的，而是从人为措施和人类协定中产生的。因为任何值得考虑的情绪以及环境的转变都能同等程度地破坏正义的和非正义的观点，而且这种转变只有通过改变我们自己以及公共利益时才具有效果。因此，正义规则的最初制定是依赖于这些不同的利益。但是如果人们是自然而然地追求公共利益，并且怀着热烈的感情的话，他们就无法利用这些规则来实现约束；如果他们不加任何防范地追求自己的利益的话，他们就会莽撞地陷入各种非正义和暴力之中。因此，这些规则是人为的，它们的终点只能通过曲折和间接的途径才能到达。而产生这些规则的利益并非是为人类的自然的和非人为的感情所追求的那

现在我们来考虑我们所提出的第二个问题，为什么我们将道德观念归于正义，而将恶的观念归于非正义。

人们根据经验已经发现，如果让他们的自私与有限度的慷慨自由起作用的话，他们完全无法适应社会。同时，他们也已观察发现，社会正是使那些情感得以满足所必需的条件，他们自然就被引诱将自身置于那些能使人们的交往更为安全和便利的那些规则的约束之下。所以，人们强行制订这些规则并加以遵守，无论在一般情况下还是以任何具体的例子来说，首先都是为利益所驱使，而且这一动机在社会最初形成期是十分强有力的。但是随着社会的日益庞大，并成长为一个部落或者国家时，这种利益就比较微弱了；在较狭小和矛盾的社会中，人们也不容易发现，每当这些规则遭到破坏时，就会导致无秩序和混乱。尽管我们在行动中经常看不到我们维持规则所获得的利益，并且还可能追逐微小的和眼前的利益，但是却永远不会忽视我们由于其他人的非正义所直接或间接受到的伤害。因为在那种情况下，我们既不会为感情所蒙蔽，也不会由于任何相对的诱惑而持有偏见。哪怕非正义远离我们，没有办法影响到我们的利益，它仍然使我们不悦。因为我们将其视作人类社会的危害，并且对任何靠近可能不正义者的人都是有害的。我们通过同情分担了他们的不安；以一般的观察来看，在人类的行为中任何带来不安的事情都被称之为恶，而同样，任何带来满足的事情被命名为德。这便是道德的善恶感随着正义与非正义发生的原因。尽管以现在的情形看，这种感觉是由注视并沉思他人的行为所得，但是我们也将其扩展到我们自身的行为上。一般原则源于实例却高于它们；同时我们也自然会同情他人而他们对我们也抱有同样的感情。因此，私利是正义确立的原始动机，但是对公共利益的同情是产生德行的道德赞誉的源泉。

一旦正义有功而非正义有过的观点在人类中被牢固地确立下来，对我们自身名誉的关注便进一步增强了它们的坚固性。没有比名誉更能切近地触及我们，也没有什么比名誉更取决于我们的所作所为与他人财产之间的关系了。由于这个原因，每个关注自己人格，或想与人们和睦相处的人都必须给自己制定一条不可违反的法则，即不能被任何诱惑所驱使而去违反那些原则，这些原则对一个正直和有名誉的人来说是最基本的。

种利益。

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第三节　论确定财产的规则

尽管关于财产拥有的稳定性原则的确立，对人类社会不仅有用，而且绝对是必要的，但是如果只停留在一般术语的层面上，就不能起到任何作用。必须要有某种方法，通过它，我们可以判断什么物品是归属于特定的某个人，而其他人则不具有拥有和享用它们的权利。我们接下来的任务是必须找到能调整这条一般原则以适合通用和实践的那些原因。

长时间摆在我们眼前的，对我们有利的东西是我们最不愿意失去的，而对我们从未享用过和不习惯使用的物品，离开了它们，我们还是生活得很方便。因此，显然，人们很容易达成共识，即让每个人继续享用他们目前所拥有的，这也是人们之所以如此自然地选择这么做的原因所在。

但是我们可能注意到，尽管把财产分配给现有者的原则是自然的并且是有效的，但是它的作用只能局限于社会形成的最初时期，而且倘若始终遵循这一原则，对社会是非常有害的。这一原则将财物的偿还排除在外，并且使得各种非正义获得了批准和激励。因此，我们必须要寻找其他一些条件，在社会建立之后还能够产生财产权。在这类条件中，我发现最主要的是四种，即占有、时效、附加和继承。我们将简要考察这些，首先由占有开始。

现在需要解决的是准确确定“占有”的含义，这并不如我们在乍看时所想象的那么容易。我们说拥有某物时，不仅是指直接接触它，还指这样一种关系，即我们有力量使用它，根据我们的眼前意愿和利益或移动，或改变，或破坏它。这是一种因果关系，既然财产权只是由正义的原则或者人类的约定而来的一种稳定的占有，那么这种关系也同样如此。但是此处我们可能会发现，我们对任何物品的使用能力的确定程度随着我们所遭遇的阻碍的可能性变化而或大或小。而这种可能性会在不知不觉中增加，所以在很多情况下就很难决定占有什么时候开始，什么时候终结，我们也没有任何确定的标准来决定这类争论。

但是这类争论可能不仅仅只和财产权和所有权的现实存在方面相关联，而且还与它们的范围相关。这些争论经常波动、无法决定，或者除了想象之外没法凭借其他官能加以决定。一个人登陆一个荒芜的无人耕种的小岛，从登陆的最初时刻就被认为是小岛的所有者，并且获得了整个岛的财产权。因为那些物品在设想中是有范围和界限的，且同时，对于新占有者来说，比例也是适合的。倘若一个人所登陆的荒岛，大小如大不列颠岛，对他财产权的划定就不会超出他所直接拥有的那些，尽管大批殖民者在他们登陆的刹那被认为是整个岛的所有者。

不过经常发生这样的事，经过一段时间之后最初的所有权变得含糊不清，而且无法解决关于所有权而产生的争端。在那种情况下，长期所有权或者时效就自然发生了，并赋予一个人对其享用的任何东西以充分的所有权。人类社会的本质既不承认任何伟大的精确性，也不能一直依靠从事物的起源来判断它们的当前情况。在相当长的时间里将一些对象置于一定距离之外，这样的距离使得它们在某种意义上失去了现实性，并且对我们的内心几乎毫无影响，就像它们从来没有存在过。一个人的所有权在目前是清晰和确定的，却会在五十年后显得模糊和令人质疑，哪怕所有权所赖以建立的事实能够被明显和确定地证明。在间隔很长一段时间之后，同样的事实会具有不同的影响。这可以作为我们前面所提到的关于财产权和正义的学说的一个具有说服力的论证。长时间的占有赋予人们一种对任何对象的所有权。但是可以肯定的是，尽管每样事物都是在时间中产生，但是并没有什么现实事物是由时间产生的。由此可得，既然财产权是由时间产生，它的对象中就不会有任何现实的东西，而是情感的产物，只在此时间内能够产生影响。

当一些物品与那些属于我们财产的物品有密切关联，并同时隶属于它们时，我们便通过附加关系获得了对这些物品的所有权。因此，我们果园里的苹果，我们的牛的后代，我们的奴隶的作品，所有这些都被认为是我们的财产，甚至在占有之前就是如此。当物品在想象中被联系在一起时，它们就很容易被放在同一地位，且通常被设想为具有同样的性质。我们很容易从一个转到另一个，关于它们的判断没有什么不同，尤其是当后者隶属于前者时。

继承权是一种十分自然的权利，从父母或近亲的假设认可中，或由人类的一般利益而来。为使人们能更勤勉和节俭，它要求把财产传给最亲近的人。这些根据得到附和或许是受到了亲属关系以及联合观念的影响，因为当父母去世之后，我们很自然会直接考虑到他的儿子，并将他父亲的财产权归于他。那些物品必然要成为某个人的财产，但是归属于谁却是个问题。很显然，那人的子女自然地袒露他们的心迹，并且已经通过已故的父母与那些财产联系起来，我们也就顺水推舟用财产权的形式进一步加强了这种联系。

第四节　论同意了的财产转移

财产的稳定尽管是有用的，甚至是必需的，但同时也有相当大的不便。在分配人类财产之时，适合性的关系不该被考虑在内，但我们必须依据那些应用得更为普遍，也更确定无疑的规则来管理自己。社会建立初期的现时占有便属于这类，之后又有占有、时效、附加和继承。由于这些规则在很大程度上取决于机遇，常常被证实与人类的需要和欲望都发生矛盾，而且人与财产往往协调不好。这是极大的不便，需要加以补救。倘若采用直接方法补救，让每个人用暴力去获得他们觉得适合的东西，就会毁灭这个社会。因此，正义的规则要在坚定的稳定性与可变的不确定的调节之间寻找某个中间媒介。但是没有一种媒介比那个显而易见的方法更好，即除了所有者同意将财产赠予他人之外，其他的财产权和所有权保持不变。这一规则没有不良后果，不会引起战争和分歧。因为这种转让是经过唯一有关的人即财产所有者的同意的。而且这一规则在协调人们之间的财产问题上能达到很多良好的目的。地球的各处生产不同的商品，不但如此，不同的人因为天性不同而适合不同的工作，并且当他们专门从事一项工作时会做得更加完美。所有这些都需要彼此间的交换和贸易，由于这个原因，获得同意的财产转移是依据自然法则的，而如果未经同意，财产就是稳定的。

到目前为止，一切都是由清楚的实用性和利益所决定的。或许是出于一些无足轻重的原因，财产的交付手续、可见的转移方式作为财产转移过程中一个必要环节，在民法、自然法中被普遍要求。一个物品的财产权如果被看作是一种实在的东西，与人和道德的或者心灵的情感无关的话，它就是一种完全无法察觉、甚至不可想象的性质。我们无论对财产的稳定性还是对财产的转移也就无法形成任何确定的观念。当财产权处于稳定时，我们在观念上的这种缺陷不易察觉到，因为不太引起我们的注意，并且很容易就被我们的心灵不经仔细检查就忽略过去了。但是财产从一个人到另一个人的转移就是比较明显的事，我们观念上的弱点在如此场合下就变得易察觉，并且责令我们在各处寻求补救的办法。没有比当前印象以及印象与观念之间模棱两可的关系更能使各种观念活跃起来了，所以对我们来说朝着这方向寻求虚假的光芒是很自然的事。为了帮助我们的想像力来设想财产的转移，我们把可见物品的所有权切实地转让给我们愿意赠予其财产的那个人。行为的假定相似性以及这种可见的转移的出现，欺骗了心灵，使它以为它设想了财产的神秘转移。对此事所作出的说明是合理的，从以下可以看出，当实物交换不可行时，人们已经发明了一种象征的交付方法用以满足这种幻想。因此，交出谷仓的钥匙就意味着交付了谷仓里存储着的谷子；交出沙土就代表把整座庄园交了出去，这在民法和自然法的规定中是一种迷信活动，类似于宗教中的罗马天主教的迷信。罗马天主教用一支细蜡烛、一件法衣以及一幅画像等被假设与神迹相类似的东西来表示基督教的不可察觉的神迹，使它们能更多地对心灵显现。法学家和道德家也是如此，他们由于同样的原因确立了这些发明，并尽力试图通过那些途径使他们自己对关于在协定情况下的财产转移之事感到满意。

第五节　论承诺的义务

命令人们履行承诺的道德原则是非自然的，这在我接下来要论证的命题中将会充分显现，即在人类的协定缔结之前，承诺是不可理解的；哪怕可以被理解，它也不具备任何道德约束力。

在我看来，承诺既不是自然清晰可见的，也不是先于人类的协定而存在的。一个不了解社会的人是不可能与他人缔结任何条约的，哪怕他们能凭直觉领会彼此的想法。如果承诺是自然的和可被了解的，那么例如我承诺之类的话肯定同时进行着某种心理活动，并且该心理活动必然是约束力所依赖的基础。因此，让我们逐一浏览心灵的所有官能，看看哪个被用于我们的承诺中。

表现在承诺上的那种心理活动并不是做任何事情的一个决心，因为单是决心是绝不会带有任何义务的。承诺也不是一种行为的欲望，因为我们遵守诺言时可以没有这种欲望，甚至还带有公开承认或宣称的一种厌恶感。承诺也不是我们乐于去做我们所承诺的事情的意愿。因为承诺经常与未来相联系，而这种意愿只对当下的行为产生影响。由此可得，参与承诺并产生义务的这种心理活动既不是决心、欲望，也不是意愿或者具体的行为，它必然表现为对一种从承诺中诞生的义务的意愿。这不只是一个哲学上的结论，是完全与我们日常的思维方式以及表达方式相符合的。当我们说我们为我们自己的承诺所束缚时，这种义务感纯粹出于意愿和愉悦感。唯一的问题便是，在对这一心理活动的假设中是不是并不存在显然的谬论，而且没有人会陷入如此的谬论之中，只要他的观念不是建立在偏见和对语言的错误应用上。

所有的道德都依赖于我们的情感，当任何行为或者心灵的品质以某个特定的方式使我们愉悦时，我们就说它是有德行的；而当我们忽视，或者没有去做这件事时，便会相应地感到不愉快，我们便认为我们本该有义务去完成它。假设义务的改变是由于情感的改变，而一个新的义务的创立是源于某个新的情感。不过可以肯定的是我们自身的情感再怎么自然地变化也不可能超过天体的运动。而且我们给出任何举动，不管是令人愉快的或令人不快的，道德的或不道德的，都不是单纯凭借我们的意愿，而是依靠承诺。如果没有承诺的作用，就不会产生相对的印象，也不会表现出不同的品质。因此，对任何新的义务也就是任何新的痛苦或愉悦的情感的希望便显得很荒谬，而且人们也不可能出自本性地陷入到一个如此巨大的荒谬之中。因此，一个承诺，必然是某种莫名其妙的东西，而且没有任何一种心理活动属于它。

但是，第二，哪怕有人和心理活动属于它，它也不可能自然产生任何义务。这可以从前面的论证中很明显地看出来。一个承诺产生一个新的义务，一个新的义务假设源自于新的情感。可是意志从来不会产生新的情感，因此，不可能自然地从承诺中产生义务，哪怕我们假设心灵能够陷入那种自愿产生义务的荒谬之中。

同样的事实，用证明正义一般情况下是一种人为德行的那种推理或许能够更清晰地进行论证。没有任何行为被要求成为我们的责任，除非在人类的本性中灌输某种适宜产生那种行为的具体的情感或者动机。这种动机不能是一种责任感。假设义务感是一种先行的义务：一个任何自然情感都不会要求做的行为，任何自然的义务不会对其提出要求，因为这种行为可能被忽略掉，却并不证明在我们的心灵和性情上有任何缺陷或不完美之处，所以也不会有任何罪恶。现在很明显，除了责任感，并没有动机促使我们去履行承诺。假如我们认为承诺不带有道德义务，我们就不会有任何履行它们的倾向。这不是自然的道德的德性。

人们天生是自私的，或者只具有有限的慷慨，因此人们并不容易被引导去为了陌生人的利益而做任何事情，除非是出于相互的利益，这种利益只有在履行这一行为之时才有希望获得。但是往往发生这样的事情，即这些共同行为无法同时完成，因此必然是一方保持不确定状态，而依赖于他方对其好心的感恩。而腐败的情况在人类中如此普遍，因此一般来说，这种保险系数很低。慈善者在此被假设为是出于私利才捐助别人，因此就消解了义务，而被树立成了一个自私的典型，便也造成了后者的忘恩负义。因此，假设我们顺从我们情感和意愿的自然方向的话，我们几乎不会从非利益的角度为他人谋利，因为我们本性中的善良与仁爱是很有限的。因此要不是出于利益考虑，我们应该很少会有这种举动，因为我们并不能指望别人的感恩。因此人们彼此之间以一定的方式互相交换良好帮助的情形就消失了，并且每个人都被迫凭借自己的技能和勤奋来为自己谋生存和幸福。那种关于稳定财产权的自然法的发明，已经使人们彼此可以相安无事，而在协定基础上的财产权和所有权的转移则使得人们可以互利互惠。但是哪怕这些法规是被严格遵守了的，也并不能使它们充分地适用于每个人，如它们本身所应成为的那样。尽管财产占有稳定了，但是倘若他们在某些方面所拥有的物品大大超过他们所需的，而同时在其他方面又得遭受物资匮乏的痛苦，那么财产稳定并没有带来多少好处。财产的转移能够弥补这一不便之处，但是也不能完全弥补，因为财产的转移只发生在眼前的、个别的对象之间，而不能发生在那些非眼前的、一般的对象上。一个人不能将二十里以外的一处某个特定房屋的财产权转让出去，因为这种双方同意并不伴有交付，而交付是一个先决条件。一个人也不能单凭言词和口头答允而转让十斛谷子和五桶酒的财产权，因为这些只是一般的概念，与一堆谷子或者一大桶酒没有任何直接的关系。除此之外，人类的交往也只限于物物交换，还可以扩展到服务以及活动上面，通过交换使我们双方获得利益和好处。

所有这些都是人类本性中自然的、天生的原则以及情感的结果，而且因为这些情感和原则都是不可更改的，所以我们也认为，我们依赖于此的行为肯定也是不可改变的，哪怕是道德家或者政治家想要改变我们，或出于公共利益而试图更改我们的日常生活方式也都是徒劳的。

我可能会对我所爱的人以及我所熟悉的人们提供很多无私的帮助，他们也会以同样的方式回馈我，不是出于其他目的而只是出于对我过去的帮助的报答。所以，为了区分那两种不同方式的交易，有利可图的和非利益的，人们就为前者发明了一种特定的语言形式，用以约束我们自己去履行各种行为。这种语言形式的组织就是我们所谓的承诺，也就是对人类有利可图的交易的一种认可。当一个人承诺了任何事情时，它事实上就表达了他履行这个承诺的决心。与之相伴随的是，借助这种语言形式，万一此人不履行的话，就会受到再也不被信任的惩罚。决心就是承诺所表达的自然的心理活动，但是假如在这种情况下，只有一个决心的话，承诺就只宣称我们先在的动机，而不会产生任何新的动机或者义务。承诺是人们的协定，它们创造了一种新的动机，因为经验告诉我们，人类的事务可以被处理得更有利于双方，假使在任何具体的事情上我们创立一些标识或符号用以给彼此以安全保证的话。这些符号被创立之后，哪个人使用它们，便很快就被他的利益所束缚着去执行他的约定，而且如果他拒绝履行他的承诺，他就不能指望再

很显然，单独意志并不能产生义务，义务必须用言词或者符号表达出来，以加强对人们的约束。此种表达一旦屈从于意志的表示，就很快成为承诺的主要部分。哪怕一个人暗地里背离了他的初衷，而无论从决心上还是从意志上都违背了他自己，他也不会因此而在语言上少受些束缚。

我们可以从暴力中得到关于承诺的起源的相同结论，暴力被认为对任何契约都是无效的，而且还将我们从义务中释放出来。这一原则证明承诺不具有自然义务，而只是为了社会的便利和利益起见而做出的人为设计。

被信任。

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第六节　对正义与非正义的进一步思考

现在我们已经粗略讨论过三个基本的自然法，即财产占有的稳定法则，在协议基础上的财产转移法则以及履行承诺法则。对这三个法则的严格遵循正是人类社会的和平和安全的基础；而在这些法则被忽视的地方，也就不存在人们之间建立起一种和谐交往关系的任何可能性。我们在此可停留片刻来回顾一下先前的推论，或许能够得出新的论据来证明那些法则尽管是必需的，却完全是人为的，是人类的发明，所以正义是一种人为的而不是自然的德性。

一、我将使用的第一条论据是源自正义的普遍定义。正义通常被定义为一种恒常的永久的意愿，即给每个人他所应得的东西。在这个定义中，类似权利和财产权之类的被假设为是独立于正义之外并且先于正义而存在的，并且哪怕人们从来不曾幻想过去践行这一德行，它们也已经存在了。

很显然，财产权并不被包括在对象的任何一个可被感知的性质之中。因为这些性质可能保持持续不变，而财产权则是变化的。因此，这一性质肯定是包含在与对象的某种关系之中的。但是这种关系并不是与外在的、非生物的物体的关系。因为这些物体也可能同样保持不变，而财产权是处于变化中的。因此这一性质必然包含在对象与理智的、理性的存在者的关系中。但是构成财产权实质的并不是一种外在的、有形的关系。因为那种关系也可能同样存在于非生物之间，或者与禽兽之间的关系等同，尽管如此，那些情况却并没有形成财产权。因此，财产权包含在某种内在关系之中，即包含于事物的外在关系对我们的心灵与行为所造成的影响之中。因此这种外在关系，即我们所谓的占有或者最初的所有权，并不被想象为是对物体的财产权，而仅仅是引起了财产权。现在显而易见的是，这种外在关系却没有在外在的物体间产生任何作用，而只是通过赋予我们一种义务感在我们的内心产生影响，这种义务感阻止我们获取那些物品，将它们留给最初的所有者。这些行为便是我们所谓的正义的恰当含义，因此财产的实质是依赖于德行而存在，而并非德行依赖财产权而存在。

二、在第二方面我们可以看到，所有的罪恶和正义都在不可察觉地互相渗透，且以不可察觉的程度互相接近，以至于纵然不是绝对不可能，也是难以确定什么时候这头终止，而什么时候那头开始。从这一论点我们可以引发新的论据来论证前面的原则。

因为无论一切罪恶和正义的情形如何，可以肯定的是，权力、义务和财产权都不会认可这样的不可察觉的差异，反倒认为人要么拥有充足和完全的财产，要么一无所有；同样，人要么完全按要求去履行任何行为，要么不具有任何义务感。义务和财产权完全建立在正义和非正义的基础之上，并跟随着它们的变动而变动。正义在哪里是完全的，财产权在哪里也是完全的；哪里的正义是不完全的，财产权必然也是不完全的。反之亦然，如果财产权并不认可那些变化，那么这些变化也肯定于正义不相配。因此，如果你赞同前面这个命题，并且断言，正义与非正义并没有很明显的差异，你事实上就是断言不存在善恶之分，因为善与恶，道德上的善恶，以及所有的自然品质都是不知不觉地相互渗透的，而且在很多情况下是无法区分的。

三、如果我们考察人类的日常行为会发现，心灵并不通过任何一般的或者普遍的原则来管束自己，在最多的情况下是出于眼前的动机和利益而行事。因为每个行为都是一种特殊的事件，必然起源于具体的原则，并且来源于我们直接的自身状况以及我们对宇宙其他事物的关注。如果在一些情况下，我们的动机延伸到了产生这些动机的恰当条件以外，并且形成了类似于我们行为的一般规则之类的东西，那么我们很容易就能观察到，这些规则并不是完全不可更改的，而是容许有诸多例外的。因此，这既然是人类行为的通常方式，我们就可以得出结论，普遍的和完全不可更改的正义法则绝不能来自自然，也不是任何自然的动机或倾向的直接产物。

综上所述，我们应当考虑到正义与非正义之间的区别有两个不同的基础：一个是出于利益，当人们发现如果他们不按照适当的规则约束他们自己的话，他们就不可能生活在这个社会中；另一是出于道德，利益一旦被观察到以后，人们看到那些对社会安宁有利的举动时就会感到快乐，而一看到相反的举动他们就会觉得不安。这是人类自愿的一种协定和人为的措施，它使得最初的利益得以诞生。因此，迄今为止，正义的法则被认为是人为的。当这些利益一旦建立和获得公认之后，就产生了自觉遵守那些规则的道德意识。不过，尽管确定以后，道德感还是被一种新的人为措施所增强，并且政治家们的公开说教、父母的私人教育，都促使我们在他人的财产面前严格自律的时候，滋生一种荣誉感和义务感。

第七节　政府的起源

因此，人类是如此虔诚地贪图他们的利益，他们的利益又是如此密切地与遵守正义有关，而这种利益又是如此确定并得到认可，那么有人或许会问：社会中怎么会有那么多骚乱？人类的本性中什么原则如此强烈以至于能压倒那种强烈情感，如此激烈而以至于遮蔽了如此清晰的一种认识？

我们在讨论情感的时候已经发现，人类非常容易被想像力所支配，而且在比例上，他们对任何对象的表面的感情要大大超过他们对对象真实的、内在的价值的感情。每个无论在空间上还是时间上接近我们的事物，都会以这样一种观念触动我们，即它在我们的意志和情感上所产生的相应的效果比那些离我们较远的，不大清晰的那些对象通常具有更强烈的力量。即使我们可能完全相信后者优于前者，但是我们却不会根据这一判断来约束自己的行为，而是屈从于我们情感的引导，情感则经常偏爱那些邻近的东西。

这就是为什么人类经常作出与他们既知的利益相背离的举动的原因，他们尤其偏爱那些眼前的蝇头小利，也不管社会秩序的维护，而这种秩序正式建立在遵守正义的基础之上。

所以，人类本性中的这种品质不仅对社会有害，而且乍一看是没有任何合适的纠正措施的。这一纠正措施只能来自人类的应允，如果人类不能使他们自己去选择较远的而舍弃近处的利益，那么他们就永远不会同意那些迫使他们做出这种选择的事，也不会同意以如此显著的方式与他们的自然原则以及习性相矛盾的事。

因此，唯一的困难在于寻找到一个权宜之计，这个方案能治愈他们天然的弱点，并使他们不得不遵守正义和公正的法则，哪怕他们本来强烈倾向于选择眼前之利。显然，这种纠正方案如果不能更正这种习性的话就永远也不会有效，而且我们不可能改变或者纠正我们本性中的任何重要方面，我们最能改变的也就是我们的环境和状况，使得对正义法则的遵守最切近我们自身的利益，而违背正义法则就会远离利益。但是，这对于全人类来说是不切实际的，只有在少数人中间才能发生，所以我们便对这些践行正义的少数人发生了直接的兴趣。这些人就是被我们叫做民政长官、国王的那些人以及他们的大臣、我们的长官和统治者。这些人与国家的大部分人无涉，在任何非正义的行为中都无利可图，或者也只有很微小的利益牵涉其中，并且他们对自己现有的状况和社会地位都感到满意，所以每一次对于正义的实施都会给他们直接的利益，因为这是维持社会所必需的。这就是市民政府以及社会的起源。无论是对于自身的还是他人的，人类都无法根治贪图眼前利益的那种狭隘心理。他们不可能改变他们的天性。他们所能做的就是改变他们的状况使得遵守正义成为某个具体的个体的直接利益，而破坏正义则使得这种利益极为微薄。因此，这些不但要求在他们自身的行为中遵循那些规则，而且还对他人进行规训使他们变得规矩，并且在整个社会中强加公正的命令。有必要的话，他们还可以使得他人在执行正义与自身利益之间发生更直接的关联，并且设置大量文武官员，让他们来协助统治。尽管组成政府的所有人也都具有人类的所有弱点，但是依靠一种最优良和最精细的可想象的发明，从某种程度上来说，就能成为一个超脱于所有弱点的组织。

第八节　忠顺的起源

我将进一步阐释，政府在它成立初期，很自然地被假设为是从那些自然法中获得约束力的，尤其是关于承诺履行的那些法则。当人们一旦意识到政府在维护和平、执行正义等方面的必要性时，他们自然就聚集起来，选出官员，确定权力，并且承诺服从他们。承诺在应用中被假设是一种契约和保证，并且伴随着一种道德义务，因此，它也被当作是政府的原始保证以及最初遵从义务的源头。如此推理看上去非常自然，以至于成为我们时髦的政治学体系的基础，并且在一定程度上成为了一个政党的纲领，这个政党还以他们哲学体系的健全和思想的自由为荣。所有人都认为，人们生来就是自由和平等的；政府和上级只能建立在大家同意的基础之上，这种应允建立了政府，就也强加给他们一种新的义务，这个义务在自然法中并没有规定。因此，人类被迫服从他们的长官只是因为他们承诺过，而如果他们不曾明确地给过言语承诺或者默许要保持忠顺，那么忠顺就不可能会成为他们道德义务的一部分。然而，这个结论倘若运用得太广，涵盖了迄今为止的所有时代和所有状况下的政府的话，就完全是错误的。我坚持，尽管忠顺的义务首先与承诺的义务有关，并且在一段时间内为那种义务感所支撑，它还是很快获得了自己的根基，并且获得了一种独立于任何协定之外的原始的约束力和权威。在我们作进一步思考之前，我们需要仔细地考察这一重要原则。

尽管正义原则能充分维持任何社会，但是人们却不会在这个广阔而圆滑的社会中自行遵守那些规则，于是他们建立政府，作为一种新的发明来达到他们的目的，并且通过更为严格地执行正义来维持旧的利益或获取新的利益。因此，迄今为止，我们作为公民的义务与我们自然的义务是相关联的，前者主要就是为了后者，而且政府的主要目标就是为了规训人们，使他们去遵守自然法则。然而，从这个方面来说，履行承诺的法则只能和其他法则一起，它的强制实施被认为是政府创建的一个结果，而不是作为一种承诺所产生的约束力所带来的一个服从政府的结果。我们作为公民的义务的目标虽然是在强调我们的自然义务的基础之上，但是首要（首要是指时间，而不是指地位和力量方面）动机，和产生这两种义务的动机，都只是个人私利。因为顺从政府和履行承诺具有各自不同的利益，所以我们也必须承认两者的义务也是有区别的。服从长官是维护社会秩序与和谐的先决条件，而履行承诺则是在日常生活中引起相互间的信任和信赖的先决条件。目的和手段是完全不同的，也不存在一个从属于另一个的情况。

总而言之，如果履行承诺有利可图，那么服从政府也是如此；如果前者的利益是普遍的，那么后者也是如此；如果一种利益是显著地得到公认的，那么另一种也同样如此。所以既然两种规则都是建立在相似的利益的约束力上的，它们就必然会有各自独特的权威所在，彼此独立。

但是不仅利益的自然约束力在承诺与忠顺中是各不相同的，而且荣誉感和良心的道德约束力在这两方面也是各不相同的：一方的意义与无意义并不依赖于另一方。顺从政府的义务并不是源自于国民的任何承诺。

我们发现，长官们不但不把他们的权威以及国民们服从的义务的起源建立在承诺或者原始协定的基础上，还尽可能在他们的国民，特别是普通民众面前隐藏它们的源头。假如这是政府的依据，我们的统治者是不会默然接受的，最多也只是假装默然接受，因为被默然地和不可察觉地给予的承诺对人类所能产生的影响显然是无法与公开表达出来的承诺相比的。一个默许的承诺就是指不使用语言而使用其他含糊的符号来象征的一种意志，但是这种意志即使是无声的，它在被运用时也是不会被人所忽视的。但是假如你问一个国家中的大多数人，他们是否同意他们的统治者所具有的权力，或者曾经承诺效忠于他们，他们很有可能会认为你很奇怪，并且很肯定地回答，这种事不是因他们的同意而做成的，相反，他们是生来就要这样服从的。

我们还可以进一步说，一个生活在专制政府统治之下的人应当不会对政府怀有忠顺之心，因为，很自然，这个政府并不是建立在同意的基础之上的。但是这既然也是一个自然和普通的政府，与其他政府一样，它势必要强加某种义务，而我们从经验中可以很清楚地看到，受这个政府统治的人们也一直这么想。这是一个显著的证据，证明我们通常并不认为我们的忠顺来自于我们的应允或者承诺。

第九节　论忠顺的限度

那些把承诺或者契约看作是我们对政府忠顺之心的源头的那些政治文人试图建立一套规则，这是完全正确的也是合理的，尽管他们的推论，即规则所赖以建立的基础是荒谬和牵强的。他们试图证明，我们顺从政府但是允许有例外存在，如果统治者十分残暴的话，就完全有理由让国民们从所有的忠顺的束缚之下解放出来。因为人们出于自愿参与社会并使他们自身服从于政府意味着他们必然看到了他们将来从社会中所能获得的利益，为此他们甘愿放弃他们天生的自由。因此，官员们必须要缔结某种相互的协定，即一种保障和担保。只有通过给予公众一些希望让他们相信能得到这些利益，他才能说服人们顺从于他。但是，当人们遭到的是暴政和压迫，而不是保障和安全时，他们就不再受到他们的承诺的制约（如所有有条件的契约一样）了，并且又回归一种自由状态，即政府创立之前的那种状态。人类不会愚蠢到与他人缔结完全是对他人有利的协定，而丝毫不考虑改善自身条件的地步。任何人如果试图从我们对他的服从中得到任何好处，就必然要保证我们也从他的权威中得到某种好处，无论是明确表达出来的还是默许的。他不能指望，当他没有做到他应该做的事时，我们还能继续顺从于他。

如果说利益首先产生了对政府的服从，那么在任何范围内，在众多情况下，当这种利益终止时，这种服从的义务也必然会终止。

第十节　论忠顺的对象

通常原则要求我们服从，但是只有在严重的专制与压迫下，才会有例外发生。既然我们对行政长官普遍盲目服从，那么接下来的问题便是，我们应该服从谁？我们该把谁作为我们法定的行政长官？政府来自于人类的自愿协定，而且显然同样的协定也决定了由谁来统治我们，并且在此问题上扫除了一切疑惑和含糊之处。倘若行政长官的权力首先建立在国民承诺服从政府的基础之上，就像其他任何契约或协定一样，人们的自愿协定肯定能具有更高的效力，所以，同一个承诺既迫使人们服从于此也使他们自己为一个特定的人所束缚，并且使其成为他们效忠的对象。

我认为作为行政长官的权力基础的第一个原则就是毫无例外地赋予世界上所有已创立的政府以权威的那个原则：我所说的就是任何一种政府形式的长期占有，或者说就是王位继承制度。当没有一种政府形式确立为长期占有时，现时的占有便充分取代了它的位置，并被作为所有公共权力的第二个来源。政府权可以被认为是君主权利的第三个来源。征服权与现时占有很相似，但是它具有较强的力量，这种力量被我们归于征服者的那种光辉和荣耀所支撑着，这种力量代替了我们对掠夺者的仇恨和厌恶之情。当既没有长期占有，也不存在现时占有，也无征服之事发生之时，如当开国君主逝世时，在那种情况下，继承权便自然派上用场，人们通常也乐得让国王的儿子继承王位，并且假定他沿袭了他父亲的权威。

这让我们去思考权力的第五个来源，即成文法，这发生在当立法机构建立了政府的一种确定形式和王位继承制度之时。乍一看，人们可能会认为这必定分布于先前的各个确立权威的主题之中。成文法来自于立法权，而立法权必然是建立于原始契约、长期占有、现时占有、征服以及继承之上，所以成文法的力量来自于其他几个原则。但是显而易见的是，尽管成文法的力量只能从这些原则中获得，但是它却没有从中获得全部力量，而是在转移过程中丧失了相当一部分，这自然是可以想象的。

第三章　论其他的德行和罪恶

第一节　自然的德行和罪恶的起源

我们现在来检验的完全是自然的德行和罪恶，而不是那些人为的设计和措施。我们将以这番考察来结束这个道德学体系。

同情是我们对于所有人为的德行存有尊重的源头。

因此我们可以发现，同情是人性中一条十分有力的原则，它对我们的审美品味具有巨大的影响，而且还在所有的人为德行中产生了我们的道德感。我们可以由此假定，它还引发很多其他的德行，而且那些品质之所以获得我们的赞美，是因为它们的意图是对人类有利的。这一假定可以在这种情况下得到确定，当我们发现我们理所当然赞许的绝大多数品质确实都有这种意图，而且使具有这种品质的人成为社会的有用成员。而那些我们当然不赞同的品质就具有相反的意图，并且使得任何与这个人的交往行为都变得危险和不顺心。

但是尽管德行与罪恶的区别可能来自于某种特定的性质对我们或者对他人产生的直接的愉悦和不快，我们也很容易发现，区别还在相当大的程度上建立在我们一贯强调的同情原则之上。如果一个人拥有的品质使得别人在与他交往时能立刻得到愉悦，那么哪怕我们自己还没有得到快乐，我们也会赞赏他。如果一个人拥有那种使自己能愉悦的品质，即使这种品质对人类无任何作用，我们还是会对他表示赞赏。

因此，让我们总结性地回顾一下现在的假设：心灵中被称为善良的各个品质，单纯地浏览一下便能给人以愉悦；而任何品质，只要产生痛苦，就被称为恶行。这种愉悦和痛苦可能来自四个源头。当我们着眼于以下品质时，我们都能获得快乐，这四种品质分别是：天然对他人有用，或者对他自己有利，或对他人来说是愉悦的，或他自己是愉悦的。或许有人会感到惊讶，在所有这些利益与愉悦感之中，我们居然忘记了在任何场合下最切近地触动我的我们自身的利益与愉悦。但是我们很容易就在这个问题上解答得使自己满意，当我们考虑到：每个具体的人的利益与愉悦感都是不同的，所以不可能所有人在情感和判断上达成一致，除非他们选择共同的立场，由这个立场出发去考察他们的目标，这样才可能看起来一致。在我们判断一个人的品质的时候，只有利益或快乐对每个考察者来说都是同等的，对被考察者来说是如此，对与其交往的人们来说也同样如此。尽管这种利益与快乐打动我们的程度比起我们自身利益与快乐来较为微弱，但是却更持久和普遍，甚至在实践中与后者相冲突，但我们在思考中还是只认可它是德行和道德的唯一标准。只有它们才产生了作为道德准则基础的独特感觉和情感。

第二节　论心灵的伟大

当我们把视线从日常生活和交流转移到历史上来时，我们会发现，所有为人类所赞赏的这些伟大的行为和情感只是建立在骄傲和自尊之上的。

一般而言，被我们称为英雄德行，并且为我们所赞赏的那种伟大和高尚的心灵品质，其实只是一种坚定和牢固的骄傲与自尊而已，或者是大量地掺杂了这种情感的。勇气、野心、热爱荣誉、胸怀以及所有其他类似的光辉品德，都在其中混杂着强烈的自尊心，并且由此而获得大部分的意义。我可以满足于退一步说，这个世界自然会尊重一种有节制的骄傲，它可以暗中激发我们的行为，而不是那种傲慢的恶言恶语，以至于触犯到他人的虚荣心。

骄傲和自尊的价值来自两个条件，即它的有用性和它给我们带来的愉悦感。借此我们得以经营我们的事业，并且同时立即使我们自己得到满足。但当它超出适当的限度之后，就失去了最重要的优点，甚至变成有害的，正是由于这个原因，我们要谴责一种过度的骄傲和野心，无论它们是被高雅的教养还是礼仪所规训。但是这样的情感仍然是令人愉快的，并且传递出了一种自豪感和崇高感给那些为其所鼓动的人，于是，人们对这种满足感的同情就大大减少了对它给行为举止带来的那种危险影响的责备。由此我们可以发现，那种过度的勇气和豪情，特别是在形势危急的情况下表现出来的，在很大程度上，我们会把它作为一个英雄的特征，并且使得这个人成为后来者的崇敬对象；同时，也正是这种过度的勇气破坏了他的事业，使他陷入一种他本不应该会有的危险和困难之地。

英雄主义或者军事荣耀，大多为一般人所敬仰。他们将其视为最高尚的价值。会冷静思考的人不会如此热衷于对此表示赞赏。在他们眼中，英雄主义所带来的无穷的混乱和无秩序很大程度上减少了它的价值。当他们要反对在这个问题上的普遍观点的时候，他们经常描绘出一幅由这种所谓的德行所产生的不幸景象：帝国颠覆，地方毁坏，城市遭到抢。当这些展现在我们眼前时，我们就会倾向于厌恶英雄的这种野心，而超过对它的崇拜。但是当我们着眼于这场灾难的制作者时，我们又发现他的性格中有着某种闪光的东西，使得我们一想到就很受鼓舞，就又不由自主地崇拜起来。我们由于它所带来的对社会的危害而感到的那种痛苦，就很快被一种更为强烈和直接的谅解所压倒了。

第三节　论善良和仁慈

我们已经解释了人类的情感中所谓伟大的部分所引起的称赞和赞许的由来，现在我们要继续阐明情感的善良性质，并追溯其价值的由来。

一旦经验告诉我们关于人情世故的充分知识，告诉我们人类情感的比例分配时，我们就领会到，人类的慷慨是有限的，很少扩展到他们的亲人朋友之外，至多到国家为止。了解了这样的人性之后，我们就不会对他抱有那种不可能的期望，而是将我们的视线局限在很小的范围内，也就是那个人的活动范围，以便对他的道德品质形成判断。当他情感的自然倾向促使他对其周围有利和有用时，我们通过感受到与其有特殊联系的那些人的情绪而赞赏他的品质，并热爱他这个人。在这个判断中，我们很快就迫使我们忘掉了自己的利益，因为我们在社会以及交往中面临着永恒的矛盾，这些矛盾发生在我们跟那些不是处在同一环境中、不具有相同利益的人之间。唯有当我们考虑到每种感情对那些与拥有这种情感的人有直接关系和交流的那些人的好处与坏处时，我们的情感与他人的情感才会汇聚成唯一的交点，即达成一致。尽管这种好处或者害处往往对我们来说很遥远，但是有时也会很贴近我们，并且通过同情而强烈地影响我们。我们很快将这种关切延伸到其他类似事件上，而当这些事离我们非常遥远时，我们的同情就相应地较为微弱，而且我们的赞赏或者责备也相对比较虚弱和不确定。此处的情况与我们对外在事物的判断是一样的。所有的对象都因为距离的缘故而显得微弱：尽管事物呈现在我们面前的表层是我们判断它们的最初标准所在，但这并不意味着，它们真的由于距离的作用而变得微不足道了；我们根据反思更正这种表象，以此达到一种更为持久和确定的判断。同样的道理，尽管同情比起我们对自身的关切来说较为微弱，并且对远离我们的人的同情比起对近处的人的同情也要更为弱些，但是在我们对于他们的品德的冷静判断中，这些差别都是被忽略的。除此之外，我们自己也在不断调整自己的状况，因为我们每天要面对与我们处于不同环境中的人，倘若我们始终保持在特定的状况并且用一种特定的不变视点的话——这种视点只为我们所特有——我们就永远无法与那些人在理性的基础上达成任何共识。因此，在社会交往中，情感的交流促使我们形成了一条一般不可更改的标准，根据这条标准，我们可以表示对人们性格和态度的赞赏或者不赞赏。尽管我们内心并不会一直支持一般观念，或根据它来调整自己的爱恨，但是这些观念对交流来说还是绰绰有余的，并且在交流中、在讲台上、在剧院里，以及在学校都能充分达到我们的目的。

从这些原则我们很容易就能解释下列性质，慷慨、仁慈、同情、感恩、友情、忠诚、热情、无私、大方以及其他一些构成善良和仁慈的性格的其他一些品质。能使人产生温柔情感的倾向会使一个人在他人生的所有阶段都是令人愉快并且有用的，还给他的其他本有可能对社会有害的品质以正确的引导。

爱对那些被爱驱使的人来说，能使他们直接感到愉悦，而恨则立即使他们感到不快。这可能就是我们之所以赞扬所有具有爱的成分的情感，而谴责所有那些包括了大量恨的成分在内的情感的原因之所在。

第四节　论自然才能

自然才能受到尊重的主要原因在于它们有一种对它的所有者有用的倾向。倘若没有经过精明和谨慎的指导，我们就不可能成功地完成一个计划；我们也不可能单凭善良的意图就使得我们的事业获得一个很好的局面。人类高于动物最重要的地方就在于理性的优越，而且同样的才能其程度差别造成了人与人之间的巨大差异。而技术带来的种种好处也要归功于人类的理性；只要命运不是变化无常的，人类利益的绝大部分肯定掌握在精明和有远见的人手中。

心灵还有许多其他品质，它们的价值也来自同一个源头。勤劳、坚持、耐心、积极、警觉、努力、恒心，还有很多其他类似很容易被回忆起来的品德，它们被尊重并非出于其他什么原因，而是因为它们有利于安顿我们的生活。同样，节制、节俭、节省、决心都是如此；而相反，浪费、奢侈、犹豫不决、无常等都是恶劣的，因为它们会毁灭我们，使我们无力从事我们的事业。

智慧和良好的见识是有价值的，因为它们对其所有者来说是有用的；才智和口才也同样具有价值，因为它们能直接带给他人愉悦。

从这一角度来看，清洁也可以被认为是一种德行，因为它当然能使我们变得令人愉快，而且是爱和好感的一个相当重要的源头。

一种品质与年龄、性格或地位密切相关的得体和不得体也会给它带来赞赏或者责备。在很大程度上，这种得体的举止建立在经验的基础上。

在我们的灵魂中，比起其他官能来有一种官能对性格的塑造作用最弱，尽管它自身可容纳诸多不同的程度，但是不论其程度高低都几乎无善恶之分，这一官能就是记忆。

在我结束自然才能这个话题以前必须要强调，我们对于这些自然才能的尊重和热爱的一个原因可能是这些才能赋予它们的拥有者以重要性和份量。一个人在他的生活中因此而变得重要起来。他的决心和行为影响了更多的后继者。他的友情和敌意都变得至关重要。我们很容易发现，那个人要在某个方面高于其他人，他一定会在我们中间激发尊重和钦佩的情感。任何重要的东西都吸引着我们的注意力，支配着我们的思想，让我们思考起来也带着满足感。这个理论解释了为什么我们会对那些具有杰出才能的人抱有尊重和敬意。

第五节　对自然才能的一些进一步思考

在论述情感时我们已经发现，骄傲和谦卑，爱和恨都是由我们的心灵、身体或财富的优势和劣势所引起的；这些优势或劣势会有那样的效果是由于产生了一个独特的印象，即痛苦或者愉悦。这种从对任何行为或者心灵品质的一般考察或观点而来的痛苦和愉悦构成了善恶，并且引起了我们的赞赏或谴责，这种赞赏或谴责其实只是一种更加微弱和不易察觉的爱与恨。我们已经给这种痛苦和愉悦指定了四个不同的源头，并且为了更充分地证明这个假设，我们在此需要指出，身体和财富的优势和劣势以同一个原则产生了痛苦和愉悦。任何对象具有对它的拥有者以及他人有用的倾向，以及给它的所有者以及他人带来一种愉悦的倾向，那么这些条件就会给那个对此进行考察并决定对其进行热爱和赞誉的人也带来直接的愉悦。

先从身体的优势开始谈起：一般情况下，那些被我们称为是女人的好郎君的男人是那些以性爱能力而著称，或是其身体能够表现出在那一方面过人本领的人，他们受到女性的欢迎，甚至连那些由于淑德而阻碍了她们获得这种享受的女人们也对他们怀有好感。这就很显然，这人所具有的这种更够给女人带来享受的能力，正是他在女性中间获得爱和尊重的真正原因。

我们能从我们的身体优势中获得愉悦的另一个原因在于它们对其拥有者来说是有用的。显然，人类和其他动物之美的很大部分在于他的各部分以一种合适的结构构成，就像我们经验所见的那样，既强壮又活泼，能够驱使生物做各种表演和练习。宽肩、平坦的腹部、粗实的关节、细长的小腿，所有这些在人类看来都是美丽的，因为它们象征着力量和活力，这些优势自然是能引起我们共鸣的，它们由此将它们产生于其拥有者的那种满足感也传给了旁观者。

到此为止我们所说的是身体的各个特征所具有的适用性。如果要考虑一种直接的愉悦，当然，一种健康的外表，与强壮和活力一样，是构成美的重要部分。而他人病态的外表总是令人不愉快的，因为它给我们带来的是一种痛苦和不安的观念。

财富的优势又是如何以同样的原则获得尊重和敬仰的呢？我们可以通过回忆前面关于这个问题的推论来回答。我们已经发现，我们对那些拥有财富优势的人的敬仰归结到底有三个原因：第一，有钱人给我们带来的直接愉悦在于我们看到了他所拥有的漂亮的服饰、陈设、花园和房子；第二，我们希望依靠他的慷慨和大方从他那里获得好处；第三，他本人从他的财产中获得愉悦和优越感，并且这种感觉引起我们一种共同的愉快。我的假设是选择第三条而不要其他两条，且将我们对富人的尊重归结为一种对他们从他们的财产中获得的愉悦感和优越感的一种感同身受。因为其他两个原则如果没有同情的话就无法发挥作用到如此程度，也不能涵盖所有的现象。我们选择一种直接和即刻的同情，比我们选择遥远和间接的同情要自然得多。除此之外还可以补充一点，当财富和权力非常强大，并使得拥有它们的这个人在世界上显得非常重要的时候，我们对他的尊重部分就归结于三个原因以外的另一个源头，即根据它们所可能造成的结果的前景的多样性以及其重要性来引起心灵对它们的关注，尽管如此，为了说明这条原则的作用，我们必然还是要求助于同情，正如我们在前面的章节中已经发现的那样。

第六节　本卷的结论

总而言之，我希望，这个伦理体系不再需要精确的证明。我们可以肯定，同情是人类本性中一种非常有力的原则。我们还可以肯定，同情同样对我们的审美能力有着巨大的影响，当我们欣赏外物时，就像我们在进行道德判断一样。我们发现，单凭同情而无需其他任何原则协作，就具有了足够的力量可以赋予我们强烈的赞美之情；同样，正义、忠诚、贞操以及礼貌等方面也都是如此。我们可以断言，所有促使同情发生的先决条件都可以在大多数的德行中找到，这些德行绝大多数都具有有利于社会或者有利于其所有者的那种倾向。如果我们比较所有这些条件，我们将肯定，同情是道德准则的首要来源，尤其是当我们考虑到，对这个假设的反对意见如果在一种情况下无法成立的话，那么它也就不能扩展到所有情况。正义当然受到拥护，这不是由于其他原因，而是因为它具有对公众有利的倾向；而公共利益对我们来说是毫无关系的，除非我们对它产生了同情。我们可以假设其他一些德行受到尊重，也是因为它们具有类似的公益倾向。那些德行的价值在于我们对从中获取好处的人有一种共通的感受，就像具有对其拥有者有利的德行，也正是由于我们的这种感受而获得了价值。

所有热爱德行的人（无论我们在现实中多么堕落，我们在臆想中都是这样的人）肯定会很高兴看到道德准则起源于如此高尚的一个源头，这个源头使我们对人类本性中的慷慨和才能有了一个正确的认识。只需要对人事略微有所了解，我们就会明白，道德感是我们内心一个固有的原则，并且是构成我们心灵的最强有力的原则之一。